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Abstract 
Despite their long presence in Britain, Muslims often continue to be portrayed as 
an ‘alien wedge’ or even the ‘enemy within’; 'the other' that simply cannot be 
assimilated. These discourses need to be interrogated, not least since they create 
communitarian walls rather than multicultural bridges.  
Muslims, like members of other groups, refer to norms other than those made or 
accepted by the state: norms that have a personal or ethnic rather than 
territorial validity; a situation that I call internormativity. Methodologically, this 
requires us to consider not only how state agencies but also Muslims on the 
ground are coping with diverse norms. This study finds and records a variety of 
responses. Depending on the issue, domain, as well as other dimensions of 
difference, Muslims may cut out, bypass, stitch together, or create anew to deal 
with the accidents and diseases of multiculturalism.  For this reason I call them 
cultural surgeons, and the art of decision-making or management of diversity as 
cultural surgery. In contrast, the state has struggled to cope and embrace 
diversity.  
Through primary and a lot of secondary research, including analysis of case law 
and legislation, mainly focusing on family law matters, and in particular the 
institution of marriage and use of shari‘a councils which have become 
particularly contested sites in recent years, this study examines how Muslims 
and the state is coping with internormativity.  
The study has three main objectives. First, focusing on the content of English law, 
to examine how far it has adapted to accommodate the beliefs of Muslims and 
their way of life. The concern primarily is to see whether, and to what extent, 
English law either explicitly or tacitly recognises ‘Muslim laws’. Second, where 
this is not the case what has been the response of Muslims to such non-
recognition? The study records strategies and tactics by which this community, 
and its individuals, have sought to deal with the challenges raised by the 
presence of conflict between differing, overlapping, normative orders. Thirdly, to 
obtain a fuller understanding of the decisions Muslims are making when it comes 
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to marriage solemnisation, in-depth qualitative interviews with 59 Muslims were 
conducted, to draw out the sample’s motivations. It is the ‘voice’ and experiences 
of individuals that the research also seeks to bring out. In particular, we 
interrogate the impact that personal, ethnic, and territorial norms are having on 
their decisions, as well as to draw out other explanatory factors. Having adopted 
the actor as the point where all normative orders ‘converge’, and having outlined 
how individuals have creatively responded, the study suggests that this be the 
vantage point from which to look at the possible reconfiguration of the state’s 
legal system. The study concludes by making some recommendations on how the 
state in particular can manage diversity more effectively.  
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Glossary 
adat  custom; tradition; law (a word with 
multiple uses and meanings) 
agunah  ‘an anchored or chained woman’. A 
woman tied to a defunct marriage 
because her husband is unable or 
unwilling to release her by granting her a 
gett (a divorce document in Jewish law) 
al-‘amal  actions 
al-i’tiqaad  belief 
al-qawa‘id al-fiqhiyyah  Islamic legal maxims 
al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ  ‘righteous or pious predecessors’ 
anand karaj  Sikh marriage ceremony  
‘aql  intellect 
                   Barelvi  a Sunni sect/revivalist movement within 
the Hanafi school of jurisprudence 
           be-izzeti  dishonour or shaming  
         bida‘ah  heretical innovation 
biraderi  various, clan, kinship, tribe 
dār al-harb  the abode or territory of war 
dār al-Islām  the territory or abode of Islam 
darura  necessity 
daʿwah  call or invite people to Islam 
deen  complete way of life 
Deobandi  a Sunni sect/revivalist movement within 
Hanafi school of jurisprudence 
dhabiha  prescribed method of ritual slaughter of 
animals making the food halal 
dhirar  harm  
dochakuka  global localisation 
düğün  wedding feast 
fardh  obligatory 
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fasakh  annulment (judicial recission) 
fatwa  legal ruling/a scholarly opinion 
                                   fiqh  understanding 
fiqh al aqalliyyāt  fiqh for Muslim minorities 
fiqh al-muwazanat  doctrine of balance 
fiqh al-awlawiyyat  doctrine of priorities 
firqah  sect 
fuqaha‘  jurists 
 ummah  community/global brotherhood of Islam  
got, qom, patti,                     
tabbar 
various, descent group 
family  
gurdwara  a Sikh place of worship  
hajah  need 
hajj  pilgrimage to mecca 
halakhah  collective body Jewish laws  
halal  permissible 
       Hanafi fiqh  one of the four Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence  
               Hanbali fiqh  one of the four Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence 
                haraam  prohibited  
heer  custom 
hijrah  emigrate 
ibadat  worship 
ijmā  consensus or agreement of the Muslim 
community 
ijtihād  striving or exerting 
ikhtilaf  difference of opinion 
    ikrah  duress 
ilm-ul-ghaib  knowledge of the unseen 
izzet  various, honour, status, prestige  
 Jamat-e-Islami  Islamic political organisation and social 
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conservative movement founded by Abul 
Ala Maududi 
jihad  ‘struggle’ 
                                  jilbab  loose outer garment worn by females 
which covers the whole body 
khat  stimulant plant native to the Horn of 
Africa 
khul‘a  a release for payment from the wife/ 
right of wife to divorce her husband  
madhhab  school of thought within Islamic 
jurisprudence  
mafqood al-khabr  missing husband  
mahdi  guided one/awaited messiah  
mahr  dower or ‘nuptial gift’ 
makrooh  discouraged 
                           mal  wealth or property 
Maliki fiqh  one of the four Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence  
                  mamzeret  illegitimate female offspring 
                             maqasid al-shari‘a  goals/purposes of shari‘a 
maslaha  public interest  
mu`amalat  dealings and transactions between 
people 
mubah  neutral 
mufti  an expert on religious law 
 mujtihad 
muqallid 
 Islamic scholar who engages in ijtihad  
One who follows a mujtahid  
mustahabb  recommended 
muwatanah  citizenship 
nafs  various, soul, ego, self  
nasl  offspring  
neo-ijtihad  ‘new reasoning’ 
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nikah  Muslim marriage cermony 
niqab  veil covering face except the eyes 
nur  a divine light 
pardeshi rewaj  foreign custom  
pirs  Sufi master/spiritual guides 
qadi  Islamic judge 
qanun wad‘i  laws made by man 
qiyās  analogical reasoning 
qur‘an  Islamic holy book  
                            riba al-qarud  usury involving loans 
rivaj  everyday notions of familial, kinship or 
customary norms 
                                 ṣaḥāba  the generation of the Prophet of Islam 
and his Companions 
salat  prayer  
sarva dharma sambhava  equality of religions and equal respect for 
religions 
sawāb  reward 
sawm  fasting 
Shafi’i fiqh                   one of the four Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence 
shahadah  declaration that professes belief in the 
oneness of God, one of the five pillars of 
Islam 
sharam  various, shame, embarrassment 
shari‘a  various, way of life or more narrowly 
Islamic law  
siyāsah  government, policy 
sunnah  the sayings, deeds and teachings of the 
Prophet Muhammad  
Sunni   follower of one of the two main branches 
of Islam 
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tābi‘īn  the generation that followed the Prophet 
and his Companions 
tābi‘īn al-tābi‘īn  and their successors 
tadrîj  principle of gradualism 
tahsinat  improvements 
takhayyur  selection 
talaq nama  divorce certificate 
talaq-i-tafwid/’esma’  a delegated right of divorce from the 
husband to the wife 
talfiq  amalgamation 
taqlid  ‘to follow’ past legal rulings 
taysir  facilitate 
quam  community  
ulema  body of Muslim scholars  
ummat wasat  a middle nation 
urf  various, custom, law  
usul al-fiqh  ‘the roots of law’, or ‘principles of 
understanding’ 
vivah  Hindu marriage ceremony 
wa Allahu a‘lam  and Allah knows best 
al-wala' wa-l-bara  loyalty and disavowal 
wali  marriage guardian 
wasaýiyya  moderation; the middle path 
zakat  charity or alms giving 
zat  caste, tribe 
zina  illicit sexual relations 
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Introduction 
1.1 The challenge of normative and legal plurality: The need to make 
decisions 
Some important inroads are being made by the new academic and policy interest 
in ‘super-diversity’ and its implications (Vertovec 2007, 2010). The transition 
from ‘diversity’ to ‘super-diversity’ is forcing us to rethink some of the most basic 
concepts in social science – notions such as community, identity, and indeed 
citizenship (Blommaert 2013). Today’s super-diversity is not just about more 
countries of origin, ethnic identities, languages and religions. At the heart of the 
concept is the recognition that there are yet additional (im)migrant 1 
characteristics, (for example an immigrant’s channel of migration, transnational 
linkages, legal status and socio-economic profile), that require close examination 
since they affect every day social life, interactions and integration. Few scholars, 
to date, have recognised ‘legal consciousness’ (the understandings and meanings 
of law circulating in social relations), 2 as an additional immigrant characteristic, 
and how the processes of migration, globalisations, 3  localisation, 4  and 
                                                          
1 There are alternative positions on whether EU citizens ought to be classified as immigrants or simply 
migrants. The position adopted reveals the attitude the user has about the relationship between Britain 
and the European Union.  
2 Broadly speaking ‘legal consciousness refers to what people do as well as say about law. It is understood 
to be part of a reciprocal process in which the meanings given by individuals to their world become 
patterned, stabilised, and objectified (Silbey 2008: 695). ‘[T]he study of legal consciousness traces the 
ways in which law is experienced and interpreted by specific individuals as they engage, avoid, or resist 
the law and legal meanings’ (ibid). For details see Silbey (2008). 
3 Though not having the same meaning for everyone, globalisation pre-eminently involves tendencies 
(however interpreted) towards transnational similarity or homogeneity by unifying economic, social 
arrangements, institutions and values (Cotterrell 2002: 43). Contrary to the usual thought of globalisation 
as a single process, involving the spread of Western’ influence, open markets and human rights, there are 
a number of globalisations going on in our postmodern era. In a race to globalise, Glenn (2004: 51) 
identifies three main candidates: the West, Islam and Asia. In management circles, Western techniques of 
management and organisation are being replaced by those from Asia: see in particular, Kaplinsky & 
Posthuma (1994). Adding further complexity to the macro phenomena is the view that globalisation 
intertwines with local considerations, resulting in ‘glocalisation’. To the extent that the ties and influences 
of globalisation are selected, processed and consumed according to the interacting local culture’s needs, 
21 
 
synchronous technological advancements,5 are contributing to normative and 
legal plurality in Britain, and elsewhere in Europe.6  
Immigrants in a new country of residence, whether or not they have acquired 
citizenship, may refer to a number of (legal) norms deriving from numerous 
sources: norms that have a personal or ethnic, rather than territorial, validity. 
The (legal) norms (or dispute-resolution mechanisms) in question might be only 
single norms or mechanisms, or part of a whole normative ordering that they 
have brought over with them. In the new country of residence these norms might 
take on an entirely new significance in the life of the ‘minority’,7 and may 
successfully pass on to the next generation. Their personal or ethnic norms may 
not necessarily be recognised by the sovereigntist nation state’s legal system, 8 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
taste and social structure (Robertson 1995). The term glocalization was popularised in the anglophone-
world by the sociologist Roland Robertson. The word and idea came from the Japanese word dochakuka, 
which means global localisation. Originally referring to a way of adapting farming techniques to local 
conditions, dochakuka evolved into a marketing strategy when Japanese businessmen adopted it in the 
1980s. 
4  In contrast to globalisation the apparently contradictory process of localisation involves 
counter-tendencies (of whatever kind) towards appreciating difference by creating, preserving, or 
rediscovering conditions in which difference, diversity and autonomy of groups, nations or territories can 
flourish and be respected (Cotterrell 2002: 43). 
5One can, in particular, point to air travel, the internet and the rapid growth of the mobile phone network. 
Diaspora communities in particular have been able to create ‘network societies’ (Castells 1996) in which 
members can live and act in relation to long-distance ‘virtual’ peers, in sometimes enormous online 
communities.  
6 By legal plurality I mean the factual state of affairs, within any population, where behaviour pursuant to 
more than one legal order occurs. By using the term legal plurality rather than legal pluralism I 
acknowledge the difference between fact and value. Often scholars unhelpfully mix the factual or 
empirical reality of legal diversity or difference on the one hand, and normative commitment to pluralism, 
on the other. As I see it, pluralism refers to an attitude, value system, ideology, processes that see the 
realities of diversity and difference as a positive, and is ready to translate them into sustainable goals, 
whether they are social cohesion, national integration, political stability, economic development and so 
on.  
7 When thinking about minorities it is important to note that it is not a numbers game rather it is more 
about power relations. The lack of power is not dependent on, but is usually exacerbated by, how small 
the minority group is. In some circumstances the ‘minority’ may have become the ‘majority’ in local 
contexts. A case in point is the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, where Islam is the largest religion 
followed by Christianity in terms of adherents, and the ‘Bangladeshi’ population is the largest ‘ethnic’ 
group followed closely by ‘White British’ (2011 Census). For a useful discussion of how groups 
irrespective of their number can be legal or ideological minorities see Asad (2003).  
8 Subject to specific conditions recognised under private international law (also often referred to as 
conflict of laws).  
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but they can be equally, if not more so, authoritative in compelling behaviour. In 
the new socio-legal environment migrants also become aware of host norms, 
including the sub-species of legal norms administered by the state’s legal system. 
They realise that not all norms and values are shared. In fact, some personal or 
ethnic norms may be diametrically opposed to those of the majority and of the 
legal system. But stable residence in the new country means actively coping with 
diverse norms.  
The interplay of different (legal) norms is resulting in complex, and sometimes 
unexpected, outcomes. Methodologically, this requires attention to be focused 
not only upon how courts and other official agencies cope with diverse norms, 
but also upon how actors ‘on the ground’ are dealing with the fact that they find 
themselves, or their act, subject to multiple normative orderings that overlap 
and may conflict. The Japanese jurist Masaji Chiba (1998: 228-45) referred to 
this situation as ‘legal pluralism in conflict’ and when we take an actor’s 
perspective as legal ‘pluralism in subjectivity’. Santos (2002: 347) has described 
interlegality, namely that our legal life is constituted by an intersection of 
different porous legal orders, which lead us to constant transitions and 
trespassing, as a feature of postmodernity.  
Not all norms or values of different orderings are antagonistic or incompatible 
however, as is sometimes sensationally reported. It is the individual, moreover, 
who chooses (actively or passively) the norms in his or her life. On a daily basis 
actors are engaged with deciding which norm(s) they will adopt and abide by – 
they cannot sit on the fence, and yet surprisingly, little academic attention to 
date has been paid to cultural navigation or what I call ‘cultural surgery’ in the 
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context of law. I like to think of individuals who find themselves or their act 
subjective to multiple and overlapping traditions as cultural surgeons and their 
specialism as cultural surgery. 
By cultural surgery I mean the specialism of actively coping with diverse norms. 
From becoming aware of norms to deciding how one is going to confront them.  
So we are focusing our attention on whether a cultural surgeon will cut out, 
stitch together, bypass, or create anew when dealing with multiculturalism’s 
diseases and accidents. In other words, the process of coping with diverse norms 
can take different forms, such as conforming to, creatively and subtly reforming, 
combining, 9 or creating anew, or openly rebelling against norms. Accordingly, 
norms (and at a different level – identities) are continuously being changed, or 
face challenge, and in the shadow of seemingly dominant norms, other norms are 
followed, applied and implemented. Having made their decision, individuals 
model their behaviour in compliance to their choice.  Besides being under-
studied cultural surgery is a complex phenomenon. In the process of decision-
making cultural surgeons have to safeguard themselves from relatives (whose 
quarrels threaten to rip the family apart), from strangers (who may show 
hostility or discriminate against them), and from the state (which may 
criminalise them).  
In 1981 K. Benda-Beckmann’s seminal article, on ‘Forum Shopping and Shopping 
Forums – Dispute Settlement in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra’, was the 
first study to suggest a subjective notion of legal pluralism. Vanderlinden’s 
paradigm-shifting but brief theoretical contribution in 1989 on legal pluralism 
                                                          
9 Stable residence in a new country can result in the formation of syncretic or hybrid norms. We will 
examine this in some detail in the English context in chapter 4, but in the French context see Rude-
Antoine (1990), in the Belgian context Foblets (1994) and in the US context Zaman (2008). 
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focused on individuals and the choices that they are required to make between 
legal norms from different sources and of different content. Kleinhans and 
Macdonald’s (1997: 15) radical theoretical contribution has argued that legal 
subjects possess a creative transformative capacity that enables them to fashion 
the very structures of law that contribute to constituting their legal subjectivity. 
Other scholars too have adopted an ‘actor’s perspective’ when addressing the 
challenges and opportunities presented by legal plurality. Notably, Petersen’s 
attempt with collaborators to understand ‘law from the inside’ against a 
backcloth of polycentricity, which sees ‘law as being engendered in many 
centres’ (Petersen and Zahle 1995: 8). Hellum’s contribution reflected upon 
women’s experiences of managing deep legal pluralism in their daily life in 
Southern Africa, which presents them ‘with a variety of options, choices and 
dilemmas as to how to achieve their goals’ (1995: 18). Harris’s (1996) edited 
volume also included case studies that provide some insights into how groups 
and individuals exercise their agency, when presented with multiple legal orders. 
Other notable scholarship that advances an ‘actor’s perspective’ include Menski 
(1993), Turner (2006), Shariff (2008), Sbriccoli (2013), and in relation to parallel 
dispute resolution fora, Shah-Kazemi (2001), Basu (2006), Shahar (2008), Bano 
(2012), Bowen (2013), and Tas (2014).  
The central aim of this study is to illuminate the phenomenon of norm-
navigation or what I call cultural surgery.10 Cultural surgery occurs not only on 
                                                          
10 Cultural surgery is not something peculiar to Muslims or members of faith communities. Some scholars 
have argued that humans possess innate cognitive mechanisms specialised for the acquisition and 
implementation of norms, since the existence of these mechanisms would they say help explain the 
universal or near universal presence of norms in all groups (see Sripada & Stich 2006).  
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the basis of rational choice,11 but under the influence of cultural prejudice and 
political, economic and ideological hegemony. The explicit recognition of these 
forces, of power relationships between actors in the law and between normative 
orders, is essential in providing a deep understanding of the whole phenomenon. 
While the challenges here – historiographical, comparative and social scientific – 
are significant, a close investigation of norms in action, and in the minds, is at the 
heart of understanding cultural surgery (Donlan 2015: 28). Dupret (2007: 24) 
has similarly emphasised the importance of ‘close investigation of actual data 
reflecting the ways (methods) in which people (the members of any social 
group) make sense of, orient to, and practice their daily world’.  
Using the case study of Muslims and their relationship with the English legal 
system, the study investigates how they are coping with diverse norms. We 
restrict our discussion to family law matters, and in particular to the institution 
of marriage,12 which has become an especially contested site in recent years.  
The study has three main objectives. First, focusing on the content of English law, 
to examine how far it has adapted to accommodate the ‘beliefs of Muslims and 
their ways of life’.13 The concern primarily is to see whether, and to what extent, 
English law either explicitly or tacitly recognises ‘Muslim laws’.14  Second, where 
                                                          
11 According to the idea of ‘bounded rationality’ proposed by Simon (1997) decision-making is limited or 
bounded by ‘cognitive limitations’ and the ‘structures of the environment’. In practice this means that 
decision-makers behave as ‘satisficers’, that is, when presented with a situation where they are required 
to make a decision they seek a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one.  
12 Other issues related to marriage such as the age of marriage, dower (mahr), dowry, divorce, if it is an 
arranged, forced, gay, polygamous or consanguineous marriage, though equally worthy of investigation, 
do not directly fall within the ambit of this study.  
13 According to ‘official legal science’ or legal positivism, the legal ideology underpinning English Law, 
Muslim norms (whether shari’a or urf) are not ‘laws’ rather they are ‘appropriately’ conceived of as 
beliefs, customs, mores, or simply cultural practices. Chapter two discusses this in some detail.  
14  For many Muslims, a view consistent with the science of legal pluralism’, particular shari‘a and urf 
norms are ‘laws’ which they do not wish to transgress or violate. Changing the methodological lense, as 
discussed in chapter 2, results in a very different lived experience.  
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this is not the case what has been the response of Muslims to such non-
recognition? To help illustrate the diversity of responses the study records, 
creating a three-fold typology, the strategies and tactics by which this 
community, and its members, have sought to deal with the challenges raised by 
the presence of conflict between differing, overlapping, normative orders. 
Thirdly, to obtain a fuller understanding of the decisions Muslims are making 
when it comes to marriage solemnisation, in-depth qualitative interviews with 
59 Muslims were conducted, to draw out the sample’s motivations. It is the 
‘voice’ of individuals that the research seeks to bring out. In particular, we 
interrogate the impact that personal, ethnic and territorial law is having on their 
decisions, as well as to draw out other explanatory factors.   
1.2 Perceptions and realities  
The study has chosen to put Muslims under the spotlight because for a long time 
Islam has been portrayed as an existential threat to European character (Cesari 
2012: 433-4). In this mode of thinking Islam is presented as intrinsically 
different from other cultures, unchanging and monolithic, culturally inferior yet 
paradoxically threatening. Adherents of the faith are deemed inassimilable and 
the mere mention of the word shari‘a invokes fear and suspicion.15  
One reason for why such negative views have taken root is because of the British 
media’s intense ideological preoccupation with a purported Muslim threat. 
Media representations often depict a single Muslim or ‘orient’ community with 
negativisations; in essence, problematising the community. Often, and 
                                                          
15 One leading Muslim scholar pointed to what has become the elephant in the room when he wrote, ‘In 
the West the idea of Sharia calls up the darkest images of Islam […]. It has reached the extent that many 
Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to refer to the concept for fear of frightening people or arousing 
suspicion of all their work by the mere mention of the word’ (Ramadan 2005: 31).   
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increasingly, since the Satanic Verses Affair in 1988, particularly through the use 
of ideational framing, 16   newspaper reporting of Muslims has collocated 
negativisations, like associating Muslims with descriptions such as 
‘fundamentalists’ or ‘extremists’, with collectivisations that amass Muslims into a 
singular, homogeneous group such as ‘Muslim youths’ or ‘Muslim gangs’.17 Other 
recurring suggestions include that Muslims aspire to ‘impose shari‘a law’ and, 
more disturbingly, that they are ‘terrorists’.18 Associating Islam with the acts of a 
tiny minority of Muslims who have engaged in acts of terror conflates the 
religion of Islam with terrorism and perhaps more than any other type of 
framing has contributed to a rise in anti-Islamic discourse that feeds the story of 
the ‘other’ that simply cannot be assimilated or integrated (Lenard 2010: 310-
11; Barou 2014: 647). Often, and increasingly asked to demonstrate their roles 
as active citizens and to ‘British values’, Muslims thus continue to be seen as an 
‘alien wedge’ or even the ‘enemy within’.  
Media representations of Muslims shaped by the categorisations above do not 
just occur, but result from what Poole (2002: 52-3) calls the ‘manufacture of 
news’. The way the veil and the 2008 speech on civil and religious law in England 
by the then Archbishop of Canterbury have been portrayed reveal the extent to 
which narratives are manufactured; to the woe of Muslims, liberals, and 
multiculturalists.  
                                                          
16 For a conceptual background on framing theory see Goffman (1986). 
17 For details see Richardson (2009). The insightful study describes how British Muslims were 
represented during the 1997, 2001, and 2005 general elections. For a useful longitudinal study of 
portrayals of Islam and British Muslims in the British media see Poole (2011).  
18 For a useful account of how Muslims are being framed in the US see el-Aswad (2013). He picks up the 
very same portrayals.  
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The veil is a long-standing topic in the British press and has either been 
‘eroticised or constructed as Muslim women’s victimhood and of Islam’s 
backward patriarchy’ (Khiabany and Williamson 2008: 70). Often the diversity of 
reasons why British women wear the veil has been ignored. More recently, 
however, the veil’s figurative use has been transformed. It is now used 
symbolically to represent the failings of multiculturalism, and a threat to the 
British way of life. Previous depictions of Muslim women as ‘victims’ has been 
erased and instead the image is used in a sinister fashion to illustrate what is 
described as rising fundamentalism and contributes to the demonisation of 
Muslims more generally. Similarly, the coverage of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury’s 2008 speech was subject to decontextualisation, exaggeration and 
misinformation (Moore et al 2008: 32). Though attracting widespread criticism, 
including from a variety of politicians, Williams comments were in fact nuanced 
and carefully considered. To allay the danger of a stand-off, where the law 
squares up to people’s religious consciences, he suggested constructive 
accommodation of some aspects of religious law including shari’a for Muslims. In 
his view, the adoption of parts of Islamic law would help maintain social 
cohesion, but he emphasised that this relies on shari‘a being better understood. 
Disseminating a better understanding of shari’a however seems to be off the 
agenda for much of the British media, which is involved in creating a consensus 
view of what is important about Muslims and how this community is to be 
understood. The result is that other more complex understandings about Islam 
and Muslims are excluded. Constant repetition of negative tropes and in 
particular the routine framing of Muslims as the ‘other’ has a profoundly 
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negative impact on the (self) perception of Muslims. Injurious consequences 
include inter-ethnic conflict, most readily seen in the form of hate crime, but also 
the impairment of a person’s self-esteem that could lead to self-hatred (Honneth 
1992: 189; Taylor 1994: 25); in other cases to a ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Rumbaut 
2008: 3), or religiosity in the face of perceived threats. Experiences of non-
recognition and distortion of their beliefs and ways of life have left many 
Muslims feeling imprisoned in false or distorted stereotypes that they have 
found difficult to pierce, and hence have had the effect of reducing their mode of 
being. Though the constant priming of negativisations becomes very difficult to 
dismantle, these discourses need to be interrogated, not least because they 
create roadblocks to a peaceful multicultural coexistence. 
There are several reasons also for why the study focuses on the institution of 
marriage. The family is central to the whole scheme of social life as envisaged by 
Islam (McDermott & Ahsan 1980: 13). On the basis of sunnah, Muslims generally 
consider marriage to be ‘half of one’s faith’. This has contributed to the formation 
of a well-established view, namely, that ‘an unmarried man or woman is rather 
an oddity in Muslim society, particularly if he or she is able bodied and of sound 
mind’ (Hassan 2006: 246). By encouraging the norms of marriage, ethnic groups 
also strengthen their ties, and maintain their notions of honour. Ethnic or 
traditional norms predicated on honour, or prevention of shame, are often 
crucial to ethnic groups. These concepts are deeply interwoven to everyday 
notions of familial, kinship, and customary norms.19 
                                                          
19 On the importance of honour as it relates to young British Asians, one recent BBC poll found that two-
thirds believed that families should live in accordance with an ‘honour code’: ‘Honour code supported by 
young Asians, poll says’, online BBC report, (available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17319136 
[accessed 14/12/13]). 
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Whether we see religion as a culture in itself (Geertz 1973: 91), or part of a 
broader culture, it is clear that the family is seen by the state, faith and ethnic 
groups as a key institution for social reproduction and the transmission of 
culture and values. For this reason, marriage is ideologically an especially 
contested site. From the moment they arrived, as we shall we, Muslims have 
been busy ‘reassembling’ their familial norms in diaspora (Nielsen 2004: 120). 
This has led to what Grillo (2015) describes as ‘MILLI’, a ‘socio-legal-political 
industry’, involving a multiplicity of organisations, groups and individuals who, 
while having their own agendas and preoccupations, share a concern with how 
Islam relates to law and the legal aspects of Muslim presence in Britain.20 The 
terrain that MILLI operates on is the desire to maintain or constrain cultural and 
religious practices, notably as they relate to family law, especially marriage and 
divorce. (2015: 8).  This sets the scene then for us to explore how Muslims are 
coping with diverse norms, against the wider backcloth of MILLI.    
 
1.3 Chapter outline  
The study begins from the position that to remove many misunderstandings, but 
also if there is to be a buy-in of the recommendations on how we move forward 
together, it needs to provide a better understanding of Muslims and of Muslim 
norms, including the subspecies that we define as ‘laws’. Many 
misunderstandings derive from a too limited knowledge and insight into what 
the ‘other’, or ‘another’ more appropriately one might say, is doing and 
experiencing, and from the stereotypes and assumptions of one’s socialisation 
                                                          
20 The acronym MILLI stands for Muslims, Islam and the Law: A Legal Industry.  
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(Qayyum 2014: 64). In chapter two, we interrogate the label ‘Muslim’, and we 
note that there is no uniform answer to what makes someone a Muslim. Many 
people describe themselves as being Muslim, but this does not mean that they 
don’t identify themselves in other ways, or that ‘being a Muslim’ is the primary 
source of their identity, and even if it is, as this study shows, it will not be 
uniformly expressed. We interrogate also the notion of a ‘Muslim community’, 
and we notice that the community consists of a variety of sub-groups. There are 
many dimensions of difference. We note that these internal differences have 
important outcomes. We also note that Muslims like all human beings are 
motivated by all sorts of motivations, aspirations and needs. Essentialist 
tendencies have also led to scant attention being paid to individualism in Muslim 
consciousness.  
As we are oriented to the Muslim presence in Britain, we see that the community 
has been present here for a long time. Its number has grown through various 
waves of immigration from an ever increasing variety of countries, but also 
through birth rate and conversion. Immigration restrictions led to a settled 
Muslim community, and chain migration and family reunification led to dense 
patterns of settlement, which in turn significantly contributed to the reassembly 
of Muslim norms in the diaspora.   
The demographic profile reveals that almost half of the Muslim population was 
born in Britain, and are under the age of 25. This establishes that they are no 
longer ‘immigrants’, and this has important ramifications not least over their 
expectations but also in terms of the demands they make as citizens. The last 
Census also revealed significant inequalities experienced by Muslims. Muslims 
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are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. In the context of employment 
research suggests that they are experiencing the double penalty of racial 
discrimination and islamophobia.  
Muslims did not arrive in Britain as empty vessels or blank slates rather each 
person brought with them their peculiar cultural luggage that included a ‘legal 
consciousness’, which contrary to assimilationist expectations they did not 
discard or erase on entry. Either on arrival, or sometime soon thereafter, 
Muslims realised that not all norms and values are shared. In fact, some personal 
or ethnic norms were diametrically opposed to those of the majority and of the 
legal system. But stable residence in the new country meant that they had to 
actively cope with diverse norms. As we are oriented to different acculturation 
models, we consider how they could adapt. We take a brief look at the policies 
that have been adopted by the British state over the years, from assimilation, to 
multiculturalism, to community cohesion, and now it seems ‘muscular 
liberalism’. We also look at what guidance Islamic jurisprudence provides to 
Muslims. The vacuum in authority has led to much confusion. Efforts by Muslims 
to develop guidance have, notably, led to a new but contested ‘fiqh for 
minorities’. Muslims are also involved in finding their own answers by using 
their personal judgment in the new social setting. As a trend, Muslims have been 
busily reassembling their cultural and religious values, with some modifications, 
in their new homes. This is the case even with British-born generations, but the 
process has not been without its tensions. Muslims rapidly developed life-cycle 
rituals, local infrastructure and community institutions. The commitment to 
reassembly also extends to the legal sphere but among legal scholarship has 
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largely gone unnoticed. This is because of received ideas about law. Official legal 
science renders other normative orderings invisible.  
The present study is not a black-letter study of jurisprudence or of ‘law in the 
books’. Official legal science alone does not allow us to adequately see the 
normative influence of personal or ethnic orderings, or alternative 
understandings and meanings of ‘law’ circulating in social relations. This is 
because it does not allow us to get past the fiction that only the state makes and 
administers the law. This is not consistent with how Muslims in Britain see their 
lived reality. To understand how Muslims read their daily world – a world in 
which they or their act are subject to multiple, overlapping normative orders – 
we need to look to adopting the more appropriate lens provided by the science of  
legal pluralism. This forms the subject-matter of chapter three. After explaining 
why official legal science or legal modernity, an ideology undergirded by legal 
positivist and centralist ideas, is unhelpful, we turn our attention to legal 
pluralism. Pluri-legal theories recognise that multiple forms of law may be 
present within a population, which might have different sources, content, and 
range of functions. The state certainly does not have monopoly over law. These 
are just ‘political claims’ (Santos 2002: 90). They also highlight the problem with a 
hierarchal concept of law or that other norms – norms of religion, morality, 
ethical custom, or fashion – may be more authoritative in compelling behaviour 
than the legal norm.  
Against the use of pluri-legal theories several objections have been raised. We 
examine these, and in the process explain how the study conceives ‘law’, namely, 
as a sub-species of norms with no special epistemic status that makes it more 
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authoritative than another norm. This approach takes normativity beyond 
legality seriously. From examining the interaction of differing, overlapping 
normative orders, pluralists and their allies have extended their inquiry to the 
phenomena of hybridity, interlegality and internormativity.  
For years much attention has focused on how the state and its agencies are 
coping with diverse norms. This study seeks to bring out how actors on the 
ground are coping with the same. It adds to the scant literature on ‘legal 
pluralism in subjectivity’.  
Having supplied the theoretical framework, in chapter four we look at the 
interaction of personal, ethnic, and territorial ‘law’ on Muslims in the English 
context. In other words, the interaction of shari‘a (or more precisely forms of 
fiqh) and community-specific forms of urf and English law. The impact of ‘legal 
modernist’ thought is that the state treats only its normative ordering as ‘law’, all 
other normative orderings are de-statussed to simply ‘customs’, ‘cultural 
practices’, ‘mores’ and at best ‘beliefs’ . As uniform law is seen as desirable and 
the pinnacle of legal development, we have a ‘one law for all’ policy. The English 
legal system is guided by particular reference points when making law, notably 
these include a particular notion of secularism, human rights norms, and public 
policy. The state expects citizens to prioritise loyalty to the state over personal or 
ethnic group membership. In other words, citizenship requires that they 
prioritise their national identity over religious or ethnic identity. Many Muslims 
however feel compelled to follow shari‘a and urf, particularly in the family 
context. The ramifications, then, are that we have a ‘battle of laws’ that is part of 
a wider ‘war of normativities and values’ taking place.  
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We focus on the content of English law, to examine how far it has adapted to 
accommodate Muslims and Muslim norms in the context of marriage 
solemnisation. We then examine what has been the Muslim response to what is 
largely non-recognition of their identity, norms (including the sub-species of 
legal norms) and values. The analysis records multiple strategies and tactics that 
have been employed by Muslims in response to challenges raised by the 
presence of conflicts caused by a situation of internormativity. From efforts to 
reform orderings, to the creation of new trans-local hybrid living laws and 
identities, to avoidance or even rejection of particular orderings. The negotiation 
begins with the individual and their conscience, before negotiations between 
individuals and others including the state occur. Many British Muslims are 
mixing and matching, or synthesising, their norms and values and this allows for 
great variety, eclecticism and personal patterning. In this way identity remains 
individual.  
In chapter 5 we engage directly with Muslims ‘on the ground’. The aim is to 
obtain a thick descriptive understanding of the negotiation that is taking place in 
the individual’s mind. In several ways the research is explorative, for in recent 
years much attention has focused on Muslims not registering their marriage, 
(with the connotation that they then need to use unregulated shari‘a councils 
that are suspect of due process and human rights norms, particularly equality, 
when it comes to women), yet the prevalence and explanations for the practice 
have largely been based on anecdotal evidence. A primary aim, then, of the 
research is to identify the extent of non-registration amongst the sample and to 
record explanations for why this is occurring. In addition to understanding the 
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significance of shari‘a, urf and English law to the individuals involved, the 
investigation also seeks to bring out how other dimensions of difference (like 
age, gender, social class, immigration status, and residential location) possibly 
impact their decisions.   
Chapter 6 summarises the findings and makes suggestions. The findings support 
the case that the English legal system needs to accept difference or alterity more 
substantially, if it is to build multicultural bridges and not communitarian walls. 
Non-recognition, moreover, places the state on the back foot when it comes to 
helping those whom it regards, and who probably in fact are, vulnerable and 
disadvantaged. The study adopted the individual as the point where all 
normative orderings ‘converge’, and suggests that this be the vantage point from 
which to look at the possible reconfiguration of the legal system. Since many 
minorities prefer using private ordering and private orders, the state could 
respond through institutional change that is part of a bigger paradigm-shift that 
allows majority-minority communities to co-exist and define their mutual rights 
and obligations. In this way the state is moving closer to  giving effect to the will 
of all its citizens, not only to that of the majority, and this should be accompanied 
by a commitment on its part that the citizen’s right to choose is supported, even 
offered legal protection. Such an approach does not flatten individual choices 
when awarding group rights and therefore avoids the risk of imposing 
obligations on individuals who do not identify with them. This approach would 
help to protect vulnerable or powerless subjects, whose choice might otherwise 
be suppressed or ignored within the community to which they ‘belong’. Here I 
am thinking particularly of women and sub-minorities. The focus on allowing 
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individuals options, and protecting their right to choose, forms a sound basis for 
multicultural policies.   
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Chapter 2: Muslims in Britain 
2.1  Defining Muslims  
Before we can look at how Muslims are coping with diverse norms, it is 
important that we prepare the ground, by dispelling stereotypes and 
misconceptions, and by clearing particular mental blockages caused by an 
uncritical acceptance of some received ideas that may hinder our progress. This 
chapter in relation to ‘Muslims’, and the next in relation to ‘law’, seek to do this. 
There is much misunderstanding about who Muslims are, what it is that they 
believe in, and how they will behave in any given situation. If we begin by briefly 
asking what makes someone a ‘Muslim’, we see that no uniform answer is 
forthcoming.21 While most Muslims point to the shahadah as the acid test that 
separates the Muslim from the non-Muslim, others argue that belief (al-i’tiqaad) 
must be translated into action (al-‘amal).22 On the basis of doctrine rather than 
observance, newer groups who regard themselves as ‘Muslim’, such as the 
Ahmadiyya and the Nation of Islam, are not considered by orthodox Sunni and 
Shi‘a Muslims to be part of the fold (Ansari 2002: 6). Similar views have also 
been expressed about particular divisions of Alevi ‘Muslims’, and also about 
‘Muslims’ who have based their lives around the ideas of a particular teacher and 
his disciples resulting in a firqah (sect). Amongst Barelvi Punjabis, for instance, 
                                                          
21 It is generally thought that a person is a ‘Muslim’ if s/he accepts tawhid (one-ness of god) and the 
prophethood of Muhammed, expressed through the taking of the shahadah. All Muslims however do not 
share this view. Others, emphasising the sine qua non relationship of belief (al-i’tiqaad) with actions (al-
‘amal), have argued that alongside the acceptance of the shahadah there must be a commitment to the 
practice of salat (prayer), sawm (fasting), hajj (pilgrimage to mecca), and zakat (charity), which are the 
‘first and essential pillars of a life of faith’ (Ramadan 1999: 20). At its most comprehensive, being a 
Muslim is submitting to the will of Allah and therefore Islam becomes a complete way of life (deen), with 
the qur‘an (the word of God) and sunnah (the sayings and practices of the Prophet) becoming the key 
points of reference. On Islam as a complete way of life see Anwar (1979: 158-169); McDermott and Ahsan 
(1980: 7). 
22 See for instance Ali (1992: 164).  
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Ballard (1996) describes the operation of a local manifestation of Islam. 
Emphasis on what he refers to as panthic and kismetic dimensions of religion has 
led to a particular importance being placed on pirs (spiritual guides) but 
Deobandis, the other main doctrinal influence on Sunni South Asian Muslims, 
regard this as misguided and un-Islamic. This revivalist movement within Hanafi 
Islam is critical of Barelvis for, 
[…] adopting non-Muslim ideas through their cult of pirs or saintly leaders, in 
particular […] the belief that pirs can intercede with Allah on behalf of their 
followers. Such ideas they believe are not justifiable in terms of the teachings of 
the Qu’ran, the Hadith or the law schools (Rex 1996: 221). 
 
Such differences over who is a ‘Muslim’ raise all sorts of questions, including 
over who has the authority to speak in the name of Islam, to render someone in 
so that they become part of the ‘we’ rather than a ‘they’. The issue has become 
even more critical in light of perceived hijacking of Islam by particular 
jihadist/terrorist groups like ISIS/Daesh in recent years. The term ‘Muslim’, 
when used in this study, refers to people who describe themselves as Muslim. 
This does not mean that they do not identify themselves in other ways, or that 
‘being a Muslim’ is the primary source of their identity and even if it is, as this 
study shows, it will not be uniformly expressed.  
As bricoleurs, most Muslims select bits and pieces of different traditions and 
combine them for their own purposes, in their own way.23 Put differently, they 
mix and match, or synthesise, their norms and values and this allows for great 
variety, eclecticism and personal patterning.24 In this way identity remains 
individual. For this reason we can say people, not only societies, are multicultural 
                                                          
23 On the concept of bricolage see Lévi-Strauss (1966).  
24 See in detail Ballard (1994); Werbner (2002); Hussain & Bagguley (2005).  
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(Gutmann 1993). One effect of mixture is hybridised identities, and this has led 
to a variety of embraced, and sometimes imposed, descriptions: from 
hyphenated descriptions (e.g. British Muslim), to portmanteaus (e.g. BrAsian), to 
controversial metaphors (e.g. ‘coconut’, ‘fish and chips’, and ‘uncle tom’). The 
latter implies that the person oscillating between cultures has gone too far in 
favour of the new, is confused, or has lost sight of traditional values and 
allegiances. As Muslims have multiple, overlapping identities, they present 
themselves in different ways depending on the context in which they find 
themselves.25 Another effect of mixture, or when cultures meet, is that there are 
a number of vying points of reference and hierarchies which, as this study 
explores, Muslims must negotiate.   
The idea of a ‘Muslim community’ in Britain, Europe or elsewhere, often 
exchanged in public discourses, is also misleading. There are many and diverse 
communities who happen to also be Muslim. Far from being a homogeneous 
community, Muslims are ethnically diverse and heterogeneous in language, 
culture and skin colour (Kabir 2010: 6). As one scholar with insights into Muslim 
communities in Britain writes,  
A Sylheti from Bangladesh, apart from some tenets of faith, is likely to have little 
in common with a Mirpuri from Pakistan, let alone a Somali or a Bosnian Muslim 
(Ansari 2004a: 3). 
 
There are also other dimensions of difference, including importantly gender, 
masculinity, class, generation, education and profession, and religiosity. Hopkins 
(2006; see also Hopkins & Gale 2009), researching the formation and expression 
                                                          
25 For a useful discussion on how people change their presentation according to context see Goffman 
(1956).  
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of identity among young Muslim males in Edinburgh and Glasgow, found 
evidence of the importance of masculinity, which of itself was informed by a 
complex range of issues including members’ own class position, familial and 
related gendered expectation, as well as their interests in sport and other leisure 
activities. Samad (2004), in his research of Muslim youth in Britain, picks up the 
relatively unexplored dimension of class. He says that,  
The main division that is emerging between different Muslim groups and within 
certain groups is that some groups mainly of middle class backgrounds are 
achieving high educational attainment leading into prosperous professions and 
becoming integrated into multicultural Britain. However the majority are 
working class in origin, with poor educational attainment and are subject to 
uncertain futures and social exclusion and marginalisation (Samad 2004: 10). 
 
Hussain and Bagguley (2005) discuss the importance of generation and country 
of birth when it comes to belonging, identity, and related claims.26 Among 
Pakistani Muslims in Bradford, they found that members of the first generation 
still see themselves as ‘denizens’, or visitors, living but not belonging in Britain. 
Their sense of belonging was interwoven with their experience of migration, 
settlement, and (lack of sufficient English) language. In contrast, the younger 
generation ‘belong’ through being born here and saw themselves as having the 
same ‘natural rights’ as any other British citizen; this, in turn, shaped both their 
identities and claims as citizens. Decomposing the dichotomy of immigrant first 
and second generation, Rumbaut (2004) more generally draws out the 
experience of the often forgotten ‘midway generation’, referring to migrants who 
arrived after primary school but before thirteen years of age, enabling them to be 
                                                          
26 More generally, on why generation is useful for sociological groupings see Edmunds and Turner (2002).  
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somewhat socialised into the host country life through educational experiences 
of youth culture. Mandaville (2001) identifies how their minority status in 
Britain causes Muslims to revise their own conceptions of themselves in diaspora. 
He highlights the important generational aspect of this process. In shaping their 
identity, he notes that many young Muslims distance themselves from their 
parents’ views of Islam, (seeing these as outdated and shaped by a different 
socio-cultural setting), and draw from their contact with other communities and 
traditions. In some cases the process leads to Muslims turning away from Islam, 
in some cases to them reaffirming their Islamic faith, but one that is different to 
that of their parents.  
To help identify Muslims according to their adherence to their religion 
(religiosity) and orientation towards Western culture, against a backdrop of 
globalisation and one that takes account of local and historical influences, Ameli 
(2002: 227-72) has developed a typology of Muslim British identities. He 
identifies eight different types, based partly on fieldwork involving British-born 
Muslims in the outer London borough of Brent: traditionalist (characterised by 
social conservatism, ritual centredness and political indifference); islamist 
(characterised by their emphasis on Islamic politics and movements and the 
comprehensiveness of the Islamic way of life); modernist (characterised by a 
‘combination of modernization and Islamic ideology’, their desire to achieve 
social reformation through modernisation and reformation of religious thinking 
in accordance with modern modes of thought; secularist (characterised by 
rejection of the politicazation of Islam, and its traditional aspects, but, unlike the 
traditionalist form, with active participation in secular politics and social activity, 
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and lack of religious observance and involvement with social institutions; 
nationalist (characterised by those who identify themselves primarily with the 
culture of the parents’ homelands as an expression of patriotism); anglicized (or 
westernised, characterised by no serious inclination towards the original culture, 
an inability to re-assimilate into it, absorption of attitudes, values, and norms 
governing British culture to the point that it is indistinguishable from ‘native 
counterparts’, and involvement in multiplex secular social relationships with 
non-Muslims, and comparatively less religious orientation); hybrid 
(characterised by no firm orientation towards the original culture as well as not 
giving primacy to the new Western culture); and, undetermined (characterised 
by a rejection of diverse cultures one is confronted with, confusion about 
religious belief, and a sense of hopelessness and rootlessness).  
Other scholars have put forward their own system of classification (see Jacobson 
1998; Bokhari 2004; Shepard 2004). With specific reference to British Muslims 
‘for whom Islam is the reference point of thinking’ Ramadan (2005: 24-29) 
believes they can be sorted into scholastic traditionalists, Salafi literalists, 
political Salafi literalists, Salafi reformists, Sufists, and liberal rational reformists. 
Like the aforementioned, and most other categorists, he offers his typology as a 
guide that reveals tendencies, and cautions against rigid compartmentalisation.  
Some scholars have found it useful in their investigations to categorise Muslims, 
but often the scheme envisaged is inadequate, either because it is too contested 
(‘practising’), or too broad (‘non-observant’ or ‘cultural’), and/or too culturally 
loaded (‘modernist’ or ‘traditional’). For this reason, and because such 
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distinctions are often more of a reflection of the author’s assumptions about 
what it means to be ‘Muslim’, this study avoids such labelling.  
On the relationship between Islam and identity, in Muslim dominated areas like 
Bradford, Lewis (2003: 136) discusses the rise of something different altogether: 
an ‘assertive Muslim identity’, in which Islam is used by Muslim youth as a 
marker of ‘street culture’ rather than religious creed. Pointing out other 
dimensions of difference, Hamid (2011: 251) catalogues newer, emerging 
Muslim youth subcultures, including the highly macho ‘rude boy’,27 the ‘asian 
gang’, 28  fashion conscious ‘muhajababes’, 29  ‘heavy metal Muslims’, 30  ‘gay 
Muslims’31 and even ‘atheist Muslims’.32 To the list we can also add ‘secular 
Muslims’, ‘professional Muslims’, ‘millennial Muslims’, ‘feminist Muslims’, and 
‘activist Muslims’. Many Muslims are also keen to point out that they are not 
Muslims in Britain but of Britain. In sociological terms, then, Muslims are far 
from a homogeneous community. 
The internal diversity has important, sometimes unexpected, outcomes. For 
instance, Mirpuri Muslims at times highlight their religious identity and, as part 
of this affirmation, their ties to (non-Mirpuri) Muslims, but on other occasions 
they seek to highlight sharp distinctions even within their own community – 
distinctions of firqah (sect), zat (caste) and biraderi (clan) in particular.33 The 
exploitation of these differences in Britain has amongst other things impacted 
                                                          
27 For details see Imtiaz (1999); Macey (1999: 848). 
28 For details see Alexander (2000). 
29 For details see Stratton (2008). 
30 For details see LeVine (2009). 
31 For details see Kugle (2014). 
32 See for details: http://ex-muslim.org.uk (date accessed 11.10.13).  
33 Just what is a biraderi? The concept has a range of meanings, depending on context, from that of a 
kinship group of virtually infinite size – the quam or zat, the equivalent of caste or subcaste – to a smaller 
group of intermarrying close kin between who spouses are exchanged (Shaw 2014: 140).  
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local patterns of political mobilisation,34 social relations, civic engagement, and 
the organisation and running of mosques.35 Besides loyalty for instance to the 
biraderi that can precede loyalty to one’s co-religionists,36 Muslims like all 
human beings are motivated by all sorts of other factors. Writing about his own 
personal experience, An-Na‘im explains,  
As a Muslim myself I know Islam is important to Muslims in general, but people 
who are Muslims are influenced by all sorts of motivations, aspirations and 
needs, like all human beings (An-Na‘im 2010: 104). 
 
Apart from an unhelpful lack of sensitivity to intra-Muslim differences, 
essentialist tendencies have also led to scant attention being paid to 
individualism in Muslim consciousness. Expressing her irritation, Jalal points out,    
 
There is nothing particularly unusual about the attachment of Muslims to the 
symbols of their collective religious identity. It has nevertheless fuelled the 
misconception that the notion of the individual in Islam is either non-existent or 
at best weakly articulated. It is true that Muslims identify strongly and 
passionately with the Quran, their Holy Prophet and a range of other Islamic 
symbols. Yet identification with a common set of symbols and beliefs cannot be 
grounds for the erasure of the individual in Muslim consciousness (Jalal 2000: 
4).  
 
The lack of sensitivity is not only the result of a homogenised view of Muslims 
bandied around in Western discourses. In the aftermath of 9/11 and ensuing 
                                                          
34 See in detail Anwar (1991: 41-62); Nielsen (1992: 44-49); Alavi, H. (1998: 449-62); Ellis & Khan (1998: 
471-488); N. Akhtar (2003); Garbaye (2005).  
35 See in detail Anwar (1979: 163-4); Joly (1988: 37-8); Nielsen (1992: 44-9); Halliday (1992: 138); 
Akhtar (2013). This can be observed, for example, in the fierce rivalry for mosque control especially 
between the Deobandis, Tablighi Jamaat, Ahle-e-Hadith and the Pakistani Sufi orders known as the 
Barelvis. 
36 For details see Ballard (1994); Lewis (1994). 
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‘war on terror’ some Muslims have pushed ‘umma-nationalism’ (Zubaida 2007), 
a unifying ideological theme that imagines Islam as a universal community under 
attack by non–Muslims, especially Jews and Christians, which stems from a deep 
civilizational difference and antagonism. 37  Contrary to both totalising 
conceptions, the Muslim community is a community of communities and 
individuals. Members are part of a wider social matrix, tied to a myriad of other 
relationships, and influenced by all sorts of motivations, aspirations and needs. 
As this study shows, and calls for others to explore, this impacts how, why and to 
what extent they negotiate different legal traditions, authorities and norms. 
 
2.2 The development of Muslim presence in Britain  
While their presence as settlers can be traced to at least the 16th century (Matar 
1997: 63-82; Barbour 2003: 13-67), it was not until post-1945 that large-scale 
Muslim immigration, mainly of South-Asian origin, to Britain occurred (Peach 
2005: 19). In the intervening period, a small but steady number of Muslims, 
mainly in the form of lascars, migrated to Britain especially from Yemen, 
Somalia, Egypt, and South Asia (Gujarat, Sind, Assam and Bengal), to work on 
British merchant ships and ports (Ansari 2004a; Gilliat-Ray 2010). From India 
many Muslim lascars arrived through the activities of the East India Company.38 
From Yemen, Egypt and East Africa (especially Somalia) lots of Muslim lascars 
arrived with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which shortened the voyage 
to the East and led to an increase in trade. Some arrivals chose to settle in 
Britain, establishing small communities in port or canal cities such as Cardiff, 
                                                          
37 See also Zubaida (2003: 88-98); Roy (2004: 148-200). 
38 See in detail Fisher (2006); Balachandran (2007). 
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Liverpool, Manchester, South Shields, and London (Ansari 2002: 8; Lewis 1994: 
11; Nielsen 1988: 53).39 Some social scientists have also pointed out that 
Muslims have lived in Europe for even longer than this, not only as immigrants 
but as rulers, the effects of which can still be felt today (Anwar 1994: 5).40  
The Muslim population in Britain dramatically increased after the Second World 
War.41 Until the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, any citizen of the 
Commonwealth could enter Britain freely.42 Employers encouraged migration 
from the former colonies to help alleviate the acute labour shortage, particularly 
in the steel and textile industries in Yorkshire, Lancashire and the Midlands.43 
The vast majority of arrivals were young male migrants in search of economic 
betterment. Most arrivals from the Indian Subcontinent – India (Punjab, Gujarat), 
Pakistan (Mirpur District of Azad Kashmir, Punjab, North West Frontier 
Province), and present-day Bangladesh (Sylhet and Chittagong) – were not 
escaping destitution, but were acting out a calculated plan to improve the 
collective lot of the biraderi (Ballard 1994: 7-8; Shaw 1994: 36; Gardner & 
Shukur 1994: 146-150). In time these immigrants, like their predecessors before 
                                                          
39 Settlement was also involuntary, for example, in practice the East India Company simply abandoned 
lascars once they were in London.  
40This past, unknown to many, led Prince Charles, when addressing an audience at the Oxford Centre of 
Islamic Studies in 1993, to emphasise that: ‘The surprise, ladies and gentlemen, is the extent to which 
Islam has been a part of Europe for so long, first in Spain, then in the Balkans, and the extent to which it 
has contributed so much towards the civilisation which we all too often think of, wrongly, as entirely 
Western. Islam is part of our past and our present, in all fields of human endeavour. It has helped to 
create modern Europe. It is part of our own inheritance, not a thing apart’. H.R.H., The Prince of Wales, 
gave the speech titled 'Islam and the West' at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies in 1993. It can be 
accessed via: www.princeofwales.gov.uk/media/speeches/speech-hrh-the-prince-of-wales-titled-islam-
and-the-west-the-oxford-centre-islamic (accessed 8/02/13). Facts such as these require us to carefully 
consider how we express the connection between Muslims, Islam, and Europe: Is the more appropriate 
expression Muslims in Europe, Muslims of Europe or European Muslims? Each has different connotations, 
and tends to call for different ways of thinking about particular issues (see also An-Na‘im 2010: 86). 
41 Peach (2005:23) suggests the Muslim population rose from around 21,000 in 1951 to 250,000 in 1971 
and to nearly 600,000 in 1981.  
42 This is despite attempts in the 1950s to introduce administrative curbs on Commonwealth emigration. 
For details see Dummett and Nichol (1990: 177-81). 
43 See in detail Kalra (2000). 
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them, became ‘bridgeheads’ through which ‘worker rotation’ and ‘chain 
migration’ was facilitated.44 The process in turn influenced the patterns and 
nature of Muslim settlement that we see today.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, Muslims also arrived in significant numbers from 
the West Indies, Cyprus, and from various parts of Africa and the Middle East 
(Ansari 2004a). The influx of ‘visible’ immigrants, however, received bitter 
criticism from large segments of the media and wider British society.45 Those 
living in the poorer areas to which immigrants gravitated were especially vocal 
of their misgivings. The new arrivals were seen as ‘aliens’ who threatened the 
‘British way of life’ (Solomos 1993: 51), and a drain on scarce resources 
especially on housing and state benefits (Banton 1985: 35). Hostility towards 
‘the other’ manifested itself in the form of political campaigns for control,46 
widespread discrimination,47 racial harassment and violence48 and, what could 
no longer be ignored by the state, ‘race riots’.49 A new migration policy emerged 
based on two pillars: on the one hand, ‘limitation’ of Commonwealth 
immigration, which led to the enactment of three statutes, in 1962, 1968 and 
1971,50 and had the goal of zero net migration; on the other hand, ‘integration’ of 
immigrants who had already settled in Britain, which also led to the enactment 
                                                          
44 See in detail Ansari (2000: 40-6, 145-165); Nielsen (2004: 40-61); Halliday (2010: 17-57). 
45 See in detail Greenslade (2005: 17-20).  
46 See, for example, the electoral campaign of Peter Griffiths in Smethwick in 1962. Supporters of the Tory 
candidate were reported to have circulated the slogan: ‘if you want a nigger for a neighbour – vote 
labour’. See also Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 1968.  
47 See for details Lester & Bindman (1972); Griffith (1997); and, Jones & Welhengama (2000: 30-35 & 73-
75). 
48 Throughout this period racism was made respectable. The ‘nigger-hunting’ campaigns by Mosley’s 
Teddy Boys and later the ‘Paki-bashing’ episodes were portrayed as being conducted by heroes. 
49 The 1958 ‘race riots’ at Notting Hill and Nottingham were the most violent. Although involving largely 
acts of white hooliganism, these were cited as examples of the dangers of unrestricted immigration. See in 
detail Pilkington (1996: 171-184); Phillips & Phillips (1998).  
50  The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, and 1971 
Immigration Act. For details see Wray (2011).  
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of three statutes, in 1965, 1968 and 1976,51 and had the goal of improving race 
relations (Somerville et al 2009).    
With the enforcement of the 1971 Immigration Act primary immigration of 
Muslims to Britain from outside the European Economic Community virtually 
came to a halt.52 Lots of Muslims continued to arrive through the process of 
family reunification, but faced increasingly draconian measures, mainly targeted 
at South Asians, that were introduced to curtail the (supposed) abuse of the 
arranged marriage system as a means of continuing primary migration.53 The 
emphasis on the pillar of limitation and restriction thereafter became stronger, 
until the Labour government came into power in 1997 and instituted a new 
migration policy based on ‘selective openness’: a commitment to economic 
migration on the one hand, but also the development of a tough security and 
control framework, which accelerated after 9/11, on the other (Somerville et al 
2009). Throughout this period more Muslims, particularly under the Labour era, 
arrived as students, professionals and entrepreneurs, with some choosing to 
settle in Britain.    
Over the last half-century, lots of Muslims have also arrived in Britain as 
refugees, prominently from Kenya, 54  Uganda, Somalia, Iran, Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Kurdistan, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Yemen, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia and Ivory Coast. During the 1990s, as the number of refugees sharply 
                                                          
51 Namely, the 1965, 1968, and 1976 Race Relations Acts. For details see Allott (1980: 226-232); 
McCrudden et al (1991); Hepple (1992: 19-34); Jones & Welhengama 2000: 33-35).  
52 The European Economic Community was officially renamed the European Union on the 1st of November 
1993.  
53 On the practice of arranged marriage, especially within the South Asian community, see Ballard (1982); 
Bradby (1999); Charsley (2006). On how immigration measures were used to target the arranged 
marriage system see in detail Sachdeva (1993); Juss (1997); Ballard (2006); Wray (2011). 
54 For a useful outline of why African-Asians came to Britain see Alibhai-Brown (2000: 74-5). 
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grew, the state introduced successive statutes to reduce the number of asylum 
applications, to speed up the process, and to achieve more effective deportations 
of failed asylum seekers (Somerville et al).55 Since then further restrictive 
measures aimed especially at asylum seekers and third country nationals have 
been introduced.56  
The impact of various waves of Muslim immigration to Britain is that today 
Muslims of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin comprise the largest group, but 
there are also a sizeable number of smaller groups present, prominently of Arab, 
Indian, Sri Lankan, African (especially Somali), Albanian, Bosnian, Cypriot, 
Kosovan, Turkish, Bravanese, Bruneian, Malaysian, Afghani, Afro-Caribbean, 
Iranian, Kurdish, and Iraqi origin.    
  
2.3 The demographic profile of Muslims in Britain     
In the last national Census of 2011, over 2.7 million Muslims recorded their 
presence in England and Wales, officially establishing that Muslims make up 
4.8% of the overall population.57. This makes Islam the second largest religion in 
the UK in terms of adherents.58 Since 2001 the population has seen an increase of 
1.2 million (or 75 percent); the biggest increase for any religious group in 
Britain. Almost half of the Muslim population is below the age of 25, and just over 
47 percent were born in the UK, establishing that these residents are no longer 
immigrants, but part of a burgeoning British-born second, third and fourth 
                                                          
55 For details see: Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993; Asylum and Immigration Act 1996; 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002; Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004; Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. 
56 See in detail Chakrabarti (2005); Drywood (2014); Mackenzie (2014).  
57 There are at least 3,800 Muslims in Northern Ireland and 77, 000 Muslims in Scotland. 
58 The religion question was the only voluntary question in the 2011 Census, and 7.2 per cent of the 
people chose not to answer the question.  
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generations. A significant number of Muslims, approximately 100,000, are 
converts, mainly of ‘White’59 and ‘Afro-Caribbean’ ethnic origin,60 and a study 
commissioned by interfaith organisation Faith Matters suggests that as many as 
5,200 conversions occur nationwide each year (Brice 2010: 2). The 2011 Census 
confirmed that the Muslim population is ethnically diverse: over two-thirds of 
British Muslims are of ‘Asian’ ethnicity (of these, 38% identified themselves as 
Pakistani, 14.8% as Bangladeshi, and 7.3% as Indian). 1 in every 10 Muslims is 
‘Black’, 1 in every 13 Muslims is ‘White’, and 1 in every 26 Muslims is of mixed 
ethnicity.61 For the first time, the 2011 Census included the ‘Arab’ ethnic 
category, which revealed that they constitute 1 in every 15 Muslims in Britain.62 
All ethnic groups that make up the Muslim population in Britain saw an increase 
in their numbers since 2001; the largest increases being made by Pakistani and 
Arab ethnic groups. Since 1990 there has been a significant rise in the Somali, 
Afghani and Iraqi populations in Britain, but in the absence of specific 
corresponding ethnic categories in the Census that would enable respondents to 
self-identify themselves, it is not possible to provide accurate figures.  
In addition to an ethnic group question, for the first time the 2011 census had a 
national identity question. The purpose of the question was to enable 
respondents to express what they (subjectively) felt was their national identity. 
The question was seen as being especially important for people whose ethnicity 
was not for example ‘White: English’ or ‘White: British’, but who were either 
British-born or had lived in Britain for a long-time, and would not otherwise 
                                                          
59 See in detail Zebiri (2007).  
60
 See in detail Reddie (2009). 
61 Over 272,000 Muslims identified themselves as ‘Black’.  
62 Put differently they make up 6.6 % of the Muslim population.  
52 
 
have the opportunity to express their sense of ‘Englishness’ and/or ‘Britishness’. 
In England and Wales, almost three-quarters of all Muslims (73%) identified 
themselves as having a ‘British only identity’, a smaller number saw themselves 
as ‘English only’ (12.8%), while only a tiny number recorded ‘Welsh only’ as their 
national identity (0.21%). Some respondents may have misunderstood the 
meaning of the question, but the response re-ignites long-standing concerns 
raised by some activists and researchers about notions of ‘Englishness’ and 
‘Welshness’ in particular continuing to have systematic, largely unspoken, racial 
connotations (see Parekh 2000).  
Muslims are not evenly distributed across Britain rather the population is 
clustered in particular regions,63 major urban areas,64 and inner city boroughs.65 
Over a third of all Muslims live in the inner city conurbations of London. In the 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets, one in every three residents is Muslim; 
making Muslims no longer the religious minority rather Islam has become the 
largest religion followed by Christianity in terms of adherents. It is doubtful that 
any of us have yet fully come to grips with the momentous implications of these 
developments (Qayyum 2014: 63).  
The spatial distribution of Muslims, especially since 9/11, has attracted 
significant public and research attention. According to the 2011 Census, almost 
half of all Muslims live in the most deprived local authority districts in England 
                                                          
63 The majority of the Muslim population lives in the inner city conurbations of London (37.4%), West 
Midlands (14%), North West (13.2%), and Yorkshire and Humber (12%). 
64 In Blackburn one in three residents is Muslim, and in some other some cities and towns, such as 
Bradford (24.7%), Birmingham (21.8%), and Slough (23%), Muslims constitute over a fifth of the resident 
population. Amongst the capital cities of Britain, London is the place with the largest Muslim population. 
65 In several London boroughs Muslims form between one-third and one-fifth of the resident population: 
Tower Hamlets (34.5%), Newham (32%), Redbridge (23.3%), and Waltham Forest (21.9%). 
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and Wales.66 Some researchers have pointed to the overrepresentation of 
Muslims in less well-off areas, especially inner city neighbourhoods, as indicative 
of structural inequality and high levels of deprivation and disadvantage 
experienced by the community.67 Focusing on the linkages between settlement 
patterns and acculturation, others have claimed that the clustering of Muslims in 
particular areas represents self-segregation, isolationism, and communities 
living ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle Report 2001: 9),68 but the accuracy of such claims 
has been questioned.69  
To a large extent, residential polarisation can be explained by the process of 
chain migration, which led to the ‘transplantation of whole villages’ in the 
diaspora (Menski 1993: 254),70 and by the higher birth rate amongst the Muslim 
population than other groups in the particular areas concerned (Simpson 2004). 
For this reason we find that Punjabis for instance are predominant in 
Birmingham, Sylhetis in East London, and Mirpuris in Luton, Slough and 
Bradford. Researchers have also pointed to other explanatory factors for the 
uneven spatial distribution: many migrants on arrival opted for cheaper housing 
(and unskilled work) in inner cities so that they could send remittances without 
delay. Earlier waves of migrants tended to gravitate towards each other because 
of common goals and fears, for many wished to lay the foundations of a 
community within which the essentials of Islamic (and cultural) life could be 
                                                          
66 The Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 (IMD 2010) considers seven dimensions when considering 
multiple deprivation: income, employment, education, barriers to housing and services, health, crime, and 
living environment.  
67 See in detail Choudhary et al (2005); Beckford et al (2006); Gale and Hopkins (2009). 
68 See also Phillips, T. (2005); Phillips, M. (2006).  
69 See Peach (1996); Simpson (2004); Phillips, D. (2006). 
70 See also Anwar (1979: 21-6); Halliday (1992: 61-2); Shaw (1988: 22-5); Ballard (1994: 8); Ansari 
(2000: 40-6 & 145-165); Shaw (2014: 27-30); Nielsen (2004: 40-61).  
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nurtured.71 Later generations of Muslims have elected to continue to cluster in 
order to sustain communal ties and, even if it means a situation of a very varied 
Muslim population (or ummah), to have close access to community 
infrastructure such as mosques and madrassas (Abbas 2005: 37). Looking at the 
concentration of Bangladeshi Muslims in East London, Dench et al (2006) show 
that members of this community have tended to cluster together to feel a sense 
of solidarity, and as a mechanism of self-protection from prejudice, which since 
9/11 has developed into widespread Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate 
crime.72 Although lots of Muslims have elected to live in Muslim dominated 
areas, a smaller minority, bucking the trend, have chosen to distance themselves 
from the majority community, representing a sort of ‘inter-Muslim flight’. Both 
trends are much more relevant for socio-legal analysis, as this study identifies, 
than researchers have so far realised.  
The density of Muslims in particular areas adds up to considerable electoral 
power, especially when read together with the fact that many aspects of public 
control and organisation are in the hands of local government. Looking at the 
first party in Europe that is dominated by Muslim leaders, Peace (2013) shows 
how the Respect Party has managed to achieve significant electoral success by 
focusing on constituencies with high numbers of Muslim voters, which 
previously had represented ‘safe seats’ for the Labour Party. In 2010, the first 
directly elected Muslim mayor in Britain took office in the London Borough of 
Tower Hamlets. In the recent national elections a record number of Muslims (13) 
                                                          
71 See in detail Lawless (1995: 218-244); Ansari (2004a: 121-144); Gilliat-Ray (2010: 183-186). 
72 See The Runnymede Trust Report (1997); Vertovec (2002b: 19-35); Werbner (2005: 5-9); Allen 
(2010); Lambert & Githens-Mazer (2011). 
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secured a seat in parliament, but the figure, which corresponds to about 2 
percent of MPs, fails to match their share of the population.  
The 2011 Census also revealed significant inequalities experienced by Muslims 
in Britain. The unemployment rate in particular was closer to double the national 
average (7.2% compared to 4.0%); over a third (37%) of 16-24 year olds were 
unemployed despite almost one in four having a degree or above qualification.  
The picture in relation to women was even bleaker: Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
females had the lowest employment rates of all ethnic groups in Britain, with less 
than a third in employment.73A growing body of research is now showing that 
Muslims are experiencing the ‘double penalty’ of racial discrimination and 
Islamophobia in the labour market despite race, ethnicity, and religion being 
protected characteristics under the 2010 Equality Act.74 This may partly explain 
why many Muslims are opting for self-employment.75 
When it comes to the criminal justice system, Muslims (especially Asians and 
Somalis) are heavily overrepresented, making up 13% of the prison population 
in England and Wales. Since the Macpherson Report (1999) the impact of 
institutional discrimination has received greater recognition, but in terms of 
explanatory factors researchers have also highlighted broader issues of social 
disadvantage at play as well (Ali et al 2015: 43; Svenisson et al 2012).  
 
                                                          
73 This is not to say that the low female unemployment is not due to other factors, for example, linked to 
patriarch.  
74 See in detail Heath & Martin (2013); Khattab & Johnston (2014: 1358-1371).  
75 See Rafiq (1992: 57) who looks at the development of Muslim businesses in the UK with a particular 
emphasis on the northern city of Bradford in the context of Asian business development as a whole. More 
expansive research on this phenomenon is needed. The MCB estimates that 33.6% of small to medium 
Enterprises in London are Muslim owned. According to the ONS, 32% of Pakistanis and Bangladeshi’s 
owned or worked in hotels or restaurants.  
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2.4  What did the migrants bring with them? 
Though the specific push-pull factors behind their migration varied, each 
migrant brought with them their own peculiar ‘cultural luggage’: a rich mixture 
of their ethnic inheritance (distinctive cultural, religious, and linguistic 
traditions), acquired life experiences and affiliations, and a legal consciousness. 
This study focuses on two important items brought over by all Muslims (or 
inherited in the case of British-born generations) in their cultural luggage: 
shari‘a, and urf (described variously as urf, rivaj, rewaj, adat, heer and so on).  
Before we turn to briefly look at both, it is worth noting that neither in everyday 
life exists in pure form, rather each exists as a complex, plural amalgam of 
different ‘bricks’ (Menski 2006: 279-379). In their long history of interaction 
each has attempted to usurp the other, transforming the elements appropriated 
into their own image and likeness. Salafi Muslims in particular have been 
preoccupied by the task of separating an idealised form of Islam based on the 
practice of the ‘pious predecessors’ (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ) from lived experience, 
which is perceived to have been corrupted through conflation with traditional 
custom.76 While not mutually exclusive, and despite the difficulties created by 
cross-fertilisation, the separation of shari‘a and urf in broad terms is useful for 
analytical purposes, enabling us to see how Muslims read, and negotiate their 
daily world.  
Muslims call the totality of Islamic norms shari‘a (see in particular Johansen 
1999: 38-39). Like its Jewish counterpart halakhah, Chinese Tao, and Hindu 
dharma, shari‘a means the right action or path (to follow). When it comes to its 
                                                          
76 For a useful discussion of the distinction between ‘scholarly Islam’ and ‘everyday Islam’ see Alam 
(2007).  
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normative reach, shari’a is said to be (or provides) a complete way of life (Anwar 
1979: 158-169; McDermott and Ahsan 1980: 7). The primary source of shari‘a is 
the qur‘an, believed by Muslims to be the word of God, upon which all else is 
dependent and built, including the other sources of shari‘a: the sunnah (sayings, 
practices and traditions of Prophet Muhammad), ijmā (consensus or agreement 
of the Muslim community77) and qiyās (analogical reasoning) (Hallaq 1997:1). 
The latter, though facilitating law much in the same way as stare decisis or 
precedent does in common law systems, is regarded as a source of law. For Shi‘a 
Muslims, the authority of the Imam replaces ijmā and qiyās.  
All Muslims agree that shari‘a as revealed is the will of Allah so it only takes one 
form; is sacred, immutable and universal. At the same time, Muslims recognise 
that the law of God has not been given to humans in the form of a ready-made 
code or finished product. Instead rules have to be extracted from the sources 
through human husbandry (Weiss 1998: 22-23). The interpretative process of 
extraction is known as ijtihād (‘striving’ or ‘exerting’); the end product of this 
juristic process is known as fiqh (‘understanding’). In the absence of a central 
authority or caliph (one exception is that of Isma‘ilis), jurist-scholars came 
forward from within the community to provide relevant guidance or fiqh for 
members. In the early centuries of Islamic legal history, thus, schools of fiqh 
formed around leading fuqaha‘(jurists), which led to distinct schools of law – the 
madhhabs. There were dozens in the past, most disappeared and others merged 
by the 10th century. In present times, adherents of at least four classical Sunni 
                                                          
77  There is no agreement over whether ijma refers to consensus of that of the first generation of Muslims 
only; or the consensus of the first three generations of Muslims; or the consensus of present jurists and 
scholars of the Muslim world; or of all the Muslim world, jurists, scholars and laymen. On establishing 
consensus see Rahim (1995: 115-136); Hallaq, (1997: 75); Weiss (1998: 122-126). 
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(Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali), and three Shi‘a (Ithnā'ashariyyah (or Twelver 
Shi‘a), Ja’fari, Ismāʿīli) schools of law are found in Britain.  
By the middle of the 10th century, the variety of legal concepts and tools that 
were being used by the fuqaha‘, such as, qiyās, ijmā, maslaha (public interest), 
were consolidated into an interpretative methodology undergirding the process 
of ijtihad and came to be known amongst Sunni Muslims, who constitute 85-90 
percent of Muslims worldwide today, as usul al-fiqh (‘the roots of law’, or 
‘principles of understanding’). In the same century, some researchers state that a 
consensus was reached amongst Sunni jurists that major matters of ‘law’ had 
been settled allowing for taqlid – the established legal doctrines of the madhhabs 
to take priority over ijtihad.  As Schacht (1964: 70-1) notes, ‘all future activity 
would have to be confined to the explanation, application, and, at the most, 
interpretation of the doctrine as it had been laid down once and for all’.  This 
movement towards taqlid described as the ‘closing of the gates of ijtihad’ has 
since been cited as the cause that led to Islam to become a rigid and static 
system, which society could no longer shape rather it came to control society. As 
a result the legal manuals of the madhhabs were elevated in the minds of many 
Muslims to the level of the sources of shari’a; the muqallid replaced the mujtihad. 
Other scholars, including Hallaq (1984), point out that the controversial idea of 
the gates of ijtihad closing did not arise until the 12th century, but in any event 
never truly happened in theory or practice amongst a large number of jurist-
scholars.     
Fiqh categorises shari‘a norms as either relating to `ibadat (ritual worship) or 
mu`amalat (dealings and transactions between people) (Rahnema 1997: 106); 
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and, in terms of obligation to obey as: fardh (obligatory), mustahabb 
(recommended), mubah (neutral), makrooh (discouraged), or haraam 
(forbidden) (Fyzee 2008 [1949]: 16-17; Rahman 1979: 83-84).  Where fiqh on a 
particular issue is unclear from the perspective of the individual or judge, s/he 
may make a request to an expert on religious law (mufti) to provide a legal 
opinion (fatwā). Unlike the legal ruling of a court, a fatwā is a non-binding legal 
opinion and is left to the individual’s discretion: s/he may respect or ignore it.  
Once an individual has freely chosen to embrace the religion, Islam demands full 
allegiance (Kettani (1990: 226). This does not mean that Muslims cannot accept 
other norms; issues mainly arise when conflict with fardh or haraam norms 
occur, but even then Islamic jurisprudence has developed several mechanisms 
and concepts that facilitate compromise, such as darura (necessity), ikrah 
(duress), and maslaha (public welfare) (Fadl 1994a: 179). In the event that 
compromise is not possible the Muslim is required to adopt the position that in 
any ‘encounter between Islam and unbelief, Islam must dominate’ (Lewis 1994: 
13) since:  
[…] it is Allah’s laws alone that are acceptable to the Muslim and no other 
temporal or sovereign authority can command his obedience; this is the essence 
of the social contract within a Muslim community (Nyazee (1996: 118).  
 
In attempting to comprehend shari’a as a legal order, there are three points we 
can therefore note from this brief synopsis. First, we are dealing with a 
pluralistic legal order to its very core. Unlike shari‘a that is the product of God 
and therefore perfect, fiqh is the product of human engagement with the textual 
sources of Islam and therefore imperfect and fallible. This was widely accepted 
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by classical scholars, and exemplified by the statement ‘and Allah knows best’ 
(wa Allahu a‘lam).  The expression was invariably used each time they concluded 
discussions and legal opinions. Difference of opinion (ikhtilaf) was therefore 
embraced, not seen as something problematic. By extension no fatwa has 
monopoly, and for any particular set of facts, there can quite legitimately be 
several opinions, if not more. Second, the distinction between shari‘a and fiqh 
ensured that the ‘law’ could never be inert rather it is in a perpetual state of 
conceptual development (Hallaq 1984; Weiss 1998; Johansen 1999). In other 
words, fiqh is responsive to varying circumstances and across time and space, 
whereas shari‘a only is unchanging. This is why translating shari‘a as simply 
‘Islamic law’ without noting the context is problematic since it obscures this 
critical conceptual distinction between shari‘a and fiqh. Third, there was no 
general apparatus, such as the state, that applied Islamic legal codes in the way 
that we are now accustomed to in the modern era (Jackson 1996). The 
development of fiqh rather was a bottom-up process, beginning often with a 
request for a fatwā (Masud, Messick and Powers 1996: 4). This is not to say pre-
modern rulers did not apply ‘Islamic law’, but they did so by giving force to 
particular fiqh opinions and this was regarded as an expression of the ruler’s 
siyāsah (policy) authority. The separation of siyāsah from fiqh helped preserve 
the latter as an independent sphere of activity, separate from administration.78  
To understand the forms of fiqh brought over to Europe by Muslims, or for that 
matter that operate in postcolonial states today, we must also take account of the 
role of European colonial powers, which shaped, even actively constructed these. 
                                                          
78 For a useful description of shari‘a and the relationship of fiqh and siyasa in sharia-based legal systems, 
see Quraishi (2012).  
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The codification of Islamic law in India, North Africa, and elsewhere to aid 
colonial administration led to the entrenchment of particular understandings of 
shari‘a.79 In the process, modifications were inevitably introduced reshaping 
Islamic legal positions according to the colonisers’ preconceptions and 
interests.80 The resultant ‘Anglo-Muhammadan law’ survives to some extent as 
part of Muslim personal law codes, including in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
in the area of family law. Among Muslims of South Asian origin in Britain it 
therefore also survives to some extent since they have brought their 
understandings of ‘Islamic law’ with them to Britain.  
Understandings of shari‘a were also modified or re-shaped by Muslim 
communities themselves in response to colonial rule. With the removal of the 
Muslim ruler and accompanying mechanisms of governance by the colonial 
officer, the community had to source that sustenance elsewhere (Robinson 2009: 
212-3). Muslims renewed their investigation into fundamental texts. Part of the 
reason for this was that the preferences for written documents had led to a 
perceived superiority to oral testimony or custom. The result was a shift towards 
increased orthodoxy.  
Following the Indian Rebellion of 1857-8, various reformist and revivalist 
movements emerged. Reformists sort through ijtihad to reinterpret long-
standing fiqh in ways that could be reconciled with European norms and colonial 
                                                          
79 Based on the majoritarian and/or most powerfully voiced claims, in the Indian Subcontinent British 
colonial officers codified mainly Hanafi fiqh, while their French counterparts in North Africa codified 
forms of Maliki fiqh. 
80 See for details Anderson (1995). It is one of the ironies of contemporary history, given the role British 
colonial officers had in its construction and administration, how much fear and resistance there is to 
Islamic law amongst non-Muslim Britons, and on the part of the state.  
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rule, or conversely that could be robust enough to displace or overcome foreign 
rule.  
Of particular relevance since they have been imported to Britain are three rival 
movements, which at times unified against the colonial threat to Islam. The 
revivalist Deobandi movement, founded a decade after the failed revolt, sought 
to bolster the authority of the traditional ulema to address the perceived 
corrupting effects British imperialism and English education was having on the 
religion. Ulema based at the Deoband seminary (Darul Uloom Deoband) in North 
India sought to purify their religion, by purging mystical practices and other 
innovations (bida‘ah) seen by them to be contrary to ‘true’ Islam. They 
emphasised the importance of taqlid (imitation of past legal rulings) as the way 
to renew scriptural adherence to shari’a.81 The desire to purify the faith was 
shared by the Ahl al-Hadith movement, or Salafi, also referred to as Wahabhism 
by opponents after its founder, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1702/3-91).  
Founded in Nejd, and today the established form of Islam in Saudi Arabia, it was 
imported into India in the 19th century.82 Its puritanical ulema declared Sufism 
and Shi‘ism as heretical innovation (bida‘ah), and urged Muslims to reject the 
learned exegesis developed by ulema of the four madhhabs. There was, then, no 
basis for taqlid, which they branded as ‘blind imitation’. Instead, a return to the 
‘true’ Islam of prophet Muhammed and his companions (ṣaḥāba) meant 
returning to the earliest teachings of the first three generations of Muslims, 
namely, the ‘pious predecessors’ (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ).83  
                                                          
81 For a useful account of the movement see Moj (2015).   
82 For details see Allen (2005: 87-93). 
83 Interpreted as the first three generations of Muslims, that is, the generation of the Prophet and his 
Companions (ṣaḥāba), the generation that followed (tābi‘īn), and their successors (tābi‘īn al-tābi‘īn). 
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To counter the influence of both movements and the perceived moral and 
intellectual decline of Muslims – the Barelvi movement emerged in the 1880s.84 
It sought to defend a version of a local manifestation of Hanafi shari‘a centered 
on devotion to Prophet Muhammed that could be propagated by the established 
channel of ulema, but also pirs. Unlike the Deobandi or Salafi, Barelvi’s revere 
saints and shrines and believe that prophet Muhammed, although human, had 
mystical powers, including knowledge of the unknown (ilm-ul-ghaib) since he 
possessed a divine light (nur) that predated creation.  
The significant differences in ideology produced bitter criticism on all sides, and 
some hardliners from each movement went as far as to declare the ‘other’ as 
apostate. All these groups regard the Ahmadiyya movement, also founded in the 
colonial context in 1889, as heretical. This is because of their belief that their 
founder was not just a mahdi (guided one), but also an actual prophet, a 
successor to prophet Muhammed himself. All of these groups have influenced the 
development of the Muslim community in the West where there have been large 
migrations of South Asians, particularly Britain. It is not difficult to see this when 
one takes a look at mosque affiliation in Britain. According to one source there 
are 1804 recorded masjids and prayer rooms that are actively being used 
(October 2015). Of these, 43.2% are Deobandi, 24.8% Barelvi, 8.6% Salafi, and 
1.3 % are Ahmadiyya.85   
What went on during the colonial period thus continues to have a lasting legacy 
on the makeup and outlook of the Muslim minority communities in Britain, and 
elsewhere in the West. Many of the ideas and images of ‘Islam’ that inhabit us, 
                                                          
84 For details see Sanyal (2005).   
85  ‘Uk Mosque Statistics /Masjid Statistic (2015), Muslims in Britain Report, available at 
(http://www.muslimsinbritain.org/resources/masjid_report.pdf accessed 05/10/15). 
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which we assume to be important or even peculiar to the religion are in fact 
outcomes of the mutually influencing relationship between colonial powers and 
Muslim reactionaries.  
Unlike shari‘a, the relevance of urf in the legal lives of Muslims in Britain and 
elsewhere in Europe has received much less research attention. This may partly 
be explained by the fact that commitment to shari‘a is easy to identify. To borrow 
Goffman’s (1959) vocabulary, this commitment appears ‘on the stage’ while the 
attachment to custom remains hidden ‘behind the scenes’, making Muslim 
practical attachment to custom more difficult to apprehend. Writing about the 
struggle of Muslims to have Islam acknowledged as a legitimate source of value 
pluralism in the Western context, Shah (2013: 61) argues that the religious 
aspects of Muslim law, with their doctrinal justifications, are foregrounded, while 
customs conversely are suppressed because they are seen as remnants of 
paganism within a religion. He refers to this process as ‘shariatization’. Custom, 
as bandied around in Western discourses, is also often seen as something very 
old and being supported by less social pressure than other types of rules (Allott 
1980: 50). Criticising this view, Yilmaz (2005a: 28) points out that ‘[c]ustom has 
regularity like law. It also defines relationships. Both custom and law are 
sanctioned’. This view was widely accepted in the past, including in Britain. 
Francis Bacon who went on to serve as both Attorney General and Lord 
Chancellor of England, had no doubt that custom, and not law, was ‘the principal 
magistrate of man’s life’ ([2011: 501] 1765).  
Focusing on South Asian Muslims in Britain, Ballard (1994: 4; see also 2008: 49-
50) says that when it comes to solidarity and mobilisation religious affiliation 
65 
 
may be more important than mere nationality, as illustrated by the Satanic 
Verses affair, but a closer look reveals that it is the networks of reciprocity, 
namely caste (zat), and descent group (variously, got, qom, patti, biraderi or 
tabbar), that provide the framework for most settlers’ everyday lives.86 In an 
early study exploring familial practices amongst Pakistani Muslim (and 
Christian) families in Bristol, Jeffery (1976) records the ability of the biraderi to 
control its members, especially when involving izzet (variously, prestige, honour, 
status), which if endangered resulted in punitive action. On the same point, but 
in relation to the Somali diaspora, Haji-Abdi (2013) explains that a look at the 
population in Britain reveals that it is ‘divided into tribes, clans and sub-clans, 
which are based on a system that has very clear pyramid-shaped layers’. The 
hold of tribalism is such that, 
When meeting someone for the first time, a Somali is more likely to ask ‘which 
tribe do you belong to?’ rather than ‘where are you from?’ (Haji-Abdi 2013: 6). 
 
Underlining the importance of the tribal or clan norms to the Somali, (2013: 73) 
exclaims that one only needs to look at the recent political history of Somalia to 
understand that ‘ethnic loyalty easily trumps loyalty to Islam’. Besides religion, 
custom may actively and creatively resist state law (Fitzpatrick 1986: 67). 
Galanter (1981: 23) goes as far as to say that in fact state law may have to 
operate in the ‘shadow of indigenous ordering’.   
Urf, then, can be seen as a form of folk law and in fact has over the years been 
described as ‘people’s law’, ‘indigenous law’ and ‘customary law’. Intimately 
intertwined with myths, folktales, legends, proverbs, riddles, and so on – many 
                                                          
86 On the relationship of zat and biraderi see Blunt (2010: 10) 
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‘legal anthropologists’ like von Savigny (1831: 14)87 saw custom as the backbone 
of folk law.88  
2.5 How should they adapt?  
The arrival of immigrants, not just Muslims, to Britain has perennially led to 
discussion of how the newcomers adapt or should adapt. The multifaceted 
debate is occurring on both sides, and the views and arguments presented by the 
‘host’ community, or by the newcomers themselves, are informed by numerous 
social and psychological factors, including the perception that each has of the 
other’s expectation. Writing about refugees in Lincoln, Nebraska (which she 
exclaims is ‘the middle of everywhere’) Pipher (2003) explains the relevance of 
what she calls ‘cultural brokers’: members of the settled community who 
befriend newcomers and help them adjust by teaching them about their new 
environment, their new neighbours, and the cultural lens used by locals to 
interpret their daily life. Adding a further layer of complexity to the ongoing 
discussion is the fact that the ‘host’ or ‘majority’ community, (or rather ‘settled’ 
                                                          
87 It is difficult to say with any certainty when the ‘anthropology of law’ began. Mertz and Goodale (2012: 
79) explain that one reason for this is that what today would be classified as anthropological studies of 
law, or legal systems, were being conducted by scholars long before there was a self or peer 
consciousness of ‘legal anthropology’ as a distinct and legitimate sphere of legal research and writing. 
They outline usefully different points in time that one could legitimately arrive at when tracing the roots 
of an anthropological scholarship, including as far back as 5th century BCE (Herodoctus 484–425 BC) or to 
eighteenth century France (Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, 1689-1755). They also note the contribution 
of another notable early writer in this field, namely Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861): his 1814 
anti-codification pamphlet, Of the Vocation of Our Time for Legislation and Jurisprudence, ‘made the 
argument that law and legal institutions are the unique expressions of a people’s culture and history and 
cannot be understood apart from them’ (2012:79). Rouland (1994: 67) also notes the contribution to the 
birth of legal anthropology made by von Savigny, citing his influential concept of volkgeist that conceived 
law as intimately connected to the people of a society that produced it and thus best approached through 
anthropological methods.  
88 Allott & Woodman (1982: 4) provide a useful typology of studies that have been conducted on ‘folk 
law’. They believe studies can be sorted into three categories:  (a) so-called ‘traditional laws’ that 
developed before state laws claimed jurisdiction over the societies, which may have been transformed 
during subsequent social change; (b) relatively new laws of groups whose members are predominantly 
within technologically advanced societies; and (c) ‘indigenous laws’ of minority ethnic groups which find 
themselves today within technologically advanced societies. For a more recent collection of work on the 
importance of folk laws see Renteln & Dundes (1995).    
67 
 
communities), include members who themselves arrived as immigrants some 
time ago or are of immigrant heritage. They can espouse a variety of different 
views over how the newcomers adapt or should adapt.  
Turning to the newcomers, we must equally be mindful of the pitfalls of 
generalising their attitudes and approaches to adaptation. For some newcomers, 
since they are ‘twice’ or ‘thrice’ migrants, the issue of adaptation is not new. For 
all newcomers however, the issue of adaptation becomes more complicated if 
they decide to start a family in their new country of abode. Several studies reveal 
intergenerational conflicts over adaptation. Although some researchers are 
drawing out the various dimensions of the ongoing debates around (immigrant) 
acculturation, that is, the process of cultural and psychological change that 
results when different people or cultures interact, there still remains 
considerable confusion over what the process involves. 
Over the years, acculturalists have developed different models, and used 
different methods and measurements.89 Until the late 1960s, the prevailing 
literature mainly saw acculturation as involving a process of assimilation. It was 
assumed that newcomers would discard their native culture, and adopt the 
culture of the ‘host’ community. The assumption can also be seen in the 
reasoning of several English judges dealing with ethnic minorities and their 
                                                          
89 Gordon (1964: 71) lists seven ‘variables’ or types of assimilation that could be used to assess, and 
compare, the degree that immigrant groups have achieved assimilation: (1) ’Cultural or behaviour 
assimilation’ (newcomers adopt language, dress, and daily customs of the host society (including values 
and norms)); (2) ‘Structural assimilation’ (large-scale entrance of minorities will enter cliques, clubs and 
institutions in the host society); (3) ‘Marital assimilation’ (widespread intermarriage); (4) ‘Identification 
assimilation’ (the minority feels bonded to the dominant culture); (5) ‘Attitude reception assimilation’ 
refers to the absence of prejudice and discrimination; (6)’Behaviour reception assimilation’ refers to the 
absence of prejudice and discrimination; and, (7) ‘Civic assimilation’ occurs when there is an absence of 
values and power struggles.  
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‘customs’ or ‘mores’.90 Underpinning the assumption was an ethnocentric bias, 
that British and more broadly Western culture and values, informed by Judeo-
Christian and Hellenistic traditions were superior. The process of assimilation 
placed the burden of adjustment only on the newcomers and, as native culture, 
religion and identity would ‘melt’ away in the process of adjustment, conjured up 
the image of a ‘melting pot’. Through the process of assimilation, which could 
take up to a generation,91 the view was that a new ‘citizen’ would emerge and 
find meaning, identity and culture from the new mode of life s/he has embraced, 
the state s/he obeys, and the new rank s/he holds.  
This vision of how newcomers were likely to behave came under increasing 
scrutiny, and by the 1970s a number of studies came to show that newcomers 
did not necessarily discard or lose their native ethnic identity or culture in the 
process of adjustment. Instead, minorities were adopting a two dimensional 
approach, described as ‘integration’,92 which involved them striving to maintain 
their native heritage and identity on the one hand, whilst adopting aspects of the 
‘host’ culture. Subsequent acculturation research shifted from a mould 
examining the adaptive behaviour of newcomers only to include that of ‘settled’ 
or host members, assessing changes that occurred to their culture and identity. 
In the process of mutual adjustment researchers began to more actively engage 
with the fact that social constructs such as ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’, and ‘identity’, 
                                                          
90 Jones & Welhengama (2000: 88) highlight that ‘in some older cases, judges openly took the view that it 
was necessary to educate migrants and their descendants about how they should live in this country 
‘according to our way of life’ (Mohamed v Knott [1968] 2 A11 ER 563, at 568), or how they should 
conduct themselves ‘without violating the ethos of Christendom’ (see Baindail (otherwise Lawson) v 
Baindail [1946] 1 A11 ER 342 CA, at p.344-5). 
91 Poulter (1986: 161) for example thought that assimilation would occur amongst subsequent 
generations through education, mainly in schools.  
92 Other researchers have preferred to use the term ‘biculturalism’ (see for example Benet-Martinez & 
Haritatos 2005) or ‘enculturalism’ (see for example Weinreich 2009).  
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although containing references to an enduring larger historical context, are not 
static or closed-ended. Each construct can be re-shaped by collective and to a 
lesser extent individual experience, with often much room for selectivity, 
rearrangement and outright innovation (Calhoun 2007). We should therefore not 
be surprised that all around us we can observe the development of new 
ethnicities (e.g. BrAsian),93 new cultures, (e.g. valayati-rivaj), and new living 
laws, (e.g. angrezi shariat).94 At a macro-level, several metaphors have since been 
used (e.g. ‘mosaic’, ‘salad bowl’, ‘kaleidoscope’) to describe a society where 
different cultures and ethnic groups mix, but remain distinct in some aspects.  
Over the course of the last half-century in Britain, various models of 
acculturation have been championed, sometimes appropriated by policy-makers 
against a backcloth of chequered responses of public opinion at the local and 
national level. By the 1970s, the project of assimilation had lost favour.95 
Sivanandan (2006) locates the origin of its replacement, namely 
‘multiculturalism’, to the ebb of a united anti-racist struggle built by grassroots 
campaigners.96  It seems that several things came together in the early 1980s 
that led to the government ‘appropriating’, rather than embracing, this form of 
multiculturalism. One can point to the growing sway of postmodern identity 
                                                          
93 See the volume edited by Ali et al (2006). Several contributions problematise neat categorisation of 
people into types of national identities or ethnicised minorities. Instead, they forward the use of 
hyphenated categories like ‘BrAsian’ to understand the lived experience British South Asians.  
94  Angrezi-shariat, an urdu term meaning British-Muslim law, involves Muslims building the 
requirements of official or state law into the requirements of shari’a as necessary or expedient. For an 
account of how angrezi shariat was developed by Muslims see Pearl & Menski (1998: 74-80; Menski 
2001). 
95 The point often cited as the turning point is 1966, when Roy Jenkins, then Labour Home Secretary, 
backed the policy of ‘integration’ that he notably defined as ‘not as a flattening process of assimilation but 
as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Jenkins 
1967: 267).  
96 ‘Britain’s shame: from multiculturalism to nativism’. Available at http://www.irr.org.uk/news/britains-
shame-from-multiculturalism-to-nativism/ (accessed 04/02/12).  
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politics, international developments (Canada and Australia had embraced types 
of ‘multiculturalism’ in the late 1970s), and domestically the Scarman Report 
into the ‘race riots’ of 1981. Lord Scarman’s inquiry concluded that the issue was 
not institutional racism or class inequality rather individual prejudice and ethnic 
disadvantage were to blame. Unlike the 1981 Rampton Report, the 1985 Swann 
Report into the underachievement of ethnic minority children, arrived at similar 
conclusions. It was then thought that this could be remedied by meeting the 
cultural or ethnic needs of minorities and this paved the way for 
multiculturalism to become the official government policy, but it was a different 
type to the one campaigned for by activists like Sivanandan. This does not mean 
what followed with the change in direction was not good for (minority) citizens; 
some things were, but others (like pitting one ethnic group against another for 
funds or favour that bred resentment) were not. With sections of the left 
embracing the new tool of social progress, 97  the golden decade of 
multiculturalism followed. Even during its heyday conservative and right-wing 
groups criticised the project, as a threat to native values and identity, labelling it 
as political correctness hysteria and as something that gave preferential 
treatment to some. Events following the 1988 Satanic Verses affair not only led 
to the demarcation of an Asian and Muslim identity, that hitherto had been 
amassed into the general ‘Black’ category, but caused liberals to question their 
support. Others also began to raise their misgivings, claiming that a ‘soft 
                                                          
97 Conversely some on the left saw it as an apolitical form of cultural relativism, or a tool that separated 
people on the basis of ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ rather than unifying them on the basis of class, and thus 
inherently opposed its use. 
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multiculturalism’ of equal rights had grotesquely morphed into a divisive ‘hard 
multiculturalism’ of positive promotion of ethnic and religious identities.98   
Several things have happened since 2001 that have led to a retreat from 
‘multiculturalism’: the summer riots in the northern cities of Oldham, Bradford 
and Burnley, 9/11 & 7/7, the increasing conflation of multiculturalism with 
‘uncontrolled immigration’ and ‘home grown terrorism’, and something that has 
allowed ‘foreign’ value systems like shari‘a to take root in Britain. The British 
media has played a major role in the discourse against multiculturalism. Many 
journalists and tabloid newspapers have displayed an intense preoccupation 
with a purported ‘Muslim threat’. 99 Among the various media framing 
mechanisms that el-Aswad identified, he notes the suggestions that Muslims 
aspire to impose shari‘a law and, more disturbingly, that they are ‘terrorists’ 
(2013: 47).100 These discourses need to be interrogated for a variety of reasons, 
not least because they create roadblocks to a peaceful multicultural coexistence. 
In recent years, media reporting has especially focused on the ‘obscenity’ of 
‘parallel sharia courts’, ‘shari’a controlled zones’ in East London, and alleged 
plots to introduce an extremist Islamic ethos in our British schools that came to 
be known as the ‘Trojan Horse affair’.101 The policy of multiculturalism has also 
come under attack because it has been framed as having prevented public 
                                                          
98  See Goodhart (2012): ‘Immigration and Multiculturalism’. Online report (available at: 
http://fivebooks.com/interview/david-goodhart-on-immigration-and-multiculturalism/ (accessed 
04/05/14).  
99 See for details Eade (1996); Werbner (1996); The Runnymede Trust Report (1997). 
100 See for details Richardson (2009); el-Aswad (2013). 
101 2014 saw intense media coverage of the so-called ‘Trojan Horse’ affair – an alleged plot to introduce an 
‘islamist’ ethos in a number of state schools in Birmingham. Four separate inquiries were launched into 
the allegations and similar claims. Ofsted also conducted inspections at 15 city schools. The Education 
Commissioner for Birmingham found no evidence of terrorism, radicalisation or violent extremism, but 
did find a number of people in position who ‘espouse, endorse or fail to challenge extremist views’ (for 
details see the Clarke Report 2014). 
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authorities from piercing the ‘cloak of oppression’ that hides barbaric and 
harmful (Muslim) cultural practices such as ‘forced marriages’, underage 
marriages, ‘honour killings/murders’, FGM/FGC, congenital birth defects that 
ensue from the practice of cousin marriages (especially directed at the Mirpuri 
Pakistani community in Britain), and the grooming of girls by ‘Asian gangs’.  
The Cantle Report (2001), which looked into the 2001 ‘urban disturbances’ (it 
choose not to use the term ‘race riots’), was one of the first government-
commissioned reports to officially suggest a new policy direction away from the 
multicultural model. The replacement model of ‘community cohesion’ that it 
proposed, although incorporating some features of the multicultural project, 
supposed that ethnic minorities had been given too much cultural expression 
and that this, in itself, had led to polarised communities ‘leading parallel lives’, 
characterised by   ‘ethnic segregation, limited cross-cultural interaction and the 
absence of a shared identity and values’ (Robinson 2008: 8). As Sivanandan 
notes,  
[…] the thinking this time ‘was not on the lines of ‘ethnic disadvantage’, as 
Scarman had it, but of (too much) ethnic advantage, too much ‘multiculturalism’, 
not enough integration/assimilation or the much more euphemistic term 
‘community cohesion’ (Sivanandan 2006: no pagination).102 
  
Although local reviews into the towns most affected by the riots came back with 
at least other explanatory factors,103 the Denham Report 2002, which was part of 
the same administrative process, was commissioned by the Home Office to 
propose how the risk of future ‘disorder’ could be minimised. It made the 
                                                          
102 http://www.irr.org.uk/news/britains-shame-from-multiculturalism-to-nativism/ (accessed 
02/24/13). 
103 The Ritchie Report looked at the socio-political conditions of the ethnic minorities involved, as well as 
the local policies adopted in relation education, housing and so on.  
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overarching recommendation that the achievement of community cohesion must 
be the central aim of government, reflected in all policy-making.  
Over the next decade, different definitions of community cohesion at the national 
and local levels emerged, illustrating varying degrees of thinly disguised 
assimilationist tendencies. Nevertheless, the concept was widely adopted in 
Britain, and some of the ideas and approaches that developed have also been 
embraced internationally, including by the institutions of the European Union.  
The latest policy offering of ‘active muscular liberalism’ by the Conservative 
government is still unravelling. Shaped in the context of (Islamic) terrorism it is 
an extension of the line of thinking that created ‘community cohesion’. Muscular 
liberalism however more forcefully rejects the multicultural project, branding it 
a failure, importantly because it harmfully moved from the tolerance of 
particular types of cultural expression to advocating for the tolerance of multiple 
value systems. It seems to have a greater assimilationist tendency because it 
bypasses that many ethnic minorities suffer poverty, inequality, and racism, 
instead it emphasises the need for (Muslim) minorities to recognise the 
‘responsibilities’ of citizenship, to be less, well, ethnic, by adhering to ‘British’ 
values to the exclusion of all others.  
In his attempt to shed light on when assimilation or integration may occur, Berry 
(1980) developed a four dimensional model that asks two interrelated questions 
as seen in figure 3 below: 
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.  
The oft-cited model however has several limitations: Berry refers to integration, 
assimilation, separation and marginalisation as acculturation attitudes, but this 
assumes that ethnic minorities are free to choose as they please. For a variety of 
reasons, this may not be the case. Other researchers, notably Ward and Kennedy 
(1994), point out that the second question, focusing on the value of maintaining 
relationships with other groups ought to be replaced since it does not tell us 
directly what the attitude of minority members is towards the ‘host’ culture. The 
value of contact with other groups is rather different from that of valuing the 
cultural identity and characteristics of other groups.  
One other major limitation of Berry’s model, but also of acculturation research 
generally, relates to the importance of recognising that people’s acculturation 
preferences can differ according to the context or situation in which the 
behaviour takes place. For example, young female Mirpuris might show more 
behaviours corresponding to their ethnic heritage when being around family 
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members, while displaying more behaviours fitting into the ‘dominant’ culture 
when at work.104 This chameleon-like behaviour is not something peculiar to 
ethnic minority females. Minorities, living multicultural lives, often move 
between their heritage culture and the culture of the ‘dominant’ community by 
adapting their attitudes and behaviours in response to the cultural context, a 
process that has been variously described as ‘code switching’, ‘cultural frame 
switching’, and ‘cultural or legal navigation’.105 
Taking a different approach than that of cultural orientation to understand 
acculturation, others, for instance Hutnik (1991), have focused on examining 
‘identity’, that is, they have investigated whether minorities identify themselves 
with their ethnic culture, faith, the host culture, or all of the aforementioned.106 
This approach is different from that proposed by Berry’s model, or that adopted 
by behaviourists examining practices of ethnic minorities, since commitment to a 
particular identity requires conscious endorsement, whereas cultural orientation 
or behaviour may not. This helps us see, for example, that a Somali living in 
Cardiff may behave in the same way as native Welsh people, but, in their mind, 
they still unambiguously identify with, and explain their behaviours through, 
Somali culture.  
Turning back to Muslim migrants in Britain, along with the growing British-born 
generations, they have had to decide, as their predecessors had to before them, 
                                                          
104 Investigating the adaptive behaviour of Turkish minorities in the Netherlands, Arends-Tóth & Van de 
Vijver (2002, 2008; see also Zane & Mak 2003) show that for Turkish-Dutch members having both 
cultures in their lives was important, but the importance varied across ‘domains’. Turkish-Dutch 
members preferred adjustment to the Dutch culture more in the public domain, than in the private 
domain, whereas cultural maintenance was deemed important in both domains. Similarly, amongst first 
generation Asian Indians in the United States, Sodowsky & Carey (1987) found a strong preference for 
Indian cuisine and dress at home, but American cuisine and dress elsewhere.  
105 See Ballard (1994); Menski (1993); Yilmaz (2005a); Qayyum (2014). 
106 See also Bhamra (2011).  
76 
 
the terms and degree of their adaptation. Do they affiliate themselves to the 
British state, to their zat (caste) and biraderi (clan), to their firqah (sect), 
madhhab (school of fiqh), a British or European Muslim community, or to the 
global ummah? Do they adopt multiple or overlapping identities, or should they 
privilege one aspect of their identity over others? Would their choice be 
respected, and what would the legal implications be? These questions have 
forced Muslims to (re)evaluate many of their shari‘a and ethnic norms, but in the 
process of finding answers for themselves they have also provoked questions 
about liberal Britain and its limits of tolerance for difference. Before proceeding 
to examine what decisions Muslims are making in practice, it is important to 
consider what guidance Islamic jurisprudence provides for Muslims living in 
‘non-Muslim lands’ (in the West) so that they can live in accordance with shari‘a. 
 
2.6 What guidance does Islamic jurisprudence provide? 
If we briefly ask what guidance does Islamic jurisprudence provide for Muslims 
living in non-Muslim lands, over the ethical and legal duties that they owe to 
shari‘a and to their host polity, we see that no uniform answers are forthcoming 
(Fadl 1994a). One reason for this is that the current scenario of Muslims 
voluntarily migrating to live in non-Muslim lands is something new. From the 
very beginning of the history of Islam, jurists have discussed the predicament of 
the Muslim under a non-Muslim regime, but their deliberations have related to 
the believer being a temporary visitor, a traveller or captive, a recent convert, or 
the unhappy inhabitant of a Muslim country conquered by unbelievers 
(temporarily). Lewis (1992: 13) also explains that ‘the possibility never seems to 
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have entered their minds that a Muslim would voluntarily leave a Muslim land in 
order to place himself in this predicament’.  
The Christian conquest of Muslim Iberia, or Reconquista, triggered a great 
intellectual crisis for Muslims (see in detail Verskin 2015). With the fall of 
Grenada in 1492, vast Muslim populations came under non-Muslim rule and 
caused jurists to confront the question: can ’Muslims stay or must they emigrate 
to a Muslim land?’(Lewis 1992: 6).107  
The answers varied, for there was no consensus over what constituted dār al-
Islām (the territory or abode of Islam) and dār al-harb (the abode or territory of 
war).108 Fadl (1994a: 153-164) says that raw from their defeat, jurists from the 
Mālikī school adopted an absolute and uncompromising view, asserting that 
Muslims were duty bound to leave their capitulated lands and seek refugee 
under the rule of Islam. In contrast, many Hanafi and Shafi‘i jurists maintained 
the view that a territory under non-Muslim rule could still be part of dar al-Islam 
and, depending on the conditions, it was morally imperative for Muslims to 
maintain Islam in foreign lands; whereas, jurists from the Hanbali and Shi‘i 
schools typically were of the view that though not ideal such residence was not 
                                                          
107 Examples in the early period of Islam offer two alternative approaches for Muslims experiencing 
‘hardship’ related to their faith when living in non-Muslim lands: to undertake hijrah (emigration) to a 
more hospitable (preferably Muslim) jurisdiction,107(particular importance is placed on the fact that the 
final prophet of Islam himself emigrated from Mecca to Medina in order to escape persecution and, on his 
advice, his early followers emigrated to Abyssinia to seek refuge), or to remain, and exert themselves with 
other Muslims to preserve an Islamic identity (jihad); thus safeguarding shari‘a as a way of life. Both 
approaches are permissible (halal), but the reward (sawāb) for the latter is more, for it provides an 
opportunity to fulfil a core duty placed on the Muslim: to call or invite people to Islam (daʿwah).  
108 The carving up of territory between dār al-Islām and dār al-harb by classical Islamic thought 
represented the opinion that Muslims can only live an Islamic life in  dār al-islām. for it was a territory 
governed by shari‘a. The binary framework, of ‘us’ and ‘them’ until they converted or were overcome 
through jihād, became a central theme in discussions when Muslims started living outside Islamic 
territory (for details see Fadl, 1994a; 1994b).  
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in itself un-Islamic and was permitted provided that Muslims were secure from 
harm, and able to manifest or practise their religion.  
The qualified nature of the mandate to remain on non-Muslim territory led to 
more confusion and uncertainty as no consensus since has been reached over 
what constitutes ‘harm’, or the point a Muslim can be said to have been 
prevented from ‘manifesting’ or ‘practising’ their religion. Is the line crossed if 
one is not able to perform acts of worship, such as prayers, wear religious garb, 
such as the burqa, or when Muslims cannot apply the laws of shari’a in their 
totality? The answers are very relevant to Muslims across Europe, who in recent 
years have seen the banning of the burqa in public places in France, a 
constitutional amendment banning the building of new minarets in Switzerland, 
and the criminalisation of established halal practices relating to the ritual 
slaughter of animals (dhabiha) in Denmark. Petitioning the ECtHR, Muslims 
appeals were rejected in relation to the first two decisions and, given that 
Muslims can access halal meat that has been slaughtered outside Denmark, it 
seems very unlikely that the apex court would find a violation under article 9 
ECHR.109 
Reflecting on the jurisprudential guidance available, one can see that a variety of 
different views/rulings exist. Given the peculiar historical circumstances in 
which many of these views were shaped, some Muslims have argued that they 
have limited relevance to the current scenario, particularly for Muslims in 
Britain. As a result of the decision of many Muslims to settle and raise their 
children in countries characterised by non-Islamic culture and rule, a new 
                                                          
109 See Cha’are Shalom Ve  Tsedek v France [2000] ECtHR (No. 27417/95) (27 June 2000). 
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jurisprudence in recent years has been developed by some jurists, known as fiqh 
al aqalliyyāt (‘fiqh for Muslim minorities’), to provide them with guidance. Two 
prominent Muslim scholars, Taha Jabar al-Alwani in the US, and Yusuf al-
Qaradawi in Qatar, assert that the need for fiqh al aqalliyyāt arises because 
inherited fiqh does not adequately take account of the contemporary status of, 
and dilemmas faced by, Muslims living under non-Muslim rule. According to al-
Alwani, who coined the term, 
‘Fiqh for minorities’ is a specific discipline, which takes into account the 
relationship between the religious rulings and the conditions of the community 
and the location where it exists. It is a fiqh that applies to a specific group of 
people living under particular conditions with special needs (al-Alwani 2010: 3). 
 
On the question of whether the West is a non-Muslim land, al-Alwani breaks 
away from the traditional division of territory as either comprising dar al-Islam 
or dar al-harb, or even dar al-ahd (the territory or abode of truce). Instead he 
feels that territory can be sorted as being either dar al-Islam or dar al-dawa 
(territory or abode of invitation (to Islam)). This view, he concludes, more 
appropriately recognises the internationality of Islam (alamiyyat al-Islam) (al-
Alwani 2001: 55-58 cited in Fishman 2006: 4). The emphasis on the element of 
da‘wah, as other contemporary Muslim scholars have also pointed out, allows for 
the permanent residence of Muslims in non-Muslim lands, for as long as shari‘a 
as a way of life is protected (Shadid & Koningsveld 1996: 96; Maréchal 2008: 
265). In al-Alwani’s view Muslims living in the West, unlike their coreligionists 
living in dar al-Islam, are surrounded by a non-Muslim social and cultural order, 
by laws made by man (qanun wad‘i) rather than God (shari‘a), and therefore 
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have had to deal with a range of unique problems: over diet, dress, marriage (to 
non-Muslims) and so on, to more challenging dilemmas, concerning the 
enforcement of shari‘a, preservation of an Islamic identity, and the management 
of conflict between positive law and shari‘a (al-Alwani 2010: 6). Having 
developed the doctrinal basis on which they could formulate their fatwās, al-
Alwani founded the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) in 1988, and has since 
become an authoritative figure for many Muslims living in non-Muslim countries 
(Fishman 2006: 2-3). For al-Qaradawi, who is also a major figure in the 
wasaýiyya (Islamic moderation) movement,110 Muslims are duty-bound to live in 
and influence non-Muslim countries because they currently lead the world 
(Polka 2013: 36). The doctrine of fiqh al aqalliyyāt therefore is a necessary 
development to enable these Muslims to flourish, and fulfil their global mission 
of maqasid al-shari‘a (goals/purposes of shari‘a) through peaceful means and 
persuasion.111 He details several essential principles of fiqh al aqalliyyāt. 
Important amongst these are, that there is no Islamic jurisprudence without 
ijtihād, and any rulings made must observe the rules of al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya 
(Polka 2013: 34).112 The latter deals with the principles by way of which the 
rulings involving new occurrences are identified in the absence of a clear decree 
                                                          
110 The doctrine of wasaýiyya is derived from the Qur’ānic verse 2:143: ‘Thus we have appointed to you a 
middle nation (ummat wasat), yet ye may be witnesses against mankind and the messenger may be a 
witness against you’. It represents a ‘middle way’ between polarising currents in Islamic thought, whether 
described as historical or evolutionary, traditionalists and modernists, or fundamentalists and liberalists. 
For Al-Qaradawi the doctrine offers a way by which Muslims can be re-united in Islam.  
111 Maqasid al-shari‘a refers to the essential goals/purposes of shari‘a.  These are commonly understood 
to be: protection of religion (deen), protection of life (nafs), protection of offspring or progeny (nasl), 
protection of intellect (‘aql), protection of wealth or property (mal). Classical scholars, frequently 
discussed maqasid al-shari’a: after al-Juwayni (d.1085) the doctrine was developed by al-Ghazali (d.1111 
CE), and was most notably added to in the 14th century, by Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328) and Al-Shatibi (d. 
1388 CE). In recent years, several prominent Muslim scholars have also advocated for, and contributed to, 
the development of the maqasid approach, making it a key feature of how they read and negotiate 
challenges in their contemporary context. See details see  Auda (2008).  
112 For details of al-qawa‘id al-fiqhiyyah (normative maxims or principles) see Musa (2014).  
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in the qur‘an, sunnah, or ijma. Another important defining feature is that the rule 
that enables rulings to be adjusted in light of custom (urf), time, place and 
circumstances should be implemented. In terms of rulings, they should follow 
the principle of gradualism (tadrîj), avoid adherence to any specific 
madhāhib (school of legal thought), seek public interest (maṣlaḥa) and therefore 
take account of human necessity (darura), need (hajah) and improvements 
(tahsinat); rulings should also facilitate (taysir) rather than impose strictness. As 
to its normative reach, the doctrine of fiqh al aqalliyyāt offers a comprehensive 
framework, dealing not just with personal questions related to comprehension 
(fiqh) and action (aʿmāl), but also how Muslims can interact, socially, politically, 
legally and so on, with non-Muslims, as well as within the Muslim minority itself. 
 To establish/develop fiqh al aqalliyyāt, al-Qaradawi founded in 1997 the Dublin-
based European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR).113 Its primary aim is to 
enable Muslims to achieve ‘integration without assimilation’ (Caeiro 2010: 444). 
Consisting of self-selected scholars and clerics, the ECFR publishes religious 
rulings/explanations (fatwā) to meet the needs of Muslims in Europe. Since its 
establishment, several publications, institutions and websites have developed 
and advocated the doctrine, while others have either rejected it altogether, 
(criticising the notion that Muslims in the West need a ‘special system of fiqh’), 
particular terms of reference and models used by al-Alwani and al-Qaradawi, or 
specific rulings under its auspices; largely on the basis of leniency.  
During its almost two decades of existence, the ECFR has given several rulings 
that have departed from long-standing fatwās/consensus, including permitting 
                                                          
113 The organisation’s website is available at www.e-cfr.org (accessed 04/8/13). 
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(even obliging) Muslims to participate in elections, to run for political office, 
(when there is no alternative), to bury their dead in non-Muslim cemeteries, to 
obtain a mortgage to buy a home and student loans to gain an education, even 
though being party to an arrangement involving usury (riba al-qarud) is in line 
with traditional interpretations strictly forbidden in Islam. With reference to 
family law, contrary to the opinion of the major schools of sunni and shi‘i law, 
Muslims can adopt a child and give that child their last name to meet the legal 
requirements of positive law. Although females cannot marry non-Muslims, 
female converts, again in contrast to established consensus, are not required to 
divorce their non-Muslim husbands, provided that their ability to profess their 
religion is not restricted; moreover, they can receive inheritance from their non-
Muslim relatives.114  
On the matter of integration, in contrast to the position adopted by other 
prominent jurists, the ECFR in 2007 ruled that there is no contradiction between 
receiving (European) citizenship (muwatanah) and loyalty to shari‘a (al-wala' 
wa-l-bara'). To prevent segregation and isolation Muslims should, it suggests, 
demonstrate controlled flexibility, openness and engage in reciprocal 
relationships with non-Muslims. The ECFR has also instructed that shari‘a 
encourages them to abide by the laws of the nation state; to know the language, 
customs, and procedures of the society they live in; to participate in public life 
and to promote the public interest; to earn their own livelihood; and, to be 
productive and avoid unemployment (Polka 2013: 39-40).  
                                                          
114 The fatwas that the ECFR has given can be accessed on its website.  
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For the ECFR when it comes to instances of conflict of interest between qanun 
wad‘i (positive law) and shari‘a, or, put differently, between a Muslim’s civil and 
religious obligations, there are no obvious answers: ‘it depends’. This is not to 
say that god’s law is not always and unequivocally more important than man-
made law. Rather, the ECFR recognises that by following positive law, or a civil 
obligation, on some occasions a Muslim is still following shari‘a. In such 
circumstances, faced with two opposing shari‘a-compliant acts, in arriving at a 
judgment over the right course of action, the jurists of the ECFR employ the 
‘doctrine of balance’ (fiqh al-muwazanat) and the ‘doctrine of priorities’ (fiqh al-
awlawiyyat). Put into practice, this translated to perhaps the ECFR’s most 
controversial ruling: following a query by a Muslim chaplain in the U.S. army, the 
ECFR permitted the participation of Muslim soldiers in the war against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan following 9/11, provided the soldier had done his best to 
avoid direct combat. However, the general position remains that if a Muslim is 
compelled (as opposed to being permitted) to perform actions that are forbidden 
by shari‘a (muharramat) s/he must refuse, and if circumstances become 
untenable, emigrate (hijrah) to a more hospitable jurisdiction. 
Although seemingly controversial, what al-Alwani and al-Qaradawi through their 
respective fatwā bodies (FCNA & ECFR) are attempting to do is to fill the ‘vacuum 
of authority in modern Islam’ (Fadl 2009: 35-37). Since its earliest beginnings 
Islamic jurists had a pivotal role in providing authoritative guidance in Islam, but 
as a consequence of colonialism and the replacement of shari‘a by legal systems 
based on Western models, they lost their privileged position and with it their 
ability to influence through fatwās – society, law and politics on a large scale (see 
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in detail Fadl 2009: 26-36). Since the 18th century, many jurists in their own 
ways have attempted to address the ‘crisis in authority’, and the discourse of fiqh 
al aqalliyyāt can be seen as a continuation of these reformist projects.115  
Besides the FCNA and ECFR, there are other transnational institutions/fatwā 
bodies, ‘Internet Imams’,116 as well as (self-appointed) muftis in the Islamic 
world offering guidance to Muslims in and outside dar al-Islam. The list includes: 
the Muslim World League in Mecca, the dār al-iftā’ at the al-Azhar University in 
Cairo, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı in Ankara, which also has a branch in Cologne-
Ehrenfeld to cater for the religious needs of the large Turkish minority in 
Germany. Offering an alternative to fiqh al aqalliyyāt, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia-
Hercegovina Mustafa Cerić has developed a ‘Muslim Social Contract’ theory, 
modelled on the ‘Covenant of Medina’, to enable Muslims to negotiate mutual 
obligations, and to positively engage on a socio-political as well as intellectual 
level in wider European society. Similarly, the French imam-theologian Tareq 
Oubrou in his effort to provide guidance has developed what he calls a ‘shari‘ah 
of the minority’, which ‘minoritises’, ‘localises’ and ‘relativises’ Islam as a religion 
in a pluralist liberal milieu through the use of ‘classical jurisprudential devices 
(such as fatwas), contemporary hermeneutics and critical thought, and through 
personal communion with the divine (spirituality)’ (Hashas 2014: 365). Another 
influential figure for European Muslim youth in particular is Swiss-born 
theologian Tariq Ramadan, who argues that a ‘self-conscious’ rethink of the role 
                                                          
115 In particular, see the efforts by Sayyid Jamāl al-Dı̄n al-Afghānı̄ (1838-1897), his student Muhammad 
‘Abduh (1849-1905), and his student Mu|ammad Rashı̄d Riÿā (1865-1935).  
116 One can discern a significant trend mainly among British Muslim youth that involves them seeking 
legal opinions as part of a process of self-and-peer-education. Based elsewhere in the world, but it seems 
especially in North Africa, Turkey and the Gulf, internet imams or sheikhs dispense advice via emails, 
blogs, chatrooms (etc.). Local imams now find that their authority and influence has to be won, not simply 
accepted as may traditionally have been the case.  
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of shari‘a and fiqh is necessary, but should not be directed from a minority point 
of view (Ramadan 2005: 53). Instead, what he calls ‘transformation reform’ 
requires shifting from the traditional Islamic focus on law and legal norms onto 
the broader Islamic ethics (Ramadan 2009: 33). Through intellectual creativity, 
an endeavour different from innovation, Ramadan argues that (European) 
Muslims must find their own answers to contemporary challenges by ‘being 
faithful’ to the traditional techniques, such as maṣāliḥ and maqasid, and by so 
doing, even if they arrive at answers different from the ones suggested by him, 
they will ‘both reassert their belonging within mainstream Islamic tradition and 
assert their cultural and social belonging in Europe’ (Nielsen xiv in Ramadan 
1999). Offering to fill the vacuum in authority are also a generation of Western-
educated Muslim intellectuals, who are largely self-taught on religion, able to 
provide answers using a simple logic in an accessible language, when providing 
peer-education.  
With a variety of parties, ‘moderate’ and ‘puritan’, institutions as well as (self-
appointed) muftis, coming forward to fill the vacuum in authority, this has given 
rise to a number of competing voices,117 intellectual controversies, and arguably 
even a ‘jurisprudential chaos’  Fadl (2009: 29). It is within this wider context that 
Muslims in Britain and elsewhere in Europe have to make decisions concerning 
their daily life. 
 
                                                          
117 In March 2015 Imams Online launched a new online magazine, ‘Haqiqah’, which aims to reclaim the 
digital space from extremist ‘muftis’. See for details: http://imamsonline.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Haqiqah-What-is-the-Truth-Behind-ISIS.pdf.  
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2.7 The reconstruction of Muslim identity and norms 
Prior to the introduction of immigration restrictions in the 1960s, most Muslims 
who arrived in Britain never intended to become permanent settlers. The ‘myth 
of return’ was deeply embedded in the psyche of early South Asian migrants 
(Anwar 1979; Gardner & Shukur 1994: 153). Feelings of imminent return, for 
instance, amongst Somalis led them to not campaign for their social needs (el-
Solh 1991: 548), and for Iraqis to refuse long-term employment that might have 
led to permanent settlement (al-Rasheed 1992: 541-3). It is now widely 
recognised that the immigration restrictions of the 1960s and 1970s were 
instrumental in the creation of a permanently settled Muslim population in 
Britain (Holmes 1988: 26). Muslims who wanted to ensure the continuation of 
remittances had to stay on. In addition, two other factors played a crucial part in 
the transition from sojourn to settlement: the phenomenon of family reunion,118 
and the fact that air travel and long-distance telephone calls became much 
cheaper. The latter enabled immigrants to actively maintain transnational links. 
In more recent years the rapid growth of the internet and the mobile phone 
network has enabled transnational communities anywhere in the world to better 
maintain multi-polar links.119 Following the collapse of the myth of return 
settlers began to put down local roots. How this was done varied among different 
communities and among individuals themselves. The aim here is to present some 
of the main issues which have characterised the general Muslim experience of 
living in a country that in many ways was alien to them. 
                                                          
118 See in detail Wahab (1989: 7-11).  
119 This phenomenon has also enabled Muslims to be part of any number of ‘network societies’ (Castells 
1996) in which they can live and act in relation to long-distance (Muslim) ‘virtual’ peers, in sometimes 
enormous online communities.   
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Writing about the South Asian experience, Ballard (1994: 12) reports that the 
shift in mind-set led to settlers making ‘vigorous efforts to rebuild almost every 
aspect of their social and cultural traditions’. Particular factors were especially 
significant in the (re)construction process. In the first place, settlement patterns 
played an important role. Being in close proximity to other Muslims, to one’s 
kinship especially, motivated Muslims to (re)construct Muslim norms and values, 
and even at times stirred up izzet competition (Ballard 1994: 11). Within groups 
it was understood that the more religious, or cultural, one and one’s family were 
seen to be the greater the social standing – or status – they were accorded by 
their Muslim peers, tribe and/or kin. Many Muslims therefore felt under constant 
pressure to be (or seen to be) committed to urf and shari’a in the diaspora. 
Secondly, the phenomenon of family reunification accelerated the 
(re)construction process: ‘many wives saw themselves as joining their husbands 
to ‘save’ them from being estranged from their culture and religion’ (Nielsen 
1991: 47; see also Shaw 1994: 49-52). The establishment of families led to an 
instant return to networks of kinship and village as primary reference points 
(Ellis 1991: 365).120 Thirdly, lots of Muslims viewed the lifestyle and values of 
the majority native British with some distaste, certainly something not worth 
emulating. In relation to izzet, especially, it was felt that the native ‘English 
seemed to lack all comprehension of what it meant’ (Ballard 1994: 10).  
Muslims rapidly developed life-cycle rituals, (especially associated with birth, 
marriage and death), local infrastructure, (e.g. mosques, madrassas, ethnic shops 
                                                          
120 Illustrating the heterogeneity of responses, many Bengali Muslims choose not to call their wives to 
Britain at all (see Gardner and Shukur 1994: 153-4). 
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and restaurants), community advisors, imams,121 biraderi and clan-based ADR 
and shari‘a councils, second tier (or umbrella) organisations and so on. The 
rising number of mosque registrations in particular serves to illustrate the extent 
of Muslim commitment to their religious, but also cultural, norms.122  Apart from 
providing a place for communal prayer, mosques became a key hub where 
information was shared and discussed regarding what was happening in the 
‘biraderi’ or clan and more broadly the community.  
One can also point to various organisations set up by Muslims, including the 
London-based United Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA). In 
1988 it brought together the UK Islamic Mission (est.1962), the Islamic 
Foundation (est.1973), and the Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO) (est.1976), 
to lobby Penguin publishers to withdraw the infamous Satanic Verses written by 
Salman Rushdie, and the government to ban it. The Muslim Institute (MI) set up 
in 1974, originally as a foundation for research, established a number of 
organisations to help address the needs of, and shape, the British Muslim 
community, including the Council for British Muslims (CBM) that it hoped would 
act as a ‘Muslim Parliament’ in Britain, and the Halal Food Authority (HFA). The 
CBM was the key recommendation of the MI’s ‘Muslim Manifesto: A Strategy for 
                                                          
121 Muslims established institutions dedicated to the training of imams, including in 1981 the Muslim 
College in Ealing and in 2000 the Markfield Institute of Higher Education in Leicester. Since then various 
other institutions, including universities, have developed imam-training courses. In 2006, the Mosques 
and Imams National Advisory Body (MINAB) was set-up by Muslims (and to some extent constructed by 
government as part of its strategy to counter radicalisation and extremism). It aims to raise standards by 
the promotion of a set of core standards over how imams and mosque committees should conduct 
themselves primarily through the provision of infrastructure support.  
122 In 1963 a total of 13 mosques were registered in Britain (Vertovec 2002a: 21), rapidly increasing to 
177 in 1977 and to 338 in 1985 (Nielsen 1987: 387). Today, there are over one hundred mosques in 
London alone. Many of these institutions, such as the Islamic Centre of England in Maida Vale, and East 
London Mosque/London Muslim Centre, serve not only as places of worship, but are the focus of 
community life, providing a range of services, advice and information, and jobs for men and women in the 
local communities. 
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Survival’.123 The document also provided guidelines for Muslims over how they 
could remain faithful to their religion, outlining their duties and responsibilities 
to both the state and shari‘a, raised some of the problems faced by, and 
grievances, Muslims had living in a secular nation, and suggested in addition how 
the state could foster better relations with the Muslim community. Both the 
UKACIA and CBM did not have popular support either of government or British 
Muslims, partly because of ideology and the perceived unhealthy links that each 
respectively had with the Saudi and Tehran governments. This gave rise to the 
establishment of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997.124 
The MCB was founded (and to some extent constructed) to act as a single 
‘representative’ voice of the disparate Muslim communities in negotiations with 
government. In essence, it was modelled on the Board of Deputies of British 
Jews, which for decades has been the ‘representative’ of Jewish communal 
interests to government. For some years it was the ‘go-to’ organisation for the 
then Labour government, but lost favour by the mid-noughties when it became 
increasingly critical of the government’s foreign policy, and was accused of not 
doing enough to combat extremism.125 The MCB could no longer ignore the swell 
of fear, anger and resentment that the ‘war on terror’ had initiated amongst 
Muslims general. Though this won it some new credibility amongst some 
sections of Muslims, other quarters continue to see it as ‘out of touch’ and 
unrepresentative. The MCB has strived to be inclusive, but most of its affiliates 
                                                          
123 The document can be accessed at: http://www.muslimparliament.org.uk/MuslimManifesto.pdf 
(accessed 03/10/13). 
124 For a more broader and up-to-date understanding of the extent to which Muslims have established 
local, national and international ‘Muslim’ organisations and associations, from charities to professional 
networks to educational bodies to funeral services, a valuable resource is the ‘Muslim Directory’ (MDUK 
Media).  
125 See in detail Kundnani (2007). 
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are drawn from Deobandi, Jamat-e Islami, and Barelvi Muslims.  Presently, it 
claims to have over 500 affiliated Muslim organisations that include a range of 
local, regional and national organisations, mosques, charities, and schools. From 
the MCB the government moved onto engage with other Muslim voices, including 
the British Muslim Forum and the Sufi Muslim Council. While it did not consider 
them to be any more representative than the MCB, these organisations were 
assessed to be more ‘moderate’ and less openly critical of foreign policy (Gilliat-
Ray 2010:110).126  
As ‘ethnic colonies’ grew in size and became more sophisticated the confidence 
of Muslims also grew. More felt that they could re-establish their family life in the 
alien milieu (Ballard 1982: 189; Ballard 1994: 8). Wahab (1989: 5) reports that 
some Muslims became more devout in the face of what they held was a 
‘corrosive’ British atmosphere than they were back ‘home’. This is not to say that 
some norms, values and practices did not change. Muslims have made some 
modifications and, as we have already discussed, developed new hyphenated 
(but contested) identities. In Ballard’s (1994: 8) view what characterises the 
experience of newer minorities is that they have become an integral part of the 
British social order ‘on their own terms’, and not according to expected 
assimilationist trajectories that placed the burden only on them to adjust 
(Nielsen 1992: 164).  
                                                          
126 Successive governments have considered Sufi and Barelvi strands for some time as ‘moderate’, a 
euphemism for ‘good’, since they have been politically the ‘quietest’ and therefore safe to support. In the 
government’s bid to build a national coalition to challenge and speak out against terrorism, David 
Cameron in 2015 launched another forum by way of which to engage with Muslim voices – the 
‘Community Engagement Forum’. On social media especially, the government’s selection of members has 
raised disbelief from some layers of Muslims. It remains to be seen whether Muslim members of this 
gathering can be ‘representative’ of the very different Muslim voices in Britain. The Community 
Engagement Forum had its first meeting on the 13th of October, hosted by the Prime Minister at Downing 
Street. The forum consists of 30 members, chosen because of their work or expertise on radicalisation. 
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The strong commitment to the (re)construction of Islamic and ethnic identity, as 
this study also shows, is in no way limited to the first generation but extends to 
subsequent British-born generations; though this complex process has not been 
without its tensions. Mirza et al (2007) report a growing religiosity amongst 
sections of the younger generation, who exhibit a much stronger preference than 
their parents for Islamic schools and shari’a law and place a greater emphasis on 
asserting their identity publicly, for example, by wearing a hijab, or by spending 
their time proselytising (daw’ah).127 Several researchers, including Hamid (2011: 
252), have identified how an intersection of alienation from parental values, 
domestic religious institutions, marginalisation from mainstream society, 
identification with international Muslim political events, and the work of active 
revivalist organisations in Britain, have led to an assertive faith-based activism 
amongst layers of second-generation British Muslims.   
Muslim commitment to Islamic and cultural (re)construction also extended to 
the legal sphere, but this process until recently has received only muted 
attention in British legal scholarship, mainly because of received ideas about 
‘law’. Legal theorists and practitioners continue to conceive ‘law’ as a set of 
abstract rules decreed by the state and tied to a territory, rather than as 
something that could have personal application.128 Rahim notes that: 
 
In Muhammadan jurisprudence law is personal in its application to the 
Muhammadans, that it to say, is not affected by the constitution of a particular 
                                                          
127 See also Geaves (2010); Gilliat-Ray (2010); Tarlo (2009). 
128 Carroll (1997: 105) demonstrates this typical position: ‘It is important to realize that in the modern 
world Islamic law, as law, does not exist as some disembodied entity floating in the stratosphere, 
overreaching national boundaries and superseding national law. In the modern world, Islamic law exists 
only within the context of a nation-state; and within the boundaries of any particular state it is only 
enforced and enforceable to the extent that, and subject to the reforms and modifications that, the nation-
state decrees’. 
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society […] thus, if a Muhammadan goes from one state to another, he is bound 
by the same law, and if he does not live within the same jurisdiction of a Muslim 
state, the Muhammadan law still applies to his conscience (Rahim 1984: 47).129  
 
The personal application of ‘law’ is not unique to the phenomena of religion, but 
is equally applicable to customary norms. Ellis (1978: 7) perceptively noted that 
Africans, wherever they may go, ‘‘carry’ the village with them for the reminder of 
their lives’, as if it was in their bone marrow. Similarly, amongst Pakistanis and 
Indians who emigrated to Britain, Pearl (1972: 120) noted that they do not 
discard their deeply engrained family customs.  
The stranglehold of legal positivist ideas continue to hinder our understanding 
that immigrants do not arrive as legal tabulae rasae, but bring with them their 
own legal consciousness, that is, their own understandings and meanings of ’law’. 
This in practice translates to a state of affairs where there is a number of 
normative orderings acting on the individual. For us to be able to see this more 
clearly, or put differently, to understand how Muslims read their daily world – a 
world in which they or their act are subject to multiple, overlapping normative 
orderings – we need to look to adopting the more appropriate lens provided by 
the science of legal pluralism.  
                                                          
129 See also Coulson (1968: 54). 
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Chapter 3: How legal pluralism can help us see how Muslims read their 
daily world  
 
The task of this chapter is to explain how the concept of legal pluralism is able to 
help us to understand, locate and (possibly) explain different types of ‘legal’ 
norms, however configured, their interaction and interdependence, and the 
social significance of their elements on the actors involved. Before we turn our 
attention to legal pluralism, it is important to briefly examine why ‘legal 
modernity’, based on theories of legal positivism and legal centralism, is 
unhelpful.  
3.1 Why legal ‘legal modernity’ is unhelpful  
In speaking about ‘legal modernity’ one may mean many things. Evolutionist 
thought, which gained prominence in the mid-eighteenth century, believed that 
all societies passed through clear and inescapable stages of legal and social 
development, distinguished by increasing complexity.130  The idea of legal 
evolution was developed particularly in Scotland by Adam Smith (1723-1790) 
and John Millar (1735-1801), but appeared in a different form in the thinking of 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) and the German Historical School, while 
in England it gained popularity with the publication of Maine’s Ancient Law in 
1861 (see in detail Stein 1980).131 The movement presented European states and 
their legal systems as the highest stage of development.  Such ethnocentric 
claims were very convenient for European colonisers implementing their 
                                                          
130 Both French and Scottish social theorists were using evolutionary schemes during the 18th century. 
For a useful account of stadial theory see Meek (1976: 5-36).  
131 In his monograph Ancient Law (2013), Maine developed the principle that progressive societies 
developed from systems based on kinship to those of territoriality, from status to contract, and from civil 
to criminal law.   
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imperialist agenda.132 Even after independence it was assumed that post-colonial 
states of Asia and Africa would, and indeed did, follow the European model of 
legal evolution.133 Looking at current debates about Muslim laws in Europe, as 
this study also shows, they too remain influenced by colonial experiences and the 
inferiorisation of non-European concepts and values.  
So what are the key characteristics of legal modernity? Galanter (1966) 
describes ‘legal modernism’ as the movement or sustained efforts, of older and 
newer nations in the past two centuries, towards ten particular features, which 
he lists as (1966:154-5): 
First, modern law consists of rules that are uniform and unvarying in their 
application. 
 
The same rules apply to all citizens, irrespective of their membership of any 
religion, tribe, class, caste, gender and so on. There is no room for personal status 
laws rather a one law for all arrangement is applied across the territory.  
Second, modern law is transactional.  
 
People’s rights and obligations flow from negotiations they have agreed 
(contractual, tortious, criminal and so on), not from inherent worth or 
sacramental honour. Legal rights and duties are not determined by factors such 
as age, gender, class, religion, which are unrelated to the particular transaction 
or encounter.  
                                                          
132 The belief amongst colonisers was such that ‘European civilization could do nothing but good, moral, 
and material to those among whom it arrived’ (Kelly 1992: 303-4). For a discussion of how this was done 
in the African context see Moore (1992). Initially, the approach also dominated legal anthropology and is 
noticeable in some important monographs, (see, for example, Malinowski (1926), and Llewelyn and 
Hoebel (1941). 
133 See in detail Menski (2006). 
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Third, modern legal norms are universalistic. 
 
Methods of regulating are devised that enable legal decisions and rules, once 
made, to become standardised and uniform rather than altered from case to case. 
In this way the application of law is both reproducible and predictable. This 
means, for example, that qadi justice is replaced by Kant’s categorical imperative. 
Looking at the kind of institutional arrangements and techniques that are used 
by nation states to administer these rules, Galanter (1966: 155-6) notes the 
following, 
Fourth, the system is hierarchical […] Fifth, the system is organized 
bureaucratically […] Sixth, the system is rational […] Seventh, the system is run 
by professionals […] Eighth, […] Lawyers replace more general agents. […] Ninth, 
the system is amendable.  
 
This means that in practice institutions, such as courts, have a hierarchical 
structure, in which authority is distributed ‘top-down’. The system operates 
impersonally following prescribed procedures. Each case is decided according to 
written rules and records are kept to permit review. These rules can be 
ascertained from written sources through techniques that can be learnt. 
Functional techniques replace theological or formalistic ones, and rules are 
valued for their utility in producing consciously chosen ends. Full-time 
professionals (trained jurists, examiners and so on) are employed with 
demonstrable qualifications that relate to the mastery of the techniques of the 
legal system itself. The complex and technical system requires lawyers who act 
as intermediaries between the courts and the layperson who must deal with 
them. There is no sacred fixity to the system. Rules and procedures can be 
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changed by methods that are controlled by the state. In this way the state can 
revise rules and procedures according to its preferences. Looking at the 
relationship between law and political authority, Galanter (1966: 156) notes 
that, 
Tenth, the system is political […] Eleventh, [the] [l]egislative, judicial and 
executive are separate and distinct.  
 
Law is so intensely connected to the state that it enjoys complete monopoly over 
all disputes it cognises in its territory. All other bodies, such as religious courts 
or trade associations, are subordinate to the state. The judiciary who is charged 
with applying the law is differentiated in personnel and technique from other 
government functions. 
Under this notion of ‘modern law’, predominant in the West, we can see that the 
sovereigntist and territorial nation-state is adopted as the point of reference for 
law, not mankind or the divine. In fact it becomes no longer possible to 
comprehend law unless the state is presupposed as an underlying social reality. 
In other words, the state marks the border between the ‘legal’ and the ‘non-legal’ 
(Donlan 2015: 21). Law becomes a pragmatic device, an instrument used by the 
state to accomplish its will (Sugarman 1983: 233-245; Moore 1978: 244; Berman 
2000: 333-4). The intrinsic justice or moral worth of legal rules becomes 
irrelevant (Austin 1832: 278; Hart 2013: 185-6). The strong belief is that society 
and all or most of its social phenomena can be decisively influenced in the 
desired direction from the centre of political power, through top-down control 
(Summers 1977). The state tolerates no rivals by means of law over its 
sovereignty, and uniform law is seen as a condition of progress toward modern 
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nationhood (Griffiths 1986: 8). The focus for those seeking to understand law 
becomes what is posited (ordered, decided, practised, tolerated and accepted) by 
the state. In practice this translates to what did the court decide? What bill did 
parliament pass? What order, rule or regulation has the Minister made by means 
of statutory instruments? This vision of ‘modern law’ is largely based on legal 
positivist and legal centralist ideas that, for over two hundred years, have 
dominated Western legal theory. To obtain a deeper insight into legal modernity 
therefore it is important to briefly outline the origin and key ideas of both 
positivist and centralist traditions.  
The origins of modern legal positivist tradition lie in the Enlightenment, which 
proposed a conception of law free from natural law. The mood within Europe in 
the mid-18th century was one of profound scepticism ‘towards traditional 
systems of authority or orthodoxy (especially those of religion), and a strong 
faith in the power of human reason and intelligence’ (Kelly 1992: 249). A parallel 
development, also inspired by the spirit of Enlightenment, was the movement 
towards centralised ‘nation states’. At the heart of this movement, which 
arguably began with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, was the idea of a social 
contract between man and the state. According to this social contract, a nation 
state would take care of its citizens by giving them certain rights but it could, at 
the same time, place certain responsibilities on them. The impact on ‘law’ and on 
the legal systems of Europe was revolutionary. Enlightenment produced 
legislative attempts to unify and codify national legal systems that had 
previously not been seen. Along with Napoleon’s Civil Code, codification 
attempts took place in Prussia and Austria, for the purpose was to modernise 
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and order what was previously a ‘heterogeneous civil law, inherited with a 
bewildering penumbra of local customs and Roman accretions of the middle 
ages’ (Kelly 1992: 262). By the following century, legal thought in England firmly 
developed that law did not have to accord with reason or natural law for it to be 
valid.  With some force, the source of the law was asserted to be the will of the 
legislator. In his version of legal positivism, ‘a command theory of law’, Austin 
(1832) defined laws proper, in other words norms that properly could be called 
‘law’, as commands backed by threat of sanctions, issued by a political superior 
known as the sovereign, to whom people have a habit of obedience.134 The 
theory espoused not the ‘rule of law’, of government subject to law, but the ‘rule 
of men’, of government using law as an instrument of power (Cotterrell 1989: 
74). In the same period, the state began to accept a larger role in social life, 
bringing to an end its previous non-interventionist approach. 135 The change was 
described by Dicey (1926: 409) as the transition from ‘individualism to 
collectivism’. In practice the effects were quite substantial, as the state 
increasingly began to take an active interest in regulating family relationships 
and their consequences. This can be seen, for example, by the introduction of 
secular marriages by the state through the 1836 Marriage Act, and the 
liberalisation of the divorce procedure by virtue of the 1857 Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act, which moved litigation from the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical 
courts to the civil courts.  
                                                          
134 Austin modified the views developed by his reformist teacher, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), who, 
himself, was significantly influenced by the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and 
David Hume (1711- 1776). 
135 This approach favoured the theory of freedom of contract, which viewed the best policy presumptions 
as laissez faire, self-reliance and individual responsibility. For details see Printing and Numerical 
Registering Co v Sampson [1875] 19 Eq 462. 
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In Austin’s view it was logically impossible to have multiple sovereigns, or to 
divide the powers of a sovereign amongst different bodies, with each body 
enjoying habitual obedience. By the mid-twentieth century, however, this 
account had lost influence, especially amongst practising legal philosophers. The 
chief architects of a revised positivism, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), Herbert Hart 
(1907-1992), and Joseph Raz (1939-present) shifted the focus from legislative 
institutions to include law-applying institutions, such as courts, and from the 
imperative and coercive nature of law to theories emphasising the systematic 
and normative character of law. Though there are distinct differences in their 
respective elaborations of legal positivism, they all agree that laws are laws by 
virtue of their form, duly authorised by the political sovereign, irrespective of 
their moral or political content. This is not to say that they didn’t recognise that 
some laws were bad, oppressive, or simply irrational.  
The Concept of Law (1961 [2012]) by Hart is still by far the most influential 
statement of legal positivism in the anglophone world. In it he agrees with 
Bentham that law is all about rules, but he adds there are two kinds of rules: 
obligation-imposing ‘primary rules’ and power-conferring ‘secondary rules’. 
Both types of rules according to Hart enable us to understand law and any legal 
system. The ‘rule of recognition’, the most fundamental secondary rule, specifies 
the ultimate criterion of legal validity,136 which in the English context translates 
to ‘that what the Queen in parliament enacts is law’ (2012: 107). Moreover, 
Hart’s version of positivism argues that analysis of legal rules can and should be 
done by using legal methodology. By this he means techniques and concepts that 
                                                          
136Kelsen’s equivalent is the ‘grundnorm’. For a useful overview of Kelsen’s theory of the basic 
norm see Raz (1974).  
100 
 
lawyers have traditionally used in their analysis. Among these, he tells us, the 
important ones are: ‘sources of law’, ‘interpretation’, ‘validity’, ‘rights and duties’, 
‘ultra vires’ and ‘locus standi’. Most positivists assert that by using these 
concepts they can ‘prove’ that law is something quite separate from morality, 
custom, religion, mores, brute force and politics. 
In the legal centralist view, state agencies occupy the centre of legal life. Law is 
the single, unified and exclusive hierarchical ordering of normative propositions 
of the state (Griffiths 1986: 3-4). This ideology sees unification, that is, ‘one law 
for all’ which is administered by state agencies, as normal, modern, good, but 
also necessary and inevitable. Such assumptions are very much linked to the 
aspiration of a strong, unified, nation state, which in turn is portrayed as the 
mark of civilisation and progress. When it comes to other mechanisms of social 
order in society, such as the family, tribe, church, organisation, voluntary 
association and so on, and their respective normative orders, legal centralists see 
them as hierarchically subordinate to state law and to the institutions which 
implement it (Galanter 1985: 67). From this perspective, the nation-state has 
complete prerogative to decide in what circumstances and under what 
conditions it allows international law, religion, ethical custom, morality, fashion 
or any other ordering to operate within its territory and under its authority. 
Until unification and uniformisation of law from a single validating source – the 
state – is achieved, some allowances, subject to the state’s standards of 
acceptability, can be made for local or group ‘custom’ and heterogeneous 
structures (Griffiths 1986: 7-8). Importantly, the domination, subordination and 
limited recognition by the statist system means that,  
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[…] local attitudes and concerns can no longer find direct embodiment in law. 
They become law only when mediated through ideas of remote lawmakers and 
the techniques of professional judges’ (Galanter 1966: 162-3).  
 
But when it comes to dealing with local and group normative orders, including 
ethnic minority variations, these tend to be viewed with suspicion, treated as a 
modality of ‘primitive’ societies, and are generally deemed problematic (Jones 
1998: 7-8). As a result of legal centralism there is now a widespread ‘tendency to 
visualise the ‘law in action’ as a deviant or debased version of the higher law, ‘the 
law of the book’’ (Galanter 1981: 5). The observation and theorisation of ‘law’ in 
‘primitive’ societies has also suffered overtly and indirectly, by way of ‘false 
comparisons’ with this idealised picture of law in ‘modern’ societies (Griffiths 
1986: 4; see also Allott 1980; Legrand 1996). In both scenarios the phenomenon 
under observation, we are told, is simply not ‘law’. In the West, Griffiths says that 
legal centralism, 
[…] has had such a powerful hold on the imagination of lawyers and social 
scientists that its picture of the legal world has been able successfully to 
masquerade as fact and has formed the foundation stone of legal and social 
theory’ (Griffiths 1986: 4-5). 
On the macro-level, as argued by Menski (2013), we are presented with the 
conception that there are basically three types of legal systems in the world with 
the state at the helm:  
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Menski (2013: 20)  
 
A type 1 legal system, found across Europe, presents itself as applying a uniform 
law to all its subjects and is seen as the ideal global system towards which every 
other system should aspire. A type 2 legal system, for example the Canadian 
model, makes special allowances for a particular indigenous group(s), while a 
type 3 or ‘millet-type’ legal system, such as the Indian and South African model, 
retains the formal recognition of different personal status laws.  
For some time now, theories of positivism, centralism and uniformism, referred 
collectively by Cotterrell (1984: 3) as ‘normative legal theory’ because of the 
status these ideologies hold in the minds of many, have been at the end of 
increasing criticism for their unrealistic and hegemonic view of ‘law’ and how it 
operates in the society it claims to work in. Menski (2013: 7) argues that it is 
simply intellectually dishonest to insist that type 1 legal systems are the 
yardstick against which all other legal systems should be measured. Griffiths 
Type 1
Claims to be uniform law,
but makes exceptions
Type 2
Special place granted for
indigenous people
Type 3
Combination of 
general law and personal law
special exceptions
for indigenous group(s)
personal law system
general law
exceptions
Three types of legal systems in the world
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(1986: 4) describes legal centralism as ‘a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion’. In 
Cotterrell’s view, the criticism is justified because normative theory presents a 
picture of law,  
[…] grounded in abstract philosophical speculation, rather than in the empirical 
examination of actual patterns of legal behaviour or actual social and historical 
contexts in which law exists (Cotterrell 1989: 8).  
 
The irony of the current scenario becomes clear when one considers that early 
advocates of positivism wanted to get away from discussing what law ought to 
be rather to concentrate on what it actually is. Instead, in our contemporary 
times, positivist thought has become ‘a mixture of assertions about how the 
world ought to be and a priori assumptions about how it actually and even 
necessarily is’ (Griffiths 1986: 3). This has led some observers to conclude that 
legal centralism is a hindrance, even the enemy, preventing the observation of 
law in practice and in the formulation of a descriptive theory of law (Griffiths 
1986: 3-4; Mattei 2001: 254). On the same point, in their own way, jurisprudes 
Chiba (1986), Legrand (1996), Woodman (1998), Tamanaha (2001), F. Benda-
Beckmann (2003), Menski (2006) and Twining (2009), have argued that 
mainstream preoccupation over what is ‘legal’ and in this regard the drawing of 
criteria too narrowly, that is, circumscribed by statist, monist and positivist 
ideologies rather than open-ended and empirical socio-legal methodologies, has 
led to impoverished legal research and understanding.  
So what does this mean for our study? Chiba (1986) explains that by mistakenly 
assuming its own universality, (Western) ‘model jurisprudence’ has rendered 
invisible the specific experiences of non-Western cultures, legal systems, and the 
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presence of ‘unofficial laws’ and their underpinning ‘legal postulates’ in any 
given legal system. The latter observation is especially important for our study, 
which seeks to push against the tendency to keep hidden or render invisible 
through defining away non-state normative orders that resist, challenge and 
compete with the normative ordering of the state that popular scholarship only 
regards as ‘law’. In the end, as this study will come to show, observational data of 
actual patterns of behaviour in society present a strong challenge to the view of 
‘law’ suggested by ‘legal modernity’. Rather, legal reality appears as an 
‘unsystematic collage of inconsistent and overlapping parts, lending itself to no 
easy interpretation’ (Griffiths 1986: 4). Muslims in Britain are caught up in a 
multi-dimensional competition between various normative orders that are 
important to them, which includes that of the ‘modern’ state, and normative 
orderings based on shari‘a and urf in particular. This is the actual state of affairs. 
For us to come to grips with this reality, we must discard the blunt tools of 
‘official legal science’ that render this invisible and adopt new ones. We can now 
turn to examine in jurisprudential terms how theories of legal pluralism can help 
us in our task of understanding how Muslims see and experience their lived 
normative (legal) reality.  
 
3.2  Why ‘legal pluralism’ is more helpful 
Unsurprisingly, given the disagreement over ‘law’, legal pluralism too does not 
have the same meaning for everyone (Moore 1986:1 Zahle 1995: 186; Dupret 
2007: 1). The term is however generally accepted to describe a situation in 
which two or more ‘laws’ (legal systems, or orderings) coexist in a social field (or 
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given location), or are obeyed by an individual, group, or population (Michaels 
2009: 3). In this way, legal pluralism is diametrically opposed to legal centralism. 
All legal pluralists share the core credo that the state does not have a monopoly 
on the production or distribution of law (Allott & Woodman 1985: 2; Dupret 
2007: 1). Many are also critical of any single notion of law ‘as universal across 
space and time’, and the state law’s claim to ‘integrity, coherence and uniformity’ 
(Griffiths 1986: 8-14). But there are significant differences amongst legal 
pluralists too. 
F. and K. Benda-Beckmann (2006: 14) see legal pluralism not as a theory but 
merely as a ‘sensitising concept’. Griffiths sees legal pluralism as a concept 
suitable for the development of a descriptive theory of law, and as describing a 
factual ‘state of affairs, for any social field, in which behaviour pursuant to more 
than one legal order occurs’ (1986: 2). Sack (1986: 1-2) takes this one step 
further, for he argues that legal pluralism implies an ideological stance that sees 
plurality as a positive force to be utilised and controlled rather than eliminated. 
In contrast, Santos (2002: 89) is of the view that ‘there is nothing inherently 
good, progressive, or emancipatory about ‘legal pluralism’’.   
Over its occurrence, Griffiths (1986: 38) argues that as ‘legal pluralism is a 
concomitant of social pluralism’, in all diverse (and superdiverse) populations 
we will find the empirically verifiable situation of legal plurality (see also 
Melissaris 2009). For him, then, legal pluralism is simply a fact of life. It has also 
been pointed out that legal plurality is not something new, a contested feature of 
globalisation(s), (post)colonialism, or (post)modernity. It was openly 
acknowledged in ancient times. Menski (2010) in his endeavour to shed light on 
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Sanskrit law found the operation of ‘Vedic legal pluralism’. He notes that ancient 
Indians were much more plurality-conscious and aware of inter-linked legal 
phenomena than researchers have uncovered so far. In relation to Western legal 
orders, Donlan (2015: 18) also identifies that throughout ‘Western history, a 
unified system of national state common laws is the historical exception rather 
than the rule’.  
As we have seen, legal modernity has little to say about non-state law, but other 
legal orderings or unofficial laws exist, emerge and evolve whether the state 
gives them space or not (Yilmaz 2005a). As Griffiths (1986: 13; see also Ehrlich 
1936: 24) asserts, state ‘recognition or some form of incorporation or validation 
is not a prerequisite to the empirical existence of a legal order’. To make sense of 
a plurality of normative orderings, or law as a ‘conglomerate of phenomena’ 
(Sack 1986: 1-2), efforts have led to the emergence of a number of studies since 
the 1980s, assisted by the establishment in 1978 of the Commission on Folk Law 
and Legal Pluralism,137 and by the birth of the Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law in 1981. 
 
3.3 An overview of legal pluralism studies 
Before we move to examine studies of legal pluralism since the 1970s, it is 
important to briefly note the contribution of earlier legal researchers. Testing 
received ideas, Malinowski (1926) in particular led the important movement ‘out 
of the armchair and into the field’. The fertile approach allowed him to reveal 
that a variety of cultural ‘mechanisms’ operated simultaneously to maintain 
                                                          
137 To date, a network with over 400 lawyers, anthropologists and other social scientists as well 
as NGO activists and other policy makers representing all regions of the world.  
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order in the Trobriand Islands, including relationships of reciprocal obligation 
that acted as a binding force in the achievement of compliance. Llewellyn and 
Hoebel’s (1941) careful analysis of ‘trouble cases’, amongst the seemingly 
homogeneous Cheyenne Indians of the Great American Plains, led them to 
conclude 
[w]hat is loosely lumped as ‘custom’ [on the society’s level] can become very 
suddenly a meaningful thing – one with edges – if the practices in question can 
be related to a particular grouping […] there may then be found utterly and 
radically different bodies of ‘law’ prevailing among these units, and 
generalization concerning what happens in ‘the’ family or in ‘this type of 
association’ made on the society’s level will have its dangers. (1941: 53).  
 
The shift of focus from that of society as a whole to sub-groups as the unit of 
analysis to capture a descriptive theory of ‘law’ is also evident in other studies. 
Ehrlich (1936), a lawyer and administrator writing from a social scientific 
standpoint, noted that people’s behaviour is not necessarily dominated by the 
all-encompassing state law, but primarily by the inner practices of ‘associations’, 
what he called ‘living law’. Ehrlich had discovered in the Bukowina, a remote 
province of the Habsburg Empire that besides the centralised legislator and 
judiciary in Vienna, there existed an independent customary law that was much 
more important to the people than the state’s law. For a long time, Kelsen’s harsh 
critique overshadowed Ehrlich’s analyses until later scholars, notably Pospisil 
(1971),138 used his theory and suggested making use of it in describing legal 
                                                          
138 Pospisil (1971: 97-126) saw the occurrence of a ‘multiplicity of legal orders’ as a reflection of the 
patterned mosaic of sub-groups in society, of differing memberships and degrees of inclusiveness. 
Similarly, Smith (1974) argued that the ordering of society could be understood in terms of corporate 
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phenomena in modern societies. Ehrlich’s own work was inspired by that of the 
lawyer and historian, Otto von Gierke, who had pioneered the study of social 
groups and ‘associations’ in German life.  He rooted social control firmly in the 
activity of associations, not the state, and had criticised the newly drafted 
German Civil Code for being inconsistent with German social traditions. Writing 
about law as process, Moore (1978) explains that ‘reglementation’, a term she 
created to describe non-state legal orders, as emanating from multiple ‘semi-
autonomous social fields’ (SASF) that make up society. A SASF, she says, is  
 […] defined and its boundaries identified … by a processual characteristic, the 
fact that it can generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to them’ (Moore 
1978: 58).   
 
In the business or market context, Macaulay (1963) and Hayek (1973) note, in 
their own ways, the priority given by citizens to ‘private ordering’, which takes a 
number of forms, from ‘thick’ configurations that rely on customs and 
behavioural norms based on kinship, communal, or relational exchanges, to ‘thin’ 
configurations, involving individuals who do not know each other but use free 
market signals to coordinate their behaviour for mutual benefit.  
Owing to received ideas about ‘law’, none of these studies expressly referred to 
the concept of ‘legal pluralism’ and some of the researchers decided against 
using the term ‘law’ altogether when describing particular regulatory features of 
social life. The first study to use the term legal pluralism was Gilissen’s (1972) Le 
Pluralisme Juridique, in which Vanderlinden made the main theoretical 
contribution, asking about phenomena both historic and contemporary: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
groups, (which include companies, clubs and families), and these had their own internal rules (or ‘legal’ 
order’). 
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patrician and plebeian family law, the law merchant, canon law, as well as the 
various colonial and post-colonial situations.  
The term became prominent with the publication of Hooker’s (1975) state-
centred study of legal pluralism, for it discussed colonial and neo-colonial legal 
pluralism caused by the transfer of whole legal systems across boundaries. 
Hooker’s is the leading study of the ‘early phase’ of legal pluralism studies, which 
Merry (1988: 872) labels as ‘classic legal pluralism’; while, F. von Benda-
Beckmann (1988: 900) prefers the term ‘early’ discovery of legal pluralism.  
In the early phase, studies conceived normative orders as static and tended to 
treat non-state law as subordinate to state-law in colonial or postcolonial 
settings (Griffiths 1986: 35). Fitzpatrick (1983: 162) is especially critical of 
studies in this early phase because of their lack of sufficient discussion of the 
interaction of normative orders with state law. Yilmaz (2005a: 20) says that 
these earlier studies also tended to mix up the factual reality of legal plurality 
with the state’s responses to it. The next phase of legal pluralism studies that 
emerged, which Merry labels as ‘new legal pluralism’,139 shifted foci in some 
important ways. First, as Moore’s example of the semi-autonomous social field 
that is the New York garment industry illustrates, researchers extended their 
examination to include the occurrence of legal pluralism in Western contexts. 
Secondly, studies moved away from the law and society dichotomy and the 
effects of one on the other, to examine the ‘more complex and interactive 
relationship between official and unofficial forms of ordering’ (Merry 1988: 873). 
To this observation by Merry, we may add that the shift also saw researchers 
                                                          
139 F. von Benda-Beckmann (1988: 900) prefers the term ‘late’ discoveries of legal pluralism, while 
Fitzpatrick (1983: 47) prefers to use the term ‘rediscovery’ of legal pluralism.  
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examine each ‘law’s’ underpinning value system(s), (or ‘legal postulates’ as Chiba 
(1986: 6-7) puts it). Third, studies began to examine day-to-day peaceful living in 
addition to examples of conflict (Yilmaz 2005a: 20). More recent studies, 
described by some scholars as the ‘third phase’ of legal pluralism, elaborate on 
the effects of globalisation(s) on the phenomena of legal plurality. These studies 
have an even broader focus that goes beyond the individual state, group, or 
community, and the dichotomy of postcolonial or Western contexts, toward the 
transnational sphere (Michaels 2009: 4; see also Hertogh 2008: 18-20; 
Tamanaha 2008: 386-390). The state and its law now compete with ‘laws’ 
emanating from other states, as well as intra-national and supra-national 
institutions and actors (see Griffiths 2002: 298-302; Santos 2002: 92; Berman 
2002: 461-78; Jansen & Michaels 2008: 527-540).  
In the last two decades, legal pluralism has been declared a ‘universal fact’ (Riles 
1994: 641), the ‘new paradigm’ that has defeated the ideology of legal centralism 
(Griffiths 1995: 383), and as the fourth major approach to legal theory (Menski 
2006: 186). More recent writing just accepts law as dynamic and plural:  
[l]egal pluralism – the coexistence of multiple legal systems within a given 
community or socio-political space – is a normal state of affairs in all societies, 
but it presents distinctive challenges and opportunities’ (Tamanaha, Sage & 
Woolcock 2012: 1140; see also Melissaris 2009). 
 
By using theories of legal pluralism, in their own ways, scholars from disciplines 
other than legal anthropology have helped to integrate legal pluralism within 
broader theories of society and law. Legal pluralism has not only become an 
                                                          
140See also Tamanaha (2008); Melissaris (2009); Croce (2012).  
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essential reference point in the post-modern vision of law (de Sousa Santos 
1987, 1995, 2002; Twining 2000, 2003, 2009), but has also been analysed and 
placed within neo-systemic theories of law (Teubner 1992, 1993, 1997), as well 
as ‘interpretive’ (Geertz 1973; 1983), ‘habitual’ (Bourdieu 1987; 1990), and 
‘structural’ theories of law (Chiba 1986; 1989; 1993; 1998; Menski 2006; 2011). 
Some exponents of conventional legal doctrine in the West have also found 
notions of legal pluralism useful in understanding and handling the needs of legal 
practice. This is illustrated by the relatively ‘new’ 'concept of ‘polycentricity’, 
which stresses legal diversity within state law.  According to Bentzon,  
[…] researchers interested in Polycenticity are primarily concerned with the 
problematic use of conventional doctrine of the sources of law in the different 
parts of the state administration […] The polycentric character of law presents 
itself by the fact that the different authorities in the different fields of regulation 
use different sources of law and in different orders (1992: 30)141 (cf. wider 
meaning of the term used by Petersen & Zahle 1995). 
 
Researchers examining feminist and ethnic minority legal issues in Britain 
(notably, Menski, Shah, Jones & Welhengama and Yilmaz) have also used theories 
of legal pluralism in order to make it possible to understand a wide range of non-
state norms that constitute an essential part of the (legal) lives of women and/or 
ethnic minorities, which remain invisible if one only focuses on the instruments 
of official (male/white/statist) law alone. The cumulative effect of the prolific 
use of theories of legal pluralism by scholars from various disciplines has 
resulted in legal pluralism to become ‘a major topic in legal anthropology, legal 
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sociology, comparative law, international law and socio-legal studies’ (Tamanaha 
2008: 375).  
3.4 Theoretical issues related to legal pluralism   
In response to the rising use of legal pluralism theories, some objections have 
been raised. At the same time, legal pluralists themselves have engaged in 
intense debates over a number of doctrinal issues, and pointed out that there are 
significant differences amongst them (F. von Benda-Beckmann 2002:72; Dupret 
2007: 1). We now turn to discuss some of these matters (objections against, as 
well as the debates and differences amongst legal pluralists) together with their 
relevance to answering the specific questions with which this study is concerned.  
 
3.4.1 Demarcating the legal from the non-legal 
Against the use of legal pluralism, various scholars have reformulated a basic 
objection to the new paradigm, namely, that pluralists and their allies establish 
clear criteria that enables the drawing of a boundary between legal and non-legal 
rules, or, put differently, the identification of non-state ‘law’ (Tamanaha 1993; 
Roberts 1995; Kramer 2002). The difficulty of the task and potential for 
obfuscation has led some scholars to refrain from using the label ‘law’ other than 
for when referring to the state’s normative ordering. This includes scholars who 
have accepted that it is impossible to establish state law as a finite and separable 
group of norms endowed with a special epistemic status (see Ferrie 1999: 21). 
The difficulties have been acknowledged in some important anthropological 
writings, both explicitly (Merry 1988), and implicitly (Moore 1973 refers to 
normative fields rather than legal systems and Roberts 1979, in his work, refers 
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to orders and disputes). Other scholars whose work has focused on exploring the 
challenges and opportunities presented by legal plurality consider the search for 
a clear-cut definition of what is or is not law irrelevant. Menski tells us that we 
should simply accept that ‘law’ manifests itself in different culture-specific forms 
over space and time, and the ‘key question then ought to be what kind of law a 
particular phenomenon might be rather than agonising over whether something 
is law or not’ (Menski 2011: 2). Similarly, Tamanaha (1997: 128) says that ‘law is 
thoroughly a cultural construct, lacking any universal essential nature. Law is 
whatever we attach the label law to’.  
Such a claim by legal pluralists has been subjected to two major objections. The 
first employs the slippery slope argument, that is, by removing the state as the 
marker of the border between the legal and non-legal all forms of social control, 
from university regulations to table manners are at risk of becoming ‘law’ (see 
Tamanaha 1993). It is claimed that this results in crucial differences between 
normative phenomena to become obfuscated (Merry 1988: 878; see also Moore 
2001). The second objection is that using the term ‘law’ for other normative 
orders than that of the state we may be ‘jamming other peoples’ normative ideas 
into Western Eurocentric categories and thereby distorting them’ (F. and K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 2006: 15 paraphrasing Roberts 1998). For Roberts (2005) this 
de-stabilises ‘the comparative project’ and weakens our capacity to grasp the 
nature of negotiated orders (cited in Twining 2009: 371). 
 F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann (2006) were not convinced by either objection. 
Instead, they set out broad analytical criteria that they say could be used 
satisfactorily to examine different bodies of law that exist empirically which vary 
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in structure, form, content and significance in social life (2006: 12-14).  
According to them, legal pluralism which primarily is a sensitising concept does 
not obscure but rather reveals relevant similarities and differences between 
normative orders, which a narrow concept of law as state law would in effect 
make invisible.  
Other legal pluralists have also put forward criteria that they argue enables one 
to locate and demarcate non-state ‘legal’ norms from social norms more 
generally. Griffiths (1986: 38), for example, using Moore’s popular concept 
locates non-state ‘law’ to ‘the self-regulation of a semi-autonomous social field’. 
Adopting a more state-centric approach, Chiba (1986: 125) limits ‘unofficial law’ 
to those practices that are supported by the general consensus of a group of 
people which distinctively supplement, oppose, modify, or undermine official 
laws.   
This study takes the view that we make,  
 […] the context and purposes of the inquiry supply the criteria for distinguishing 
‘legal’ from other normative orders (Twining 2003: 250).   
 
When adopting an appropriate approach, we must be mindful of the dangers of 
ethnocentrism while at the same time recognising that one cannot completely 
escape from ethnocentric influences (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann (2006: 15). 
In this regard using a plurality-conscious concept is more conducive to 
minimising bias and distortion. Like Merry (1988: 889), this study argues that 
defining the essence of law or social norms is less valuable than situating these 
concepts in particular sets of relations in particular historical contexts. As a 
cultural construct there are many different types of laws depending upon who is 
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asking the question and why they are asking it (see in detail F. Benda-Beckmann 
2002: 39; Cotterrell 2006: 37; Menski 2011: 2). Like Twining (2000: 249) this 
study sees legal pluralism as a species of normative pluralism. Like Ferrie (1999: 
21), it sees both norms and laws (and practices) as points in the same process. 
When it comes to demarcating norms and law, it takes the approach that ‘law’ is 
what the people concerned consider to be ‘law’, nothing more and nothing less. 
Put differently, ‘what law is, is determined by the people in the social arena 
through their own common usages, not in advance by the social scientist or 
theorist’ (Tamanaha 2000: 314). This position, as Dupret (2007: 1) identifies, ‘is 
grounded on a principle of indifference, by which one seeks to avoid normative 
and evaluative engagements: the focus is put on the description of practices, not 
on their evaluation’. This approach, as has also been argued by Dupret (2007) 
and Donlan (2015), takes general normativity beyond legality seriously. In 
relation to the present study, our task is to examine English law, shari‘a and urf 
norms, their interaction, interdependence and the social significance of their 
elements on Muslims in Britain. The question of whether shari‘a or urf are ‘legal’ 
orderings is not crucial to the analysis. In other words, the names of things do 
not matter, only what things ‘are’ is important: ‘that which we call a rose, by any 
other name would smell as sweet’.142 A focus on normativity, rather than only 
legality, allows us to take account of norms that we may find difficult to consider 
as ‘legal’ but which come into play with positive legal norms or institutional 
norms that are important to the actors involved. This approach also enables us 
importantly to take account of single norms or mechanisms, which systemic or 
                                                          
142 These words were used by Juliet in Act II, Scene I, in the play Romeo and Juliet by William Shakespeare 
(2011).  
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institutional versions of legal pluralism like that proposed by Moore (1978) 
adequately do not. 
 
3.4.2 Are we dealing with a body of norms, orderings or systems? 
Another important debate that has emerged amongst legal pluralists is whether 
the normative phenomena being examined are best conceived as interacting 
‘bodies of norms’, ‘orderings’, or ‘systems’. When exploring the challenges and 
opportunities presented by legal plurality some scholars have described the 
phenomena being examined as consisting of discernible ‘legal systems’, whilst 
others have avoided this, so as not to imply that the ‘bodies of law’ in question 
are highly systematic (Woodman 1999: 12). Griffiths (1986) therefore prefers to 
use the term ‘orderings’. Woodman (1999: 12) however argues that similar 
difficulties arise with such an expression and therefore prefers to speak of 
‘bodies of laws’, which he says means no more than a number of norms that refer 
to each other. In his view, the notion of ‘bodies of laws’ enables us to see and 
accommodate ‘internal legal pluralism’ (or ‘system-internal pluralism’ as F. & K. 
von Benda-Beckmann 2006: 18 put it), as well as deep legal pluralism. K. von 
Benda-Beckmann (2003: 299) agrees but says that the term ‘system’ should not 
be taken too literally as,  
Law is not an amorphous set of norms and principles but neither is it a tightly 
structured system. This is not even the case for western legal systems, despite 
the efforts of centuries of legal scholarship. Law typically consists of clustered 
sets of norms, principles, concepts and procedures. And such clusters provide 
cognitive and normative and institutional contexts for interaction. 
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Like English law, this study recognises that the phenomena of shari‘a and ethnic 
orderings are also internally diverse, and refer in actuality to many different 
‘orderings’ – as many as there are functioning sub-groups, to use Pospisil’s 
(1971) argument – rather than one. Moreover, there is some doubt to what 
extent the norms of shari‘a, urf, and English law can be separated from each 
other or, for that matter, from the norms of other normative orderings for 
example European Law. We are presented then with the difficult task of setting 
out what label we employ. The study recognises that ‘[a]ssigning labels to the 
different fragments of an order, no less than the order itself, is always an 
approximation that will fail to capture the nuances of actual practices’ (Donlan 
2015: 20). In this study we use the term ‘ordering’ when referring to shari‘a, and 
urf. Without ignoring complexity, or implying reification, or a ranked position, 
the analytical device is employed because we require a manageable point of 
reference that enables us to understand the phenomena under investigation, 
their complex relations, together with English law, and how Muslims in Britain 
ultimately negotiate each.  
 
3.4.3 Can the multiplicity of orderings be placed into a hierarchy? 
Legal pluralists and their allies have used a variety of terms – living law,143 
everyday law,144 home-knitted law,145 implicit law,146 polycentric law,147 non-
monopolistic law, privately produced law, law in action, law in minds, religious 
law, canon law, god’s law (shari‘a, dharma, halakhah, etc.) customary law, folk 
                                                          
143 Ehrlich (1936). 
144 Macdonald (2002). 
145 Petersen (1996). 
146 Fuller (1968). 
147 Petersen & Zahle 1995).  
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law, indigenous law, unofficial law,148 minority legal order,149reglementation,150 
normative order, institutional norms – to capture non-state normative orderings 
and their co-existence with state law. Given the coexistence of a multiplicity of 
competing orderings within a population or location, an important issue that has 
emerged is whether the variety of normative orderings can be placed in a 
hierarchy. This has led to some discussion about whether there are ways that 
allow us to rank and benchmark normative orders. In contrast to advocates of 
legal modernity, Woodman says,  
[s]tate law seems not to be distinguishable from other normative orders by 
virtue of its effectiveness as a form of social control, its institutional 
enforcement, its degree of doctrinal elaboration, its unity, self-consistency or 
inflexibility (Woodman 1999: 12).   
 
Legal pluralists and their allies who attribute no special pre-eminence to the 
state or its law, accept that this may lead to a state of affairs that can be 
described as ‘an unstructured and promiscuous plurality’ (Fitzpatrick 1986: 
116). Others, such as Ehrlich (1936), see or saw state law as subordinate to other 
normative orderings in terms of guiding behaviours, which are more important 
to people. There are yet other legal pluralists, who we might describe as ‘weak’ 
or ‘state’ legal pluralists, who reduce or subordinate legal plurality within the 
framework of the state and its law. To understand this better we need to unpack 
two different types of ‘legal pluralism’ that Griffiths says operate in reality. The 
‘strong’ type refers to a situation where ‘not all law is state law nor administered 
by a single set of state institutions, and in which law is neither systematic nor 
                                                          
148 Chiba(1998). 
149 Malik (2012). 
150 Moore(1978).  
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uniform’ (Griffiths 1986: 5). This type of legal pluralism is ontologically excluded 
by the ideology of legal centralism. The ‘weak’ type, on the other hand, can be 
found where different bodies of law are being applied for different groups of 
people within a population, commonly on the basis of ethnicity, nationality, 
religion or geography, but are validated by a single authority – usually the 
sovereigntist state. As outlined earlier, such a situation is consistent with what 
Menski (2013) describes as type 2 and type 3 legal systems. In Hooker’s (1975: 
1-5) view weak pluralism is applied as a means of sensible governance, but 
according to Griffiths (1986: 7-8) ‘unification remains the eventual goal, to be 
enacted as soon as circumstances permit’. Griffiths (1986: 5-13) therefore argues 
that weak legal pluralism is merely an ‘imperfect form’ of legal centralism, a 
feature of the arrangement of state law that bears only a confusing nominal 
resemblance to strong legal pluralism which is an empirical state of affairs. As 
such, according to him, it cannot serve as the basis for a descriptive and analytic 
framework, and thus is less relevant for sociological investigation. Woodman 
(1999: 10) disagrees, arguing instead that weak (or as he calls it ‘state’) legal 
pluralism is a form of legal pluralism, which is empirically observable, socially 
significant and practically useful to identify. He does however acknowledge that 
strong (or as he calls it ‘deep’) legal pluralism is distinguishable, for under a 
situation of deep legal pluralism other laws have separate and distinct sources of 
content and legitimacy. It addition, it is important to note, that even in countries 
in which a form of state legal pluralism gives rise to personal status laws, 
unofficial laws can still be observed to be operating alongside these (see Yilmaz 
2005a). In reality, therefore, all legal systems exhibit strong or deep legal 
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pluralism, which in our contemporary times are best explored against the 
backcloth of migration, globalisations, localisation and synchronous 
technological advancements.  
Approaching the issue of hierarchy from another angle, some scholars have 
pointed to the resources, power and influence that the state uniquely possesses 
and can wield (Moore 2001: 106-7). According to Zorn, legal pluralists must not 
‘refuse to recognize that the state does have powers unavailable to other 
institutions’ (Zorn 1990: 293). Not to recognise this, she argues, is to ignore 
important historical processes and power relationships. Similarly, Merry (1988: 
879) notes that the state exercises coercive but also symbolic power through 
state institutions. She argues that this ideologically impacts on other legal orders, 
and results in the state providing the framework for the practices of other legal 
orders. Some legal pluralists have criticised such a view, mainly on the basis that 
remains shackled to a state-centric world view (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1988: 900). 
Whether or not there is a hierarchical concept of law has to be resolved in the 
context of the investigator’s enquiry. As Hinz (2006: 32) points out what is 
higher and what is less important is factually determined and determinable, and 
it can vary from field to field. In relation to the present study, the research 
questions and methodology adopted are based on a deep legal pluralist 
approach. Although there is some consideration of how the British state ought to 
manage legal plurality, the central concern of this study is how Muslims 
themselves, as individuals, members of communities, citizens of a specific state, 
and global citizens, are negotiating shari‘a, urf orderings and the norms of 
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English law. These normative (legal) orderings of different origin coexist in 
Britain regardless of their mutual recognition of each other. We have already 
discussed earlier in this study how shari‘a and English law respectively claim 
dominance and demand obedience. It is important here to add that customary 
orderings also make similar demands and actively and creatively resist legal 
centralism (Allott 1980; Fitzpatrick 1986; Starr & Collier 1987). And then there 
are possible competing expectations emanating from global visions of human 
rights, international law and also the global Muslim ummah. How Muslim actors 
see the hierarchical positioning of these various orderings in the context of 
marriage solemnisation is discussed below and is also established in more detail 
through the analysis of fieldwork data in Chapter 5. 
 
3.5 Towards exploring interactivity, hybridity, inter-legality 
More recent literature on legal pluralism has shifted its attention to examine the 
complex relations between different orderings (laws, bodies of norms, systems, 
dispute mechanisms, or social fields), and their underpinning value systems 
(Chiba 1986, 1989, 1993). The interaction of different laws has been described 
as a highly ‘dynamic process’ (Santos 1995: 473; Yilmaz 2005a: 25; Menski 2011: 
1), that may result in conflict and contestation, harmonious coexistence, 
reciprocal weakening or strengthening, hybridity, syncretism, creolisation 
negotiation, isolation, diffusion, differences in scale, and extinction. 
In her 1978 seminal contribution, Law as Process, Moore develops her idea of the 
‘semi-autonomous social field’ (SASF) as a means of examining the connections 
between the inner and inter functioning of SASFs. She explains that each SASF 
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has rule, custom and symbol generating capacities, the means to induce 
compliance, yet it remains nevertheless simultaneously vulnerable to the rules, 
customs and symbols of other SASFs, including the piecemeal legislation of the 
state, which may or may not be invited by its own members. By underscoring the 
partial autonomy of a social field, Moore draws attention to the fact that each 
SASF affects the way another is able to operate and effect social changes in 
practice. Moore’s concept has proven to be popular, as has in more recent years 
the analytical framework suggested by Chiba, largely because he uniquely draws 
attention to the interaction of different types of laws as well as their 
underpinning value principles and systems, (explicitly recognising that no action 
or norm is ever value-free).  
Chiba (1989) developed his framework, namely, the ‘three dichotomies of law’, 
as a cross-national analytical tool to enable the accurate observation of the 
interaction of different types of laws, and their connected value systems. In short, 
his ‘first dichotomy’ makes a distinction between ‘official law’ and ‘unofficial 
laws’. Official law is defined as ‘the legal system sanctioned by the legitimate 
authority of a country’ (Chiba 1986: 5), ordinarily law made or accepted by the 
state. If we were to apply the concept to our study this would refer to the English 
legal system. Chiba (1986: 6) defines ‘unofficial law’ as the ‘legal system not 
officially sanctioned by the legitimate authority, but sanctioned in practice by the 
general consensus of a certain circle of people’ although limited to those 
practices that ‘distinctively supplement, oppose, modify or undermine any of the 
official laws’. If we were to apply it to our study this would refer to orderings not 
recognised by the state but sanctioned by the consensus of Muslims, within or 
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outside Britain. Chiba argues that different systems of law interact with one 
another either harmoniously or conflictingly, but the effectiveness of official law 
is dependent upon the unofficial laws concerned. Chiba does not discuss, 
however, that unofficial laws interact as well. This study does examine the 
interaction of ‘unofficial Muslim laws’ or orderings, namely shari‘a and urf, and 
points out that these orderings also interact with what could be described as 
internally plural ‘Christian’, ‘Jewish’, ‘Hindu’ and ‘Sikh’ and so on orderings (or 
unofficial laws), operating in Britain.  
Chiba then tells us that both official and unofficial laws are connected to a 
particular value system or principle, which ‘acts to found, justify and orient the 
latter’ (Chiba 1986: 6-7). These values form ‘the second dichotomy of law’, and 
Chiba (1989: 178) separates them into ‘legal rules’ and ‘legal postulates’. Legal 
rules are connected to official law, and are defined as ‘formal verbal expressions 
of particular legal regulations to designate specified patterns of behaviour’. In 
relation to the English legal system these legal rules would include ideas such as 
equity, justice, equality, the rule of law, individualism, secularism, and so on. 
Legal postulates in contrast are connected to unofficial laws. The legal postulates 
of customary orderings would include ideas such as honour (izzet), shame 
(sharam), the caste system, clan, kinship, and/or familial unity and so on. In 
relation to shari‘a they would include the qur‘an, sunna, ijmā and qiyās (for 
Sunni Muslims) and so on. Chiba tells us that the most fundamental legal 
postulate is the ‘identity postulate’ because it ‘enables a people to maintain their 
cultural identity in law’ (Chiba 1986: 45). Moreover, it enables people ‘to choose 
official or unofficial law alternatively so as to adapt themselves to changing 
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circumstances while maintaining their individuality and identity’ (Chiba 1986b: 
43). Although Chiba does not elaborate in any great depth what constitutes the 
identity postulate, one could interpret it as being synonymous with ‘Englishness’ 
or ‘Britishness’ or ‘Muslimness’ and so on.  
In his ‘third dichotomy’, Chiba draws a distinction between the different origins 
of ‘law’ in society. He distinguishes ‘indigenous law’, (law that originated from 
the native culture of a people), from what he calls ‘transplanted law’, (that is, ‘law 
transplanted by a people of a foreign culture’ Chiba 1989: 179). This dichotomy 
is of increasing significance in our age of unprecedented global mobility, 
globalisations and technological advancements. We have already discussed how 
immigrants bring with them a normative and legal consciousness as part of their 
cultural luggage. Similarly, developing the idea of transplanted law, which is 
quite different from Watson’s (1977) idea of a ‘legal transplant’, Menski (2006: 
58-65) proposes the idea ‘ethnic implant’, a role reversal of the colonial 
transplant, to describe precisely the importation by immigrants of their non-
Western laws into Western countries.151  
Having outlined how different orderings can come into contact especially 
through migration, it is important to note that through the process of interaction, 
each ordering can take significant meaning and in part its identity from the 
other(s) (Chiba 1989: 207; Silbey 1992: 43; Yilmaz 2005a: 26). Fitzpatrick 
(1984: 122) explains that state law interacting with custom transforms the 
elements it appropriates into its own image and likeness, but equally other 
normative orderings will often appropriate techniques and legal content from 
                                                          
151 See also Shah (2005); Shah & Menski (2006); Twining (2009: 262-92).  
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the state. He sees this process, which he calls ‘integral plurality’, as part of the 
dialectic of power and counter power. Similarly, Santos (2006: 46) emphasises 
the ‘porous’ nature of the boundaries between different legal orders and that in 
‘dense’ interactions ‘each one loses its ‘pure,’ ’autonomous’ identity and can only 
be defined in relation to the legal constellation of which it is a part’. F. and K. von 
Benda-Beckmann (2006: 19) assert that under conditions of legal pluralism,  
[…] elements of one legal order may change under the influence of another legal 
order, and new, hybrid, or syncretic legal forms may emerge and become 
institutionalised, replacing or modifying earlier ones.  
 
According to them, ‘such transformational processes are an integral part of legal 
pluralism’, and the changes that result are by no means unidirectional. To make 
sense of the highly dynamic, uneven, and unstable state of affairs, Santos (2002: 
427-38) argues that we need a ‘new legal common sense’. He introduces the 
concept of ‘interlegality’, ‘as the phenomenological counterpart of legal 
pluralism’, to describe the complex social constructions of normative orders and 
the psychological state of the individual subject experiencing them. The need to 
give attention to the ‘subjective’ perspective of social actors experiencing 
normative (legal) plurality has also been emphasised by other researchers. We 
now turn to consider their contributions, together with Santos’s, to obtain a 
deeper theoretical understanding of how individuals may experience and 
negotiate normative plurality.  
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3.6 Legal pluralism in subjectivity 
Vanderlinden (1989) says that legality and plurality are best approached from 
the perspective of individuals as sujet de droits rather than institutions. He 
argues that ‘instead of looking at the legal pyramid from the top, from the centres 
of decision, from the standpoint of power’, we ought to ‘contemplate it at the 
level of ordinary men in their daily activities’ (Vanderlinden 1989: 153). By 
adopting this approach, he notes that the ordinary person in his daily life is,  
[…] confronted in his behaviour with various, possibly conflicting, regulatory 
orders, be they legal or non-legal, emanating from various social networks of 
which he is, voluntarily or not, a member (Vanderlinden 1989: 153-4).  
 
Both Moore (1978: 3) and Pospisil (1967: 9) note also that individuals may 
simultaneously be subject to rules of several ‘SASF’s’ or ‘legal levels’ respectively, 
which may overlap and conflict. As we have noted already, Chiba (1998: 234 -
238) describes this situation as ‘legal pluralism in conflict’ and when we take an 
‘actor’s perspective’ as ‘legal pluralism in subjectivity’. Similarly, Santos explains 
that in experiencing ‘interlegality’ individuals find that their life ‘is constituted by 
an intersection of different orders’ (Santos 1987: 298). He argues that the 
multiple network of legal orders are not separate or autonomous entities 
existing in the same political space, as conceived by ‘traditional legal pluralism’, 
but rather the spaces between orders are porous resulting in a ‘conception of 
different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds as 
much as in our actions (Santos 1987: 297-298). Taking things one step further, 
Kleinhans and Macdonald (1997: 25-46) reject the characterisation of law as 
simply an external force to be obeyed by subjects. They argue that,  
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The modern self is a construct, but this construct itself has a constructive 
capacity, and it is upon this constructive capacity that the internormative 
character of legal pluralism must be focused (1997: 44).  
 
Therefore, legal subjects control law as much as law controls them within its 
normative sphere. Kleinhans and Macdonald pinpoint a transformative capacity 
that legal subjects possess which they say enables them to produce legal 
knowledge and, as it is knowledge that maintains and creates realities, they are 
able to  
 […] fashion the very structures of law that contribute to constituting their legal 
subjectivity’ (Kleinhans & Macdonald 1997: 38).  
 
This study envisages individuals as genuine norm-creators and the nexus of 
normative activity, but recognises that they do not generate norms out of thin air 
(see Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Nor does this study draw a sharp line between 
individual or collective actions. This view is consistent with what Lévi-Strauss 
(1966) describes as the practice of ‘bricolage’: people’s capacity as a matter of 
agency to select bits and pieces of various systems and to combine them for their 
own purposes in their own way. As skilful navigators, Muslims invent, combine, 
mix, construct, deconstruct and reconstruct norms as a matter of agency. Ballard 
(1994) makes the same observation in his ethnographic analysis of South Asians 
in Britain, a very large number of who are Muslims. How this is done by Muslims 
in the legal context will be the subject of analysis in the next chapter. In our quest 
to know more about how Muslims read and negotiate normative (legal) plurality 
it is important to add to our analytical toolkit ‘Menski’s Kite’ (2009; 26-45)  
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         Figure 1 
 
 
Menski’s model is based upon a number of propositions (2011:1-22; 2013: 15-
31): first, that law is a universal phenomenon, but it manifests itself in many 
different ways; secondly, law not only takes different forms but also has different 
sources; thirdly, these sources, in essence different manifestations of the state, 
society, ‘transcendental’ and ‘transnational’, compete and interact in various 
ways; fourthly, any given body of rules produced or accepted by one will also 
contain components of the other three, which adds another (generally invisible) 
layer of plurality; and, fifthly, law constantly needs to be worked out or 
negotiated (for example by the state, community, or individual) in a culture-
specific social context, and thus is inherently dynamic and flexible.  
Stated summarily, Menski’s kite illustrates that four types of internally plural law 
(what he calls ‘POP’ structures) are constantly found in dynamic competition as 
Menski’s Kite (2010)
1  Nature
(Religion/Ethics/Morality)
3  State Law 2 Society 
(Postivism) (Socio-legal approaches)
Note: Each corner is plural -
‘plurality of pluralities’ (POP)
4   International law
Legal Pluralism
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illustrated in figure 1 above. Of particular significance for this study is that the 
kite model draws attention to the fact that the individual may simultaneously 
face the cross-demands from (1) natural law, which for Muslims translates as 
divine law or shari‘a; (2) socio-legal and economic norms, customs or 
conventions, which in our study translates to particular forms of urf; (3) various 
forms of state-centric positive laws, which in our study means the English law; 
and (4) international laws and norms, which translate to, inter alia, the law of 
another state, (especially relevant for Muslims employing private international 
law in Britain), supra-national bodies like the EU, as well as the legal judgments 
of supranational bodies such as the ECtHR and CJEU. The resulting sequence of 
numbers in tracing decision-making processes ‘implies no intention of ranking or 
relative superiority’ (Menski 2006: 610) or evolutionism, rather what we have is 
a ‘competitive pluralist symbiosis’ (Menski 2013: 27). 
Faced with cross-demands from competing (legal) norms, or networks, of which 
they may or may not voluntarily be a member, individuals have to decide how 
they will manage pluri-legality in their life. What choices will they make? Menski 
(2009: 9) notes that when making their decisions individuals have to make up 
their own minds about what is ‘the right law’,152 the most appropriate solution 
for them in a pluri-legal scenario. As a result we can observe that psychologically 
a person will, 
[…] rank last what is least liked, but the unwanted ‘other’ remains present. A 
state-centric approach that dislikes religion would generate a sequence of 3-4-2-
1. A fundamentalist Muslim opposed to the state would probably proceed with a 
1-2-4-3 sequence and so on (Menski 2013: 26).  
                                                          
152Menski has developed the concept from what the German jurist, Rudolph Stammler (1856-1938), 
called ‘das richtigeRecht’. 
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Menski (2013: 27) contends that ‘Muslim consciousness clearly involves all these 
four corners, creating the potential for huge conflicts, but also room for altruistic 
harmonisation’. In light of such theoretical debates, the Muslim legal experience 
in Britain is the subject of analysis of our next chapter, to which we now turn. 
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Chapter 4: The interaction of English law and Muslim ‘laws’ 
 
4.1  The ideological position of the English legal system 
The major impact of legal centralist and positivist thought is that in Britain we 
have ‘type 1’ legal systems. The term law is only used to refer to the state’s 
normative ordering and Britain’s legal systems envisage uniform laws as both 
desirable and the pinnacle of legal development. It is also understood that law 
gains its authority because it has procedural validity (Luhmann 1992: 1427). 
This is powerful because, simply put, law emanates from a perceived 
democratically legitimate and accepted process. In 2006, the chairman of 
Britain’s Commission for Racial Equality, which has since been reconfigured, 
publicly shared this sentiment when he stated:  
We have one set of laws. They are decided on by one group of people, members 
of Parliament, and that’s the end of the story.153 
 
The idea of legal pluralism, of multiple, overlapping normative orderings, 
existing side by side and not dependent on each other for their validity, is seen 
by state officials as alien, archaic, and undesirable since it runs counter to 
(particular notions of) the rule of law, equality, uniformity, and integration 
(expressed as we have seen as ‘community cohesion’ and more recently 
‘muscular liberalism’). The general policy therefore, presented by the English 
legal system, is that there must be ‘one law for all’. Any other system or 
                                                          
153 Muslims ‘must’ accept free speech, BBC news report, 26/02/2006 (available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4752804.stm, last visited 05/02/2015). Trevor Phillips was responding 
to angry protests by Muslims against the publication of cartoons satirising Prophet Muhammed.   
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normative (legal) ordering,154 such as shari’a or urf, has prima facie no place in it 
except, and to the extent, that English law recognises its norms or institutions as 
having some effect. How the English legal system has exercised its discretion, 
especially in granting exemptions from the uniform law, is discussed in some 
detail below.  
Along with a one law for all policy, over several centuries the English legal 
system has come to embrace the ideology of secularism, which inter alia is seen 
as the appropriate governance tool for facilitating peaceful coexistence amongst 
citizens (Taylor 1998).155 This notion of ‘secularism’, displayed as ‘neutrality to 
all faiths’, is not the same as the Indian form that sees all religions as equidistant 
from the state (sarva dharma sambhava) (Engineer 1998: 1). But forged in 
response to the horrors of intra-European religious conflicts (Taylor 1998: 32), 
demands the ‘privatisation’ of religion (Asad 2003: 205). In practice, however, 
there is some doubt over whether the English legal system is, in accordance with 
its claim, ‘neutral to all faiths’: one can, for instance, point to the privileges the 
Church of England continues to enjoy since its establishment in 1532 (for details 
see Robilliard 1984: 84-103; Klausen 2005: 8; O’Halloran 2014: 161-2). There 
are currently 26 Lords Spiritual who sit in the House of Lords, the upper house of 
Parliament, by virtue of their ecclesiastical role in the established Church. This 
unique position, as demonstrated in the shaping of the 1988 Education Reform 
Act, can have important effects.156 Lenard asserts that if Europe’s genuine 
                                                          
154 Although some competencies have been granted to the EU and the 1998 Human Rights Act makes the 
ECHR enforceable.  
155 For an anthropological view of ‘secularism’ and ‘the secular’ see Asad (2003: 21-66).   
156 Although parents are able to exercise their right to have their child excused, the Act (as amended) 
requires each pupil at a voluntary, foundation or community school to take part in a collective act of 
worship of a ‘wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian character’ during each school day. The National 
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character was secular, rather than Christian, restrictions on the wearing of the 
veil or the building of minarets on mosques would not occur (Lenard 2010: 316). 
Expressing the same sentiment, as well as their frustration, many Muslims are 
asking: how else do we explain the banning of minarets yet the allowing of 
spires? Some scholars have also asserted that the very notion of Western 
‘secularism’ is the spread of a Christian anthropological framework in a non-
Christian guise (de Roover, Claerhout & Balagangadhara 2011; Shah 2013). The 
latter view, although not developed in this study, is much more relevant for legal 
analysis than researchers have so far realised.  
Besides a commitment to some form of ‘integration’, two other important 
ideological elements also provide important reference points against which 
English law’s response to minorities and their claims can be unpacked, measured 
and analysed. First, the positive right to religious freedom, and more broadly 
human rights, and second the aspiration to protect minorities.  Both the absolute 
right to religious belief, and importantly, the qualified right to manifest one’s 
religious belief, are now enshrined in a number of international, regional and 
domestic agreements and legislation. As evidence of this one can point to article 
18 of the 1948 UDHR, articles 18(1) and 27 of the 1966 ICCPR, article 13(3) of 
the 1966 ICESCR (the UK ratified both treaties on the 20th of May 1976), the 
1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, art 9 of the 1950 ECHR, which was 
indirectly incorporated by the UK through the 1998 Human Rights Act, and 
article 10 of the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (which became 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Muslim Council of Britain, founded in 1978, had lobbied for the wording to be changed to the ‘worship of 
one supreme god’ but met resistance from the Church of England. 
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legally binding in December 2009). These treaties and conventions, and more 
broadly international law, are imbued with value assumptions of European, 
predominantly Christian, civilization (see for details Stumpf 2005), and by 
ratifying these instruments and incorporating the ECHR into domestic law, 
English law, as must all legal systems, has chosen its aspirational values 
(Bradney 2001: 71-5), signalling the importance it places on religious, and more 
broadly, human rights values. 
Turning to the separate, but overlapping, embracement of the value of protecting 
minorities, though the genesis can be traced back to at least the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia in the European context (Gross 1984: 5; Leuprecht 2001: 112), the 
concern became particularly prominent after the events of WW1, when 
protection of racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities was enshrined in a 
series of minority treaties in 1919.157 Though they were off the agenda for some 
time after WW2, (largely due to the treaties being regarded as unenforceable and 
because Western European countries saw minority safeguards necessary for 
Eastern European countries and not for themselves), they made a soft return in 
the late 1980s. Since then minority rights have been codified in the 1992 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities,158 two Council of Europe treaties (1995 FCNM159 and 
1992 ECRML160), and in the 1990 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. Although ratifying states have generally tended to equate their 
                                                          
157
 For details see Preece (1998: 67-94). 
158 The Minority Rights Declaration enshrines an obligation on states to acknowledge and promote the 
rights of minorities to profess and practice their own religions, to enjoy their own cultures and identities, 
and to use their own languages. 
159 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
160 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. 
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fulfilment of minority rights as being achieved by their fulfilment of human 
rights, this is not always the case. Illustrating the effect of the FCNM, the UK 
government in 2014 recognised the Cornish ethnic group as a national minority. 
Prior to this, the Cornish language was recognised as an official regional 
language, like Welsh and Gaelic, under the ECRML in 2002.  
Against this backcloth, when looking at the official status of Muslim ‘laws’ in 
Britain, we find a complex dual picture. The English legal system has different 
rules pertaining to Muslim ‘laws’ that come under conflict of laws (or private 
international law as it is sometimes called) than for those that do not (for details 
see Pearl and Menski 1998: 84-113). Under the rules of private international law, 
various forms of customary and Islamic law that have been duly authorised by 
the state of another jurisdiction may be recognised as ‘law’, but only as foreign 
law. In this context, a review of case law and accounts provided by expert 
witnesses reveal an inconsistent approach being adopted towards individuals, 
(whatever their domicile), who have conducted acts while abroad in accordance 
with the law of a particular foreign legal system but then become involved in 
litigation in British courts. At times, judges and entry clearance officers avoid 
close examination of certain acts, and proceed on the basis of (sometimes 
erroneous) assumptions; at other times, they become unreasonably pedantic and 
obstructive (Warraich & Balchin 2006: 9), and can end up taking contradictory 
positions simultaneously over the same facts (see the story of H in Menski 
2007a: 284-294).   
When it comes to the validity of shari‘a or ethnic norms per se, that is, when not 
involving a foreign legal dimension, the state and its institutions treat them as 
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simply ‘customs’, ‘mores’, or ‘cultural practices’ – not as ‘law’. This approach has 
also been adopted (often uncritically) by a number of scholars writing about 
legal matters involving ethnic minorities. Sebastian Poulter’s seminal texts, 
English law and ethnic minority customs (1986) and Asian traditions and English 
law (1990a), exemplify this attitude and reflect the distortive effects of the 
ideology of legal centralism. With this re-definition we are presented with the 
picture that there is officially no legal plurality or scenarios involving conflict of 
laws in Britain. This approach, of course, simply ignores Muslim, and other 
ethnic minority, legal perspectives and ignores the agency of individuals and 
groups. Moreover, the effects of the ideology of legal centralism, in combination 
with the presupposed superiority of British culture and values that now also 
includes secularism, manifests in the form of two major expectations in the legal 
sphere. First, the expectation placed on Muslims, and other ethnic minorities, is 
that it is in their best interests to adopt British values, British identity, and to 
follow the rules of English law. 161 In other words, the message is ‘fit in’: ‘when in 
Rome do as the Romans do’ (Poulter 1986: v). The second expectation is that 
religion and ethnicity should be ‘privatised’ (Parekh 1990: 67; Barot 1991: 196). 
This does not mean that there is no space for them in the social sphere, only that 
there is no space in the legal sphere. Although this is not policed as aggressively 
as under the French laïcité model, failure to comply opens ‘the other’ to the 
possibility of ‘ethnic penalties’ (Modood and Berthoud 1997: 144-145), to the 
                                                          
161 For a recent example, see Eleftheriou-Smith, Loulla-Mae (2014): David Cameron pledges lessons on 
Magna Carta as he seeks to push ‘British values’. The Independent Online (last accessed 03/08/2014). 
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extent that the ‘more ethnic one is seen to be, the more the likelihood of 
marginalisation and penalisation’ (Shah 2002: 1).162  
The acknowledgement by all major political parties that assimilation is not a 
realistic policy has not however led to a change to the structure of the legal 
system. The nature of, and the presuppositions that operate within, the English 
legal system means that both civil and criminal law begin from a position that 
makes them resistant to demands of cultural (religious) recognition or ‘cultural 
defence’ (Renteln 2004).163 Despite such messages, Muslims have generally been 
unwilling to abandon shari’a and their urf orderings as a way of life.  However, 
motivated by a genuine desire not to offend the laws of the country that they see 
as their home, they have sought the inclusion of both in English law.  
 
4.2 The official legal response to Muslims and Muslim (legal) norms 
Before we look at English law’s response to Muslim claims for accommodation, it 
is important to note that the common law system in itself is inherently flexible.164 
One can point to particular instances where judges have demonstrated 
remarkable willingness to develop the law in light of changing social and cultural 
                                                          
162 Over the tendency to ‘criminalise alterity’ see also Ballard (2011).  
163 Although not the focus of this study, in the criminal sphere the official law has for some years now 
been creating a growing number of ‘cultural offences’, such that an act which is within the cultural group 
of the ‘offender’ (which might be condoned, approved or even endorsed and promoted in a given 
situation), receives aggravated punishment, or is criminalised through the creation of specific offences. A 
recent example is the criminalisation of the consumption and supply of khat, which came into force on the 
24th of June 2014, and is regarded by many members of the Somali Muslim community as a specific 
offence targeting them. For a recent example that involved a Shi‘a Muslim see R v Z (2009) 2 Cr App R (S.) 
32. 
164 On the parameters of stare decisis, judicial discretion and law-making see Zander (1989: 278-9); 
Duxbury (2008). 
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developments.165 Moreover, custom is still a source of law today, though 
underplayed and marginalised. Judges have recognised particular instances of 
custom creating a special law for the locality involved but only if the custom is 
‘reasonable’, ‘certain’, and deemed as having existed since ‘time immemorial’ 
(Zander 1989: 375-7).  The latter requirement does not require the claimant to 
trace a custom back to 1189, ‘the terminal date of legal memory’, but to establish 
that the usage of the custom has persisted for a reasonable time. Technically, 
then, judges do have scope to recognise custom as law, or to grant custom legal 
validity.  
Turning to how English law has dealt with Muslims and their claims for 
accommodation of their (legal) norms, we see that the response has neither been 
consistent nor coherent, lending itself to any easy interpretation. Judges during 
the 1960s and early 1970s showed a willingness to allow newer minorities, 
including Muslims, the right to maintain cultural practices and values rather than 
imposing unequivocally English standards. English courts recognised the 
significance of religious marriage ceremonies,166 the right of a Muslim wife to her 
mahr (dower),167 (child) marriages conducted abroad contrary to English 
marriage rules relating to capacity,168 talaq and other extra-judicial consensual 
divorces,169 polygamy,170 and the relevance of stigma when it came to granting a 
                                                          
165 See for example the case of R v R [1991] 4 A11 ER 481 at 483. The House of Lords swept away a 
principle that had been in place for over 250 years, namely that women agree to sexual intercourse on 
marriage and cannot retract that consent.  
166 Kaur v Singh [1972] 1 A11 ER 292.  
167 Shahnaz v Rizwan [1964] 3 WLR 1506.  
168 Cheni v Cheni [1962] 3 A11 ER 873; Alhaji Mohamed v Knott [1969] 1 QB 1.   
169 Qureshi v Qureshi [1971] 1 A11 ER 325; Varanand v Varanand [1964] 108 SJ 693.   
170 Imam Din v National Assistance Board [1967] 2 QB 213. 
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divorce.171 For this reason, some writers have described this as a ‘liberal phase’ 
(see Maidment 1974; Poulter 1979; Pearl and Menski 1998). 
This trend was halted by the intervention of Parliament, which responded to the 
misgivings expressed over these decisions. In relation to divorce, the 1973 
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, s.16, provided that forthwith no 
extra-judicial divorce obtained anywhere in the British Isles would be recognised 
as having legal effect.172 A divorce that took place abroad, although recognised if 
at least one party was habitually resident or a national of the country in 
question,173 became subject to considerations of ‘public policy’.174 With the shift 
in approach, judges openly voiced disdain for Muslim cultural practices. In one 
reported case, Chaudhary v Chaudhary, Cumming-Bruce LJ criticising talaq-al-
bida stated:  
[p]ronouncement of talaq three times finally terminates the marriage in 
Kashmir, Dubai, and probably in other unsophisticated peasant, desert or jungle 
communities, which respect classical Muslim religious tradition.175  
 
Judges, by and large, felt that Muslim, along with other faith-based, legal 
traditions could not be trusted to protect human rights norms, particularly when 
it came to women. Secondly, English law could be applied over customs, or 
mores, and even at times in contradiction to private international law since it 
was fit for universal application and its values were superior. As exemplified by 
the Act and case cited above, English law had embraced a more restrictive and 
                                                          
171 Banik v Banik [1973] 3 A11 ER 45.  
172 This has since been re-enacted in the Family Law Act 1986, s.44.  
173 Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, s.3 later amended by s.46(1) Family Law Act 
1986.  
174 Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, s.8.  
175Chaudhary v Chaudhary [1984] 3 A11 ER 1017 at 1018(J). These words were re-quoted in Mirza 
Waheed Baig v. Entry Clearance Officer, Islamabad, [2002] UKIAT 04229 at para 31. 
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exclusionary approach. It signalled to minorities, that for a ‘custom’ or ‘tradition’ 
to be eligible for legal recognition, particular standards had to be met. The 
approach was consistent with the state’s new agenda of ‘integrating’ newcomers, 
who had previously been allowed to continue many of their native practices in 
the context of civil law because at that time they were sojourners. The shift in 
approach led to debate over what these standards were.  
In Poulter’s view, legal recognition could not be afforded to customs that 
encroached minimum standards of ‘public policy’, and ‘certain core values in 
English society’ (1986: v-vi). He did not provide a list or description of what he 
meant by English ‘core values’, preferring instead to highlight ‘customs’, such as 
polygamy, talaq, and forced marriages, which he saw as transgressing them. 
Adopting what appears to be a more liberal position, in later writings he referred 
instead to ‘shared values’ (1992b: 270 ; 1995: 83), and identified more 
prominently human rights and civil liberties – the bedrock of British values – as 
the relevant tests for legal recognition (1998: 23). Poulter argued that reference 
to the latter would provide more consistency in decision-making, reduce 
ethnocentricity because of the ‘universal’ nature of human rights,176 and help get 
the balance right between the ‘three central objectives of equal opportunity, 
respect for cultural diversity and mutual tolerance’ (1992a: 187).  
In practice, English judges made it clear that ‘tolerance’ is circumscribed by 
notions of public policy, reasonableness, human rights, and that minority or 
foreign practices would not be recognised if they were deemed ‘repugnant’ or 
                                                          
176 Several states have opted out of human rights treaties because of perceived clashes with their values 
and traditions. Underpinning decisions is often the view that these treaties are Euro-American centric in 
origin. This in and of itself brings to the fore ongoing debates over whether human rights are universal or 
culture-specific?   
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otherwise offended the ‘conscience of the court’; although the exactitudes of each 
were left unclear. In relation to how Parliament has responded to ethnic 
diversity, it is possible to identify a number of examples where specific 
exemptions to statutory offences have been granted to accommodate the 
religious or cultural practices of different British communities.  
Before we turn to examine these, it is worth noting that the UK’s partly codified 
constitution has for centuries allowed individuals to do as they please in matters 
of faith and culture, unless the law states otherwise. With the 1998 Human 
Rights Act the state has had to shift its approach to recognising religious liberty 
as a positive right. For this reason, the 1998 HRA is a game-changer (Qayyum 
2014: 66).  
Among the newer minorities, Sikhs appear to be the main beneficiaries when it 
comes to legislative exemptions. A Sikh wearing a turban is not required by law 
to wear a crash helmet on a motorcycle or hard hats on building sites.177 Also for 
religious reasons, they are not prohibited from carrying kirpans in public 
places,178 or at schools.179 Subject to particular provisos, Sikhs and Hindus are 
also not prohibited from cremating their dead in open air,180 and can scatter 
their ashes in rivers in accordance with their religious rites.181 In contrast to 
Muslims,182 Hindus and Rastafarians,183 Sikhs,184 along with Jews185 and itinerant 
                                                          
177 See respectively Road Traffic Act 1988, s.16(2) and Employment Act 1989, s.11.  
178 Criminal Justice Act 1998, s.139(5)(b). 
179 Ibid.,139A (4)(c). 
180 Ghai, R (on the application of) v Newcastle City Council & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 59. Prior to this case any 
method of cremating the body other that prescribed by s.8 of the Cremation Act 1902 was an offence.  
181  Such activity will not contravene the 2010 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) 
Regulations, and will not therefore be a criminal offence relating to pollution. See also The Water Act of 
1989.  
182 Tariq v Young and Others (Case No. 24773/88, EOR Discrimination Case Law, (2) Winter 1989); Morgan 
v Civil Service Commission and the British Library (Case no. 19177/89, EOR Discrimination Case Law 
Digest 19177/89, (6) Winter 1990). 
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Gypsies,186 were recognised as a protected ‘ethnic group’ under the 1976 Race 
Relations Act, and this continues to be the case today under the superseding 
2010 Equality Act.187  
Like Jews, Muslims are exempt from the statutory provisions over the slaughter 
of animals and domestic fowl, enabling shechita and dhabiha methods and thus 
paving the way for kosher and halal meat.188Though this exemption has come 
under intense attack in recent years, it continues to remain intact. Besides the 
field of Islamic finance, some recognition is also discernible in the field of 
adoption. Although no reference to Muslims is made, the 2002 Adoption and 
Children Act introduced the concept of ‘special guardianship’, which is the 
equivalent of kafala in Islamic law, ‘an Islamic ‘fosterage’ arrangement that takes 
account of the traditional Muslim prohibition on adoption’ (Menski 2008a: 
57).189 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
183 Crown Suppliers (Property Service Agency) v Dawkins [1993] ICR 517, CA.  
184 Mandla (Sewa Singh) and Another v Dowell Lee and Others [1983] 2 AC 548.  
185 Seide v Gillette Industries Ltd [1980] IRLR 427 EAT; see also Lord Denning’s judgment in Mandla v 
Dowell Lee and Another [1982] 3 A11 ER 1108 (CA). 
186 Gypsies were identified as an ‘ethnic group’ for the purposes of the Act in Commission for Racial 
Equality v Dutton [1989] 1 A11 ER 306, CA. See also R v South Hampshire District Council, ex parte Gibb 
[1994] 3 WLR 1151, and R v Gloucestshire County Council, ex parte Barry[1997] AC 584, R v Dorset County 
Council, ex parte Rolls and another [1994 2 WLR 1151, which established that the status of Gypsy for the 
purposes of the Act would cease if the itinerant lifestyle is relinquished.  
187 Being able to invoke protection as a racial group, rather than bringing a claim of discrimination on the 
protected characteristic of religion, still has an important benefit. See, the case of R(E) v Governing Body of 
JFS [2009] UKSC 15. An admission policy that selected on the basis of religion in the context of over-
subscription was deemed lawful, but not one that did so on the basis of racial group.  
188 Slaughter of Poultry Act 1967, s. 1(2), and Slaughterhouses Act 1974, s.36(3). This exemption dates 
back to Slaughter of Animals (Scotland) Act 1928 and the Slaughter of Animals Act 1933 (which applied to 
England and Wales). For slaughter by religious method see also The Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or 
Killing) Regulations 1995, schedule 12 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 
on the protection of animals at the time of killing. 
189 A look at Adoption, a new approach - White Paper (Department of Health, 2000, CM 5017) reveals the 
link: ‘In order to meet the needs of these children where adoption is not appropriate, and to moderate the 
law so it reflects the religious and cultural diversity of our country today, the Government believes there 
is a case to develop a new legislative option […]’ (para 5.9).  
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Attempts for legislative recognition otherwise have been generally unsuccessful. 
Until its abolition in 2008 in England and Wales,190 the common law offence of 
blasphemy only combated the vilification of the Christian religion, despite 
vigorous lobbying (and litigation) by Muslims for it to be extended to protect 
Islam following the infamous Satanic Verses affair in 1988.191 In the same year, 
the National Muslim Education Council lobbied the government for a change to 
the Education Reform Act (ERA), which required compulsory acts of ‘broadly 
Christian’ worship in schools.192 The attempt was also unsuccessful. All pupils in 
most schools are required still today to take part in a collective act of worship 
that is ‘wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian nature’ on each school day,193 
unless a school has obtained a ‘determination’ from SACRE that lifts the 
requirement, or a parent exercises the right for their child to be excused.194 The 
ERA established religious education as part of the basic national curriculum that 
all schools are required to implement. In accordance with the Act, as amended, 
most English schools teach a syllabus that is ‘in the main Christian’, but account 
is taken, though often in a small way, of other ‘principal religions’, including 
Islam. Faith schools provided education long before the state made elementary 
education compulsory in 1880,195 and thus religious communities have for a long 
time had the right to set-up their own independent schools. But until recently 
there were no Muslim state-funded schools. The first Muslim state-funded 
                                                          
190 See Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s.79. It was replaced by the 2006 Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act, which created a new offence of incitement to religious hatred.  
191 R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p. Choudhury [1991] 1 All ER 306; R v Horseferry Road 
Magistrate Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate [1991] 1 All ER 324.  
192 Inter alia, they had lobbied for the wording to change to ‘the worship of one supreme God’. 
193 Education Reform Act 1988, s.6(1). 
194 Ibid.,s.9. See also s.71 School Standards Framework Act 1998.  
195 See 1880 Elementary Education Act.  
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school, Islamia Primary School in Brent, Greater London, fought a 15-year 
campaign before being awarded grant maintained status in 1998 (for details see 
Parker-Jenkins et al 2005). Since then other independent Muslim schools have 
also managed to obtain state-funded status. Of the 6817 faith schools in England 
today, 23 are now state-funded Muslim schools.196 There are at least a further 
155 registered Muslim Independent schools, that is, private Islamic schools in 
England according to the Association of Muslim Faith Schools (AMS).197 Faith 
schools, particularly Islamic ones, have also become a contested site in recent 
years. Though there has been some conflict over the planning and building of 
mosques (McLoughlin 2005), Muslims have been able to successfully build places 
of worship. Alongside purpose built mosques, over the years, Muslims have 
converted a large number of terrace houses and buildings previously used for 
other purposes that they then have registered as places of worship.  Though this 
is not a compulsory procedure, registration brings some benefits including, as we 
shall see below, the mosque to qualify as a registered building under the 1949 
Marriage Act.  
Mosques, and other Muslim institutions, are able to obtain charitable status that 
grants significant tax benefits provided that they can demonstrate that they fulfil 
the prescribed requirements of the 2006 Charities Act. Muslims can bury their 
dead according to their religious rites. Local authorities have allowed sections in 
public cemeteries to be used by different religious denominations, and for 
private Islamic cemeteries in Britain. In the absence of contractual 
arrangements, the law does not allow for Muslims to take time off for the Friday 
                                                          
196 See Faith Schools: FAQS. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number 06972, 14 October 2015, 
p.16.  
197 See http://ams-uk.org/muslim-schools/ (accessed 02/11/15).  
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congregational prayer (ṣalāt al-jum`ah) despite them regarding it as a 
compulsory obligation under shari‘a. A clear line of decisions establish that art 9 
ECHR is not engaged when an employee asserts the right against an employer in 
relation to their working hours.198 Though each case must be considered on its 
own facts, when faced with indirect discrimination claims under the 2010 
Equality Act, employers have succeeded in establishing that the requirement 
relating to working hours was justified.199   
Besides accommodation of religious practices or values, English courts have also 
recognised in some circumstances (often when involving behaviour that fits 
stereotypical ideas or images) the importance of cultural values, especially 
related to honour (or izzet). In the case of R v Bibi,200 the Court of Appeal reduced 
the sentence of a Muslim woman convicted of drug couriering on the basis that 
sufficient account had not been taken of the ‘cultural fact’, as she pleaded, that 
many Muslim women are subservient to the authority of males. In the case of 
Bakhitiari (Leila) v Zoological Society of London,201 the court took account of how 
injuries inflicted by a chimpanzee on an Iranian British-born child would 
negatively impact her future marriage prospects when determining the final 
award of damages.  In the case of R. v MC [2002],202 the Court of Appeal increased 
the sentence handed down to a rapist partly because the victim, a young virgin 
Muslim woman, had lost a degree of respect in her own community, damaging 
                                                          
198 Stedman v UK [1997] 23 EHRR CD 168; Ahmad v UK [1981] 4 EHRR 126; Copsey v WBB Devons Clays 
Ltd [2005] ICR 1789, CA.   
199 Cherfi v G4S Security Services [2011] UKEAT 0379/10. 
200 R v Bibi [1980] 1 WLR 1193.  
201 Bakhitiari (Leila) v Zoological Society of London [1992] CLY 1689. 
202 R. v MC [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 80. 
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her marriage prospects and self-esteem. In another case, Seemi v Seemi,203 also 
recognising be-izzeti (shaming), the court awarded a Muslim woman £20,000 in 
damages after her former husband had falsely claimed in public that she was not 
a virgin at the time of consummating the marriage.204 In sharp contrast, as we 
will discuss in some detail below, Muslim women who had nikah ceremonies, but 
did not register those ‘marriages’ with the state, were told that such unions had 
no legal standing.  
Reviewing the degree and type of accommodation given by the state as a whole, 
it seems clear that both Parliament and the English judiciary have been content 
to adopt a piecemeal or ad-hoc approach to accommodating minority practices 
and values, reflecting their desire arguably to see as little as possible a change to 
English law, except where the need is compelling or the demands are strong and 
skilfully negotiated. In this regard, the Muslim community has struggled 
generally to present united demands, not least because of the community’s 
internal plurality and lack of hierarchical organisation.  
Although the state has granted very few exemptions to Muslims, and to ethnic 
groups in general, it does allow individuals to do as they please in matters of 
faith, unless the law states otherwise. A position that has since been bolstered by 
the 1998 Human Rights Act. In this way a significant amount of conflict is 
avoided.  
 
                                                          
203 Seemi v Seemi 1990 NLJ 747. 
204 For a discussion of the influence of culture on the determination of damages see Renteln (2009: 199-
218).  
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4.2.1 The legal validity of the nikah in various scenarios 
The family as a unit, like in most other religions, holds a central position in Islam. 
Though understandings of what constitutes a ‘family’ may be different we find 
the same tendency of reverence in the English, as well as in other, traditions. As 
the union of two people is regarded as the bedrock on which the institution of 
the family is built, over time each tradition has developed specific rules of how 
this could validly be done. These rules, which we can call ‘gateway criteria’, are 
what people, but especially ‘judges’, use to decide if the institution that one has 
tried to create is a valid example of that institution. The rules address whether a 
person can marry, to whom, who has to agree to the marriage, what ceremonies 
and what formalities need to be completed and so on.  
At this point, a number of problems arise, emanating from the reality that each 
tradition has its own gateway criteria, which may or may not be recognised by 
the other. It is not uncommon then for a person to find that they are treated as 
‘married’ (and therefore have certain rights and obligations) under one 
normative regime, but not under another. More precariously, one may find to 
their dismay that the same ‘marriage’, that is recognised as being valid according 
to one normative regime, is actually criminalised under another. Given the 
importance placed on the institution of marriage by all sides, and more broadly 
the family, this area has become an especially contested site, contributing to 
what Grillo describes as the establishment in Britain of MILLI (Muslims, Islam 
and the Law: A Legal Industry): a ‘socio-legal-political industry’, involving a 
multiplicity of organisations, groups and individuals who either desire to 
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maintain or constrain Muslim cultural and religious practices, notably as 
authorized by shari’a in the context of family law (2015: 8).  
Before turning to examine in some detail the problems that have been created by 
the diverse sets of gateway criteria, and Muslim responses, it is important for us 
to briefly examine the gateway criteria laid down by English law.   
In earlier times, according to the Law Book of Gratian (also known as the 
Decretum Gratiani), compiled in 1151, English marriage ‘was relatively simple: 
Consent plus consummation’ (Jacobs 2001: 2). Legal disputes over validity would 
have been rare since a couple wishing to marry, as far as practicalities were 
concerned, had only to announce their intent and set-up house together. In the 
13th century, codifying the position, Pope Innocent III decreed that oral consent 
alone, freely given by both parties, was the essence of marriage and led to the 
status of ‘husband’ and ‘wife’. Marriage per verba de praesenti took effect 
immediately, and marriage per verba de futuro, resulted in a binding agreement, 
that led to the marriage coming into being on consummation. Marriage could 
occur without prior notice, and elsewhere than at church. No church official was 
needed, and no written record of the marriage had to be kept. This reality led to 
the conceptualisation of a ‘common law marriage’. Ironically, by the 14th century, 
when disputes occurred it was common law not the ecclesiastical courts that 
used church ceremonies to determine the legality of most marriages, the 
entitlement to property (including dower) rights, the husband’s right/duty to act 
for his wife (coverture), and even, potentially, the inheritance rights of the 
children. The approach adopted led to the creation of,  
[…] two classes of married people: those whose unions conferred property rights 
and responsibilities, and those whose marriages were valid only in the eyes of 
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God and their neighbors. Marriages of the latter sort were unsolemnized, and 
verged on ‘invalid’ to the legal mind (Jacobs 2001: 7).  
 
The law changed little between the 14th and mid-16th centuries. In 1563, the 
Council of Trent decreed secular or contract marriages unlawful, by the issuance 
of the decretum de reformatione matrimonii. Though affecting much of Europe, it 
was not binding in England. This was because Henry VIII, earlier, in 1532, had 
himself recognised as the Supreme Head on earth of the Church of England, 
ensuring final authority over doctrinal and legal disputes (including over 
marriage) vested with the sovereign rather than the papacy, and, in so doing, 
foregrounded the Anglican ordering.205 Over the next two hundred years, the 
status of clandestine marriages remained unclear.206 During this period, the 
different courts of English law – common law, equity, criminal and ecclesiastical 
– used not the same gateway criteria when presented, either directly or 
indirectly, with the question: had a valid marriage occurred?207  The position was 
not made obvious by the legislature. In 1695 by the Marriage Duty Act the state 
did impose a tax to be paid on marriage to help pay for the French War, and, by 
way of preventing revenue loss, fines on parties and clergymen who solemnised 
a marriage without the publication of banns, or possession of a marriage licence. 
Yet, such (clandestine) marriages were not rendered null and void by the 
Act. Besides the fact that fines were often not enforced, the practice of 
clandestine marriages continued because they were cheaper than official church 
                                                          
205 See for details Act of Supremacy 1534.  
206 The Church of England did, however, step up its promotion of church marriages, in accordance with 
the Book of Common Prayer, which included, that an ordained minister conduct the solemnisation of 
marriage, during canonical hours, and after three public readings of the banns.  
207 Property, especially inheritance, issues tended to be heard in common law courts, enforcement of 
contract in ecclesiastical courts, accusations of bigamy from 1603 in criminal courts, and issues related to 
marriage settlements and trust deeds in the equity courts. 
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marriages, and the element of secrecy was important for minors fearing 
opposition from parents and servants fearing dismissal.  With the publication 
of scandalous accounts of how unscrupulous individuals were flouting public 
morals and the law, through committing bigamy, and the fraudulent seduction of 
heirs and heiresses, by way of clandestine marriages, Parliament intervened with 
the 1753 Marriage Act (also referred to as Lord Hardwicke's Act). The Act, which 
ushered in a new age of more state regulation of marriage, sought ‘to better 
prevent clandestine marriages’. It provided that any marriage other than one 
performed in a church or public chapel, by an ordained Anglican clergymen, 
either after three public readings of the banns or purchase of a licence from a 
bishop or one of his surrogates, (unless by special licence by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury), would be invalid for all intents and purposes whatsoever. The Act 
also abolished the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts to enforce a contract of 
marriage, and entrenched regulations for, the publication of banns, issuing of 
licences, and the registration of marriages. Some types of marriages were, 
though, expressly exempted from the new rules: marriages by members of the 
royal family, marriages solemnised beyond the borders of England,208 and 
marriages amongst Quakers (Society of Friends) and Jews in accordance with 
their religious rites (for details see Henriques 1908).  
The Act achieved many of its objectives, but the ease with which nullity could be 
obtained, related either to flaws in the publication of banns, or the absence of 
consent by guardians when marriages involved minors, led to it being 
                                                          
208 The Act did not apply to Scotland, resulting in the town of Gretna Green, which is situated near to the 
border of England, to become notorious for its role in facilitating clandestine (runaway) marriages. To 
prevent the practice parliament passed Lord Broughman’s Act of 1856, which required at least one party 
to the marriage to have been resident on Scotland for 21 days or more immediately preceding the 
marriage.   
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repealed.209 Its successor, the 1823 Marriage Act, largely was a re-enactment, but 
added provisions that both scenarios did not automatically lead to invalid 
marriages. In relation to the former, the Act provided that both parties must have 
‘knowingly and wilfully’ intermarried in violation of marriage formalities 
(related to the banns, licence, or officiating Anglican clergymen). The fact that 
everyone else, (other than members of the royal family, Jews, and Quakers), had 
to comply with these formalities created great hardship for (Roman Catholic and 
Protestant) non-conformists.210 A number of social changes, including the spread 
of Enlightenment values, the wealth and influence of non-conformists, the 
industrial revolution itself, led to ‘toleration’ of non-conformist practices. The 
1836 Marriage Act established a new form of marriage that involved a purely 
civil ceremony. Parties could, now, intermarry by giving due notice to, and 
obtaining a certificate from, the superintendent registrar for the district in which 
one of the parties was resident. In practice this meant that the registrar filed the 
notice, entered it into the Marriage Notice Book, which was open to the public for 
inspection.  Parties could choose to have their ceremony at the register office, or 
in a ‘registered building’, the latter allowed Catholic and Protestant non-
conformists, but also members of other minority religions, to marry in their own 
places of worship (if registered building status was obtained), and include the 
solemnisation process as prescribed by their religious rites.  Another reform, 
provided by the 1898 Marriage Act, meant it was no longer necessary for the 
registrar to attend ceremonies in places other than churches, instead there was 
only a requirement of an ‘authorised person’. The Marriage Acts of 1949 – 1994 
                                                          
 
210 Stone (1977: 31) reports that up to a third of all marriages between 1753 and 1836 were illegal or 
void because of the monopoly given to the Church of England.   
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consolidated the position, and set out in our present times the requirements of 
English law to effect a valid marriage. The law provides for:  
 
(i) marriage according to the rites of the Church of England; 211 
(ii) marriage according to the usages of the Jews; 212 
(iii) marriage according to the usages of the Society of Friends; 213  
(iv) marriage in a register office, (with no religious service, in the 
presence of the superintendent registrar, a district registrar, two 
witnesses, and using a prescribed declaration);214  
(v) marriage in a registered building, (in the presence of a registrar of 
marriages or an ‘authorised person’, two witnesses, and using a 
declaration similar to that used in a register office); 215  
(vi) marriage on approved premises (such as stately homes, hotels and 
similar buildings), (with no religious service, in the presence of the 
superintendent registrar, a district registrar, two witnesses, and using a 
declaration similar to that used in a register office).216 
 
All options, except for (i), require a certificate to be issued by a superintendent 
registrar. Until recently, the only place where Muslims or other newer minorities 
could validly marry was in a register office or registered building. 217 As required 
                                                          
211 Part 2, Marriage Act 1949 and s.26 (e). 
212 Ibid., s.26 (d). 
213 Ibid., s.47 and s.26(c). 
214 Ibid., s.45. 
215 Ibid.,ss..43-4. 
216 Ibid.,ss. 46(A) & (B). 
217 Ibid.,214,ss.45 & 45(A). The 1990 Marriage (Registration of Buildings) Act and 1994 Marriage Act 
amended the 1949 Marriage Act, allowing buildings to be registered even if they are used for purposes 
other than wholly religious worship, and allowed buildings not registered under the 1855 Places of 
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by the 1855 Places of Worship Registration Act, the latter needed to be a 
‘separate’ building, used exclusively for the purpose of worship. This was a 
significant obstacle for Muslims since most mosques are used for a variety of 
purposes, as community centres, places for public meetings, and supplementary 
education (madrassas). The result of such requirements was that Muslims could 
not solemnise marriages in many mosques. 218 In relation to community centres, 
popular places for the nikah and walīmah (marriage banquet), and generally for 
minority weddings, they also could not be used since they were not places of 
public worship. In contrast, Quakers and Jews are exempted from these rules. 
Their ceremonies need not be in any particular building, or require the presence 
of a state official, and can take place at any hour of the day or night.219  
Muslims have also experienced other difficulties related to differences in 
gateway criteria for creating a valid marriage. Firstly, under shari‘a, a proxy 
marriage is permissible. A representatives (wakil) acting on behalf of either the 
prospective bride or groom with their permission can exchange declarations. 
Secondly, in Muslim ceremonies, one commonly finds the couple in separate 
rooms, (usually at the family home), making declarations separately. It is also 
possible, though opinion is divided amongst scholars, for a valid marriage to be 
effected even if the parties are in different countries over the telephone.220 In the 
eyes of English law, such ceremonies would not amount to valid marriage, even if 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Worship Registration Act to become designated ‘approved premises’, where valid registration ceremonies 
can take place. 
218  On the impact of such restriction, Hamilton (1995: 48) reports that in 1991, out of 452 mosques 
registered as a place of worship under the 1855 Act, only 74 mosques were registered buildings.  
219 Ss. 26 (1)(c), (d) and Ss.35(4) & 75(1)(a) Marriage Act 1949.  
220 For an example of a ceremony conducted over the telephone see the case of KC v City of Westminster 
Social and Community Services Department (2007) EWHC 3096 (Fam), and KC v City of Westminster 
Social and Community Services Department (2008) EWCA Civ 198.  
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they occurred in a mosque that had been designated a registered building.  
Thirdly, on the issue of whom one can marry, otherwise expressed as prohibited 
degrees of relationship, shari‘a does not permit same-sex marriages, marriages 
with close blood or milk relations (considered maharim),221or marriages with 
non-Muslims, (though there is a long-standing opinion that men can marry 
women from the other Abrahamic faiths). In contrast, other than treating 
relationships between certain persons related by affinity as void ab initio,222 
English law would disregard the other prohibitions since they fall outside its 
rules. Though there have been no reported cases on such issues, giving the 
impression that there is little or no conflict, it is possible to find examples of an 
‘offending’ son or daughter being ex-communicated (or worse) by their family 
and wider community. Not only when involving inter-faith marriages but also if 
marriage occurs outside one’s caste, class, and/or kin. A closer look also reveals 
that these issues are being dealt with by the police, courts and expert witnesses, 
at times unbeknown to them, under such headings as ‘honour’ or ‘gender related’ 
violence. These differences in gateway criteria are much more relevant than legal 
researchers have thus far realised.  
In relation to same sex unions, since 2005 gay couples have had the right to enter 
into civil partnerships and, following a remarkable volte-face, ‘gay marriages’ 
from 2014.223 Opposition to the latter was vigorously raised by various religious 
organisations, including the Muslim Council of Britain, but the government saw 
the change in law as an important step towards achieving equality and fulfilling 
                                                          
221 As prohibited in the qu‘ran (surah 4, verse 23).  
222 Prohibited relationships are defined in s.1 of the Marriage Act 1949; see also Marriage (Prohibited 
Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986.  
223 See in detail Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
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human rights obligations. To date, there have been no Muslim same-sex 
marriages, but there has been a highly publicised example of a civil partnership, 
involving two Pakistani Muslim females.224 
Before we turn to look at other points of difference in the gateway criteria, it is 
important to distinguish between what shari‘a allows, and what is obligatory and 
encouraged. Equally, here, we need to be mindful of differences between 
doctrinal rather than lived shari‘a. The latter takes us closer to, or crosses into, 
the realm of Muslim (ethnic) rather than Islamic practices. Much change has 
taken place over time, not just necessarily because of state controls, (these can 
and are evaded), but because large sections of contemporary Muslims have 
adopted a contextualising approach that sees the historical context in which 
many rules pertaining to marriage, (and more broadly gender), were borne. One 
should also be aware of the conditions that must be met before we can say that 
seemingly ‘permissible’ unions (involving for instance multiple wives or child 
brides) are actually shari‘a-compliant.   
When it comes to polygyny, (only Muslim men can have up to four wives, if 
specific conditions are met), there is a clear conflict between shari‘a and English 
law. The 2013 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act revised only part of the long-
standing (Christian) definition of marriage as the voluntary union for life of one 
man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others, which was affirmed famously 
by Lord Penzance in 1866.225 In other words, the union of marriage still has to be 
exclusive. Not only does English law render a marriage in which either party is 
                                                          
224 For details see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/pakistani-women-rehana-
kausar-and-sobia-kamar-marry-in-britains-first-muslim-lesbian-partnership-8632935.html (date 
accessed 02/02/14). 
225 For details see Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee [1866] LR 1 P & D 130. 
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already married to someone else as void ab initio,226 since as far back as 1861 
such an act is an offence.227 
Up until 1946, English courts refused to recognise either an actually polygamous 
marriage (where the husband had married more than one wife), or a potentially 
polygamous marriage (one where the husband was legally capable of taking 
more than one wife owing to his domicile, but in fact had not), even if the parties 
had acted in accordance with the law of their country of domicile (lex loci 
celebrationis). Wives were not allowed to seek any form of matrimonial relief if 
party to such marriages.228 Recognising the harsh impact of such an approach, 
that if continued would affect a greater number given the increase in 
immigration post-WW2, the courts began to accord validity to ‘marriages’ 
presented before them by distinguishing them from the established precedent in 
Hyde v Hyde and Woodmanese, notwithstanding their potentially polygamous 
character.229 Recognition remained under the aegis of the judges until 1972 
when the enactment of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Potentially Polygamous) 
Act finally placed on statutory footing that matrimonial relief could be granted to 
a spouse in a potentially, or actually, polygamous union. Though the Act gave 
some important marriage-like effects to polygamous unions,230 the disconcerting 
concept of a potentially polygamous marriage continued to cause problems until 
                                                          
226 S.11(b) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
227 For details see s.57 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  
228 See in detail Re Bethell [1888] 38 Ch. D. 220; Re Naquib [1917] 1 KB 359; Nachimson v Nachimson 
[1930] P. 217. 
229 Srini Vasan (otherwise Clayton) v Srini Vasan and Baindail (otherwise Lawson) v Baindail [1946] 1 A11 
ER 342. 
230  Another marriage-like effect is demonstrated in the case of Onobrauche v Onobrauche [1978] 8 Fam 
Law 107: the first wife could not rely on the fact of ‘adultery’ to establish the ground of irretrievable 
breakdown necessary for a petition of divorce since it related to the husband’s actions involving his 
second wife. 
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it was nullified in 1995.231 The 1972 Act, later largely re-enacted in s.47 of the 
1973 Matrimonial Causes Act, also made it clear that polygamous marriages by 
English domiciliaries, even if recognised by foreign jurisdictions, would be void 
ab initio. The change in the law left only one exception as to when a polygamous 
union would be recognised as being valid under English law. A polygamous 
marriage by a foreign domiciliary that is solemnised in a jurisdiction that allows 
it (in accordance with the lex loci celebrationis). Though such marriages may be 
valid, during the 1980s, Immigration Rules were amended to prohibit 
polygamous wives from exercising their right of abode, restricting settlement to 
one wife. 232 
When it comes to marriages involving ‘minors’, there is considerable debate 
amongst Muslims over what shari‘a prescribes. The qur‘an does not specify a 
legal age of marriage, but circumscribes that parties be both physically mature 
and of sound judgment. Based on hadith,233 a spectrum of opinions has evolved, 
from no age limitation, to when one reaches ‘adulthood’, (for some this means 
attainment of biological puberty), to the minimum age of 18 years.234 If we 
briefly ask what customary orderings such as rivaj or heer have to say about the 
minimum age of marriage, we see also that no uniform answers are forthcoming. 
                                                          
231 Over the problems the concept continued to create see Hussain v Hussain [1982] 1 A11 ER 369, and 
Law Commission (1985) Private International Law: Polygamous Marriage – Capacity to Contract a 
Polygamous Marriage and Related Issues, Law Commission Report no 146, Scottish Law Commission 
Report No 96, London: HMSO. The Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 
clarified that all ‘potentially’ polygamous marriages are monogamous marriages and therefore valid, and 
amended s.11 (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, limiting its operation to actually polygamous 
marriages only.  
232 See in detail S.2 Immigration Act 1988 and Immigration Rules part 8: family members, paragraphs 278 
– 280.  
233 Especially Sahih Bukhari, one of 6 major canonical texts in Sunni Islam (also referred to as the 
authentic six or al-sihah al sittah). 
234 The lack of consensus was reflected in figures, produced by an ITV documentary in 2013 (‘Exposure - 
Forced to Marry’), that imams from 18 out of 56 mosques agreed to conduct a nikah involving a 14-year-
old Muslim girl. 
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Under English law, a marriage in which either party is below the age of 16 is void 
ab initio.235 Moreover, it is an offence to have sexual intercourse with a girl under 
the age of 16,236 and will be treated as rape if she is below the age of 13.237 
Immigration Rules also ensure that entry clearance is not granted to spouses or 
fiancé(e)’s who have not, at the time of making their application, attained the age 
of 18.238 Despite instances of media sensationalism, conflict between shari‘a, 
customary orderings, and English law over the issue of child marriage is more 
imagined or theoretical rather than real, since there is little evidence of the 
practice amongst Muslims in Britain.  
There is however a strong body of evidence of the practice of forced, which at all 
times must be distinguished from arranged, marriage. Since consent is a 
condition of marriage, shari‘a strictly forbids forced marriage, holding such 
unions as invalid, and those who forced, or allowed, the marriage as guilty of 
major sin. For a variety of reasons, including the maintenance of family and 
kinship alliances, izzet, purdah and prevention of sharam, the practice of 
arranged, which can spill into forced, marriage has remained crucial in the lives 
of sections of particular groupings of Muslims in the diaspora. Here, most 
strikingly in the institution of forced marriage, we see the importance of 
tradition over both shari‘a and English law.  
                                                          
235 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, s.11.  
236 Sexual Offences Act 1956, s.6(1). In one case, a marriage involving a 13-year-old girl to a 26-year-old 
man was recognised as valid, as it had been conducted abroad (in accordance with the lex loci), and 
therefore came under an exception provided by the Act. It is doubtful that the decision by the Court of 
Appeal would be followed today. 
237 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.5.  
238 See in detail para 277 of the Immigration Rules, & the case of Quila and Bibi v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2011] UKSC 45. 
159 
 
Under English law a marriage in which either party did not consent is 
voidable.239 By voidable it is meant that if duress can be established the 
petitioner (the person who acted under compulsion) can obtain an annulment 
from the court, but until this is done the marriage remains valid. Presented with 
a number of cases involving newer minorities, English courts have had to 
determine what constitutes ‘duress’. In 1983, the Court of Appeal moved from a 
very narrow, but well-established interpretation of what constituted duress, that 
required the petitioner to prove their will was overborne by a genuine and 
reasonably held fear caused by threat of immediate danger to life, limb and 
liberty,240 to, remarkably, whether their will had been so coerced as to vitiate 
consent. The new guidance also directed that account be taken of the personal 
characteristics of the petitioner that may make them more vulnerable in terms of 
their will being overborne.241In an early case following the volte-face that also 
involved a male Muslim petitioner, the court accepted a parent can apply 
pressure to persuade their child to do what they think is right for them, but the 
marriage would be voidable if there is not a genuine change in mind.242 Besides 
this development, during the course of the last decade new measures have been 
introduced by the legislature, which have received mixed reactions. In 2007, the 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act laid down a clear procedure enabling 
anyone to ask a family court to implement injunctive relief (a Forced Marriage 
Protection Order). Aimed at deterring forced marriages involving a transnational 
partner, Immigration Rules were amended in 2008 to prevent entry of a spouse 
                                                          
239 S.12(c) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
240 For details see Singh v Singh [1971] 2 A11 ER 828; Singh v Kaur [1981] 11 Fam. Law 152.  
241 Hirani v Hirani [1983] 4 FLR 232. 
242 Mahmud v Mahmud [1994] SLT 599, (Scotland). 
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or fiancé(e) who had not at the time of making the application attained the age of 
21. After a long legal battle however, the amendment was held by the Supreme 
Court to be a breach of the ECHR.243 In 2014, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act made it an offence to coerce someone into marriage. The Act 
defines ‘marriage’ as any religious or civil ceremony of marriage, whether or not 
it is legally binding.244 Yet, a religious ceremony of marriage that takes place 
without fulfilling the preliminary civil requirements, despite years of 
campaigning by Muslims, is not recognised as creating a valid marriage in 
Britain. This has been a great source of contention for Muslims, and therefore it 
is important that we look at this in some detail.   
English courts have taken a tough line on the validity of marriages solemnised 
according to the usages of Muslims. Such marriages, in which the parties have 
knowingly and wilfully intermarried in disregard of certain formalities, as 
provided by the Marriage Acts 1949 – 1994, have been held to be invalid or non-
marriages in the eyes of English law.245 It is also possible to identify examples of 
where English law has gone as far as to prosecute Muslims who have conducted 
an Islamic marriage ceremony or nikah.246In 1965, a Muslim leader was 
convicted of an offence for performing a nikah in England.247 The defendant had 
knowingly and wilfully solemnised a nikah in a private home, not in a ‘registered 
                                                          
243R (on the application of Quila and another) (FC) (Appellants) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 45; R (Bibi & Anor) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45. 
244 S.121 (4) Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. 
245 S.11((a)(iii) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
246 Twenty years earlier, Mohamed Ali, also prosecuted for conducting a nikah, was found to have no case 
to answer because, for the provisions of the then 1836 Marriage Act to apply, the ceremony ruled 
Humphreys J ‘must be at least one which will prima facie confer the status of husband and wife on the two 
persons’. The case was decided in 1943, but reported in [1964] 2 QB 352, R v Mohamed Ali.  
247 R v Bham [1966] 1 QB 159.  
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building’, and this act was held to be contrary to the law.248 His appeal was 
however allowed by the Court of Criminal Appeal, since  
[…] unless the ‘marriage’ purporting to be solemnised under Islamic law is also a 
marriage of the kind allowed by English law it is not a marriage with which the 
Marriage Act 1949 is concerned […] (168 E).  
  
The decision gives rise to two separate, but overlapping, questions. What is the 
position if the parties have a nikah believing that they are contracting a valid 
marriage according to both shari‘a and English law? Does a nikah create a void 
marriage, or a so-called ‘non-marriage’? Dealing with the second question first, 
the distinction may not seem important at first glance, but it is a crucial one. Not 
least because, a court dealing with a void marriage can make financial orders, 
and redistribute property between the parties. A declaration of a void marriage 
is also important because it is an official recognition that some semblance of a 
marriage did occur, albeit that it was fundamentally flawed.  
A void ‘marriage’ is invalid ab initio, meaning from its inception, and does not 
require ratification by the court, though this is often preferable since it provides 
clarity for the parties involved. A non-marriage involves a ceremony that is so far 
removed from what constitutes a valid marriage, as per the gateway criteria of 
English law, that it is deemed a non-event; hence no discussion over its validity 
or invalidity is required. In A-M v A-M (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Validity of 
Marriage),249 Hughes J (as he then was) provides examples:  
                                                          
248 See in detail s.75(2)(a) Marriage Act 1949.  
249 A-M v A-M (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Validity of Marriage) [2001] 2 FLR 6.  
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[…] a staged dramatic marriage ‘ceremony’ conducted in a play or in the course 
of a soap opera. Another might be the exchange of promises between small 
children [55].250  
 
[…] the same would no doubt apply to all manner of self-devised rituals 
intending to be binding in conscience by those forsaking the civil forms of 
marriage, as well as to ‘marriages’ according to foreign religions, and to any 
ceremonies which make no attempt to be English marriages within the Marriage 
Acts [56].  
 
In this case, Hughes J concluded that a nikah conducted by a mufti in a flat in 
London was a non-marriage, since  
[…] the ceremony was consciously an Islamic one rather than such as is 
contemplated by the Marriage Acts. Just as in Regina v Bham [1966] 1 QB 159, 
nobody purported to conduct or take part in a Marriage Act 1949 ceremony, and 
the fact that no one applied their mind to how English law would view what they 
did does not alter that conclusion.  
 
Following A-M v A-M, in Gandhi v Patel251, a vivah (a Hindu ceremony of 
marriage) conducted by a Brahmin priest at a restaurant in London met the same 
fate. Park J emphasised that this also was a non-marriage, since the Hindu 
ceremony purported to be a marriage according to a foreign religion, and it made 
no attempt to be an English marriage within the Marriage Acts. After a careful 
review of the law on non-marriage in Hudson v Leigh [2007]252, Bodley J 
explained that in determining what, if any, marriage had occurred it all hinges on 
the degree of non-compliance with the Marriage Acts. Questionable ceremonies 
                                                          
250 See also Gereis v Yaqoub [1997] 1 FLR 854. Algionby J explained that a ‘marriage’ ceremony conducted 
in the course of a play is, by way of clarification, a non-marriage.  
251
 Gandhi v Patel [2002] 1 FLR 603. 
252
 Hudson v Leigh [2007] EWHC 1306 (Fam). 
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should, he says, be decided on a case-by-case basis, in particular taking account 
of: 
I. whether the ceremony or event set out or purported to be a 
lawful marriage;  
II. whether it bore all or enough of the hallmarks of marriage; 
III. whether the three key participants (most especially the 
officiating official) believed, intended and understood the 
ceremony as giving rise to the status of lawful marriage; and  
IV. the reasonable perceptions, understandings and beliefs of 
those in attendance.  
 
Such guidance does seem sensible, but only if applied in a way that a Hindu vivah, 
Sikh anand karaj, or a Muslim nikah is not struck down in circumstances in 
which a Christian holy matrimony is upheld. The decision in Gereis v Yagoub,253 
which has not been deemed by any subsequent court as per incuriam, suggests 
indefensibly exactly that. A look at the facts reveals a couple that chose to 
intermarry at a Coptic Orthodox Church in London. The church however was not 
registered, the priest conducting the marriage was not licenced, and no prior 
notice of the marriage was given to the superintendent registrar. Moreover, the 
couple were aware, having been pre-warned by the priest, that the ceremony did 
not give rise to the status of a lawful marriage, for which they would have to have 
a civil ceremony at the register office. But no civil ceremony was ever completed 
by the couple during the ten years they were together. Aglionby J ruled that more 
than a non-marriage had been achieved, namely a void marriage, because despite 
failing to meet the necessary formalities as required by law, the ceremony: 
                                                          
253 Gereis v Yaqoub [1997] 1 FLR 854. 
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[…] bore the hallmarks of an ordinary Christian marriage and both parties 
treated it as such […] and that those who attended it […] clearly assumed that 
they were attending an ordinary Christian marriage [858].  
 
The decision is another example of the privileged position that Christianity holds 
in the eyes of English law. Following Hudson v Leigh, there have been several 
other cases involving the issue of whether a nikah had resulted in a valid, invalid 
or non-marriage. In AAA v ASH, since both parties knew that a nikah did not 
comply with the formal requirements of marriage under English law, the court 
held they had participated only in a non-marriage.254 In El Gamal v Al Maktoum a 
nikah conducted in a flat in Knightsbridge was also held to be a non-marriage. 255 
In setting out the reasons, Bodey J explained that neither party demonstrated an 
attempt to be part of, or to set up, a ceremony that purported to comply with the 
requirements of English law. He found it hard to accept the petitioner’s 
insistence that both parties had through an oral nikah, (the respondent denied 
that a ceremony even occurred), intended to create a valid marriage under 
English law. He considered, but dismissed, the view that intention was the all-
important factor that ought to convert a ceremony that failed to comply with the 
Marriage Acts 1949 - 1994 into a marriage, albeit a void one. Holman J took the 
same view in Dukali v Lamrani.256 In this case there was no doubt that both 
parties, moreover the consulate staff too, believed that their civil ceremony 
(which incorporated the nikah) had legal effect in Morocco and England. They 
had chosen to marry at the Moroccan Consulate rather than at an English 
                                                          
254 AAA v ASH, The Registrar General for England and Wales and the Secretary of State for Justice [2009] 
EWHC 636 (Fam) . On the particular facts, the court could not find a presumption of marriage to aid the 
father’s ability to obtain parental responsibility. 
255 El Gamal v Al Maktoum [2011] EWHC B27 (Fam). 
256 Dukali v Lamrani [2012] EWHC 1748 (Fam). 
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registry office because they wanted to ensure that any children from the 
marriage also had dual nationality. Holman J explained that the ceremony may be 
recognised under Moroccan family law, but it occurred in a Consulate in London 
and therefore the relevant law for determining the legal status of the ceremony 
was English domestic law. Since there was no, or any purported compliance 
(according to the judge), with English law requirements, it could only be a non-
marriage.  
The recent case of MA and JA v Her Majesty's Attorney General,257 affirms the 
tough line taken when the gateway criteria of English law is ignored. In this case, 
the ceremony did not fully satisfy the formalities of the Marriage Acts 1949 - 
1994 (the parties had failed to give notice to the superintendent registrar and no 
certificate had been issued). Nevertheless, it was deemed to have met the 
essential requirements (the mosque was a registered building and the imam 
conducting the ceremony was an authorised person). Moylan J concluded that 
there was no statutory provision that rendered such a ceremony void, unless 
there was deliberate non-compliance. The same would be true in his view if 
there was a failure to publish banns or obtain a licence.  
A brief review of the law on void and non-marriage has established that a nikah, 
unless complying with the essential formalities of English law, is a non-marriage. 
A belief to the contrary reasonably held by the parties does not alter the position, 
but it is fatal to any claim if the parties knew that the nikah does not comply with 
the formalities as prescribed by English Law. The only question that arises, then, 
is whether there is any other option available to a Muslim couple by way of 
                                                          
257 MA and JA v Her Majesty's Attorney General [2012] EWHC 2219 (Fam). 
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which they could have their union afforded the legal status of marriage? In 
exceptional cases, to achieve equity, English courts have accorded relationships 
involving a long period of cohabitation the status of marriage, provided that 
particular conditions are met, including that the couple had lived as man and 
wife and were reputed to be so.  This includes relationships in which there was a 
ceremony (that was defective in some way or irregular), and where there was no 
ceremony, but the parties conducted themselves as if there had been. The legal 
presumption of marriage is not something new, or the result of the presence of 
newer minorities. Its origins can be traced back to the late 19th century. It was 
first applied in a case involving both a long cohabitation and a foreign marriage 
ceremony (vivah) in 1964.258Over three decades later, in Chief Adjudication 
Officer v Bath,259 the Court of Appeal used the legal presumption in a case 
involving an anand karaj and 37 years of cohabitation, cut short by the death of 
the male partner.260 Importantly, the claimant could only receive a widow’s 
pension, if she was party to a marriage. The couple were reputed to be, and 
believed they were husband and wife. The Inland Revenue and Department of 
Social Security, illustrated by their tax deductions, had also shared the belief. The 
Sikh marriage ceremony had taken place in an unregistered gurdwara in London, 
but this did not prevent the court from finding a marriage. After a careful review 
of the authorities, Evans LJ explained that the legal presumption of marriage 
arose from the fact of extended cohabitation as man and wife, and importantly,  
                                                          
258 See for details Captain de Thoren v. A.- G (1876) 1 App. Cas. 686; Lyle v Ellwood [1874] LR 19 EQ 98 and 
more generally Borkowski (2002): The presumption of marriage. Vol 14, no 3, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, pp. 252 -266.  
259 Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath [2000] 1 FLR 8. 
260See in detail Mahadervan v Mahadervan [1964] P 233. 
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[…] the presumption was extended to include an inference that the statutory 
requirements first introduced by Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act 1753 had been 
duly complied with; but in each case the presumption was capable of being 
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence [21].  
 
Through a nifty piece of judicial equity we see, here, how the formalities 
prescribed by statute were sidestepped. What this example also reveals is that 
judges are prepared to intervene to give otherwise ‘irregular’ minority 
arrangements (defective in some way from the perspective of English law) legal 
effect when equity demands it. This is not done by recognising minority or 
foreign laws, but by judges undertaking their own ‘English ijtihad’, finding 
inspiration from their own tradition’s legal resources. In this way, only English 
law applies, the authority of the state remains sovereign, and the perception of a 
uniform law is maintained.  
As outlined above, though the nikah was deemed a non-marriage in A-M v A-M, 
this was only part of the story. Following CAO v Bath, Hughes J still found a valid 
marriage by way of legal presumption of marriage. The Muslim couple in the case 
also believed that their religious marriage ceremony had legal effect; they too 
held themselves out to be husband and wife to others; and their cohabitation 
lasted for over 20 years. In Al-Saedy v Musawi [2010],261 the Muslim petitioner’s 
claim for a presumption of marriage to be applied to her union was dismissed. 
Reviewing the dicta in CAO v Bath, Bodey J concluded that there was no place for 
the application of the presumption of marriage where the parties could not have 
reasonably have held the belief that their ceremony was enough to satisfy the 
                                                          
261  Al-Saedy v Musawi [2010] EWHC 3293. 
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requirements of English law. This requirement, significantly, reduces the scope 
of the presumption. Since it would be hard to reasonably believe that a second-
generation immigrant, or someone who had lived in Britain for a period of time, 
could reasonable believe that any type of religious marriage that they have, or 
may undergo, would fulfil the requirements of English law.  
The combined effect of the above requirements is that Muslims, it appears, have 
little choice but to comply with English law if they wish to see their marriages 
recognised as legally valid. Can one say, then, that Muslims have abandoned the 
nikah and chosen to follow the requirements wholly prescribed by English law? 
Or for that matter left on the rubbish tip of history their ethnic traditions when it 
comes to marriage?  This is not so. As this study illustrates, Muslims have 
developed innovative methods to get around perceived problems, modelling 
their behaviour in compliance with their choice.  
The ability of minorities to innovate so as to satisfy the demands of overlapping 
laws was picked up, during the 1980s, so perceptively by Menski (1988; 1993). 
He identified the emergence of what he coined ‘angrezi shariat’ amongst South 
Asian Muslims in Britain. At one level, the concept captures that Muslims learnt 
to combine the requirements of English marriage law with the nikah. Under 
angrezi shariat if the couple want to get married, the rules are, they marry twice. 
To have their marriages recognised in the eyes of English law they will have a 
civil ceremony, but will only regard themselves as ‘married’, or be reputed to be 
by their kin and ummah, once they have the nikah. Only after the nikah, since 
shari‘a strictly prohibits zina (pre-or-extra-marital sexual relations), will the 
couple set up home together and consummate the marriage.  
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Menski (1993) explains that the development of angrezi shariat occurred in 
three stages. In the first stage, as is often the case with new immigrants,262 
Muslims were unaware of the requirements of English law and therefore in 
accordance with their legal consciousness only had a nikah. When a relationship 
broke down, the husband would divorce his wife by talaq, irrespective of 
whether she was in the Indian Subcontinent or Britain, allowing them both to 
move on and remarry if they so wished. In this way, life continued, until 
individuals realised that non-compliance with the rules of English law created 
great inconveniences. Confusion over legal statuses affected immigration, 
welfare, and decisions related to ancillary relief, which especially affected 
women. Some husbands had deserted their wives with great impunity, but as the 
wives seeking readdress from English courts to their dismay were to find out, the 
nikah was not even a semblance of a marriage in the eyes of English law.  
The inevitable second stage brought home to Muslims that there are different 
sets of gateway criteria when it comes to marriage. More fundamentally, it 
brought to the fore a clash of authority between shari‘a and English law. Muslims 
had to decide where their loyalties lay. Menski explains that Muslims had three 
alternative options: they could avoid English law altogether, relying instead on 
the universality of shari‘a. The second option would be to simply follow the new 
law of the land they had made their home. The couple, then, would marry in a 
secular and administrative form as prescribed by English law and do nothing 
else. The third option, and the one chosen by most Muslims in Britain today, is to 
combine the rules of English law and sharia, thereby creating angrezi shariat.  
                                                          
262  Not being able to speak or read English, avoidance (or hostility) of officialdom, attitudes formed by 
past experiences in their country of origin, little contact outside their recreated ethnic enclaves, are just 
some of the reasons why it took many Muslims time to learn the rules of their new country of residence.  
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Today, many Muslims, then, marry twice and if things don’t work out divorce 
twice. In other words, they have a ‘double-decker’ marriage. The secular 
registration ceremony often precedes the nikah, and is viewed not uncommonly 
as a form of betrothal, that can be terminated before the all-important nikah 
(Menski 1988: 15; Hamilton 1995: 50). It is also done in this order, to provide a 
form of protective recourse to the wife, who potentially could marry an 
unscrupulous husband who flouts the injunctions of shari‘a. Having lost her 
virginity, or worse still become pregnant, both of which reduce her status for 
remarriage in the eyes of her community, there is, then, recourse to financial and 
property orders under the 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act. The trend in more 
recent years has been to have the ceremonies close to each other. In this regard, 
one can read the registration of mosques and of imams as ‘authorised persons’, 
which enable this to happen without any real gap of time in between, as another 
feature of the ongoing process that is angrezi shariat.  
Earlier I said that at one level, the concept of angrezi shariat captures that 
Muslims learnt to combine the requirements of English marriage law with the 
nikah. At a deeper level, it reveals much more. It shows very clearly that Muslims, 
like other newer minorities in Britain,263 are not lost ‘between two cultures’ 
(Watson 1977). They are not simply passive subjects of the law, but productive 
legal actors. In jurisprudential terms, they have embraced legal pluralism and 
created hybrid legal systems in Britain, which they perceive are shari’a-
compliant. In sociological terms, this is an expression of the fact that they wish to 
lead multicultural lives, that they have multi-faceted identities.  
                                                          
263 On the formation of angrezi dharma among Hindus in Britain see Menski (1993).   
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To some extent the British state has also recognised the reality of hybrid ‘legal’ 
systems being followed by minorities in Britain. In the context of annulment of 
marriage, it is possible to identify instances where the courts have gone as far as 
to recognise that a marriage between South Asians in Britain is not fully 
complete and legally binding until the requirements of both English law and the 
respective religious law have been completed.  In a nullity of marriage case 
involving Sikhs decided in 1972, Kaur v Singh,264 the Court of Appeal noted that:  
It is beyond question that in order to fully marry according to Sikh religion and 
practice, it is necessary to have not only a civil ceremony in a register office but 
also a Sikh ceremony in a Sikh temple [293].  
 
The petitioner convinced the court that the husband following the civil ceremony 
had failed to organise an anand karaj (which it was accepted was a precondition 
to consummation), and therefore she was entitled to a decree of nullity on the 
ground of his wilful refusal to consummate.  In A v J,265 the wife’s refusal to have 
a vivah following a civil ceremony was also held by the court to amount to a 
wilful refusal to consummate. This case moreover reveals the different weight of 
importance placed by the parties on the civil ceremony. The wife was 
disappointed by the husband’s cool and inconsiderate attitude towards her 
following the civil ceremony, a major reason for her refusal to have a vivah. 
Acknowledging her hurt feelings, the husband had apologised and explained that 
his behaviour arose from his supposition that a formal relationship was 
appropriate until the vivah, at which point they would be ‘properly married’. The 
different presuppositions led to very different expectations, ultimately leading to 
                                                          
264 Kaur v Singh [1972] 1 A11 ER 292.  
265 A v J (Nullity) [1989] 1 FLR 110. 
172 
 
the relationship breaking down. In the more recent Scottish case of H v H,266 the 
Extra Division Court granted the Muslim petitioner a nullity on the basis that the 
civil ceremony at a register office had not been preceded or followed by a nikah.  
Another, perhaps more direct acknowledgement, of the operation of hybrid 
‘legal’ systems amongst British minorities is illustrated by how judges and, more 
recently, Parliament have dealt with the harm caused by ‘limping marriages’.267  
The concept refers to a scenario where the ‘wife’ has had her civil marriage 
dissolved but finds her (often vindictive) partner refusing to take steps to 
dissolve the religious marriage. Under classical interpretations of halakhah only 
the Jewish husband can give a get (a Jewish divorce). In Britain, Rabbis in battei 
din used by Reform Jews have sometimes issued a get irrespective of the 
husband’s permission. In contrast, accepting the prerogative of the husband, 
Orthodox battei din will rarely, if ever, do so. Without a religious divorce the wife 
cannot remarry under Jewish law – becoming an agunah (‘chained to her 
marriage’). If she ignores the law, and enters into a new relationship, she 
commits a grave sin. Moreover, any child born from what is regarded an illicit 
relationship is branded a ‘mamzer’ or ‘mamzeret’ (female) and is prohibited by 
halakhah from marrying a fellow orthodox Jew on reaching adulthood. Under 
shari‘a, some Muslims also have adopted the interpretation that only the 
husband can give the talaq. Under English law, in contrast, it is the court that 
dissolves a civil marriage, if either party can establish the ground of irretrievable 
                                                          
266 H v H [2005] Fam LR 80.  
267 Using the quantum of maintenance due to the wife as leverage in one case involving a Jewish couple, 
Brett v Brett [1969] 1 A11 ER 1007, the Court of Appeal ordered that if the husband had not granted the 
get within 3 months following the hearing, the amount would increase quite substantially. Generally, 
despite the harmful effects, few cases have been reported on the issue of limping marriages.  
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breakdown established by one of five facts.268 To provide (Jewish) wives with 
leverage, Parliament passed the 2002 Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act,269 
enabling a party to petition the court not to grant a decree absolute in relation to 
the civil marriage until the dissolution of the religious marriage.    
On the whole however, constrained by its ideological presuppositions, English 
law refuses to officially recognise hybrid ‘legal’ systems such as angrezi shariat. 
At the same time, it has avoided direct confrontation by neither taking steps to 
prohibit ‘marriage’ ceremonies according to religious or foreign law in Britain, 
nor, unlike in some European countries, by imposing penalties if religious 
marriages are solemnised before civil ceremonies.270In the context of disputes 
arriving in court, this often means that important facts of the case related to 
Muslim laws are either missed, or simply ignored. Aware of English law’s 
approach some litigants are manipulating facts resulting in disputes presented in 
court to take a twisted form, or find themselves with significant leverage to 
bargain in the shadow of English law, forcing wives for instance to give up 
maintenance or matrimonial property claims in return for a religious divorce. At 
times, as we have seen with the application of a legal presumption of marriage, 
the courts have pierced the veil of uniformity that espouses a strict adherence to 
English black-letter law through the use of equity to meet the challenges of 
justice. Another example of this is provided by the unreported case of Ali v Ali 
(2001) Unreported, otherwise known as ‘the case of the missing one pound’. 
Decided in 1999, the case involved a Bangladeshi Muslim couple, both working 
professionals in London, who found themselves in a heated court battle when 
                                                          
268 See for details s.1 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
269 The Act amended the 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act by inserting s.10A. 
270 For details see Doe (2011: 221-2).  
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their marriage broke down. After Mr Ali applied to the High court for a divorce, 
Mrs Ali cross-petitioned asking the court to withhold the divorce until her 
husband had paid the mahr (dower). As a pre-condition of valid marriage, a 
groom is obliged under shari‘a to give the bride an agreed mahr, or ‘nuptial gift’, 
which after the nikah is promptly due, unless it is settled that it be deferred. The 
mahr is often a sum of money, but can also be a dwelling, land, jewellery or some 
other chattel, and is the sole property of the wife, not the guardian or husband. In 
the case of Ali v Ali the agreed mahr amount was £30,001. The husband, as one 
would expect, argued that the mahr was not an issue for the court, and if it was it 
was not payable, as in England only English law applies. As the court’s expert 
witness, Menski explained that the Muslim couple had undergone not untypically 
a double-decker marriage, a civil ceremony recognised by English law and a 
nikah in accordance with shari’a. As there were two marriages, there had to be 
also two divorces, which also meant that there were two sets of financial 
arrangements that the judge needed to consider (Menski 2002: 49). In the 
interests of preventing injustice to the wife coupled with the concern to avoid the 
wife’s recourse to a shari‘a council, the judge awarded Mrs Ali £30,000. In 
Menski’s (2002: 50) view, by giving her £1 less he applied not shari‘a but 
asserted the application of English law. In so doing, he maintained the thin but 
indispensable line between uniform law and personal laws, despite the 
unrelenting pressure for such a reform in the context of family law caused by the 
commitment of minorities to their ethnic, or personal, rather than just territorial, 
laws.  
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4.3 Muslim responses to a situation of legal pluralism 
Faced with the non-recognition of Muslim laws, penalties for failure to comply 
with English law, at times, hostile or negative attitudes and perceived 
interferences with their different family structures and processes, Muslims have 
had to find their own answers or solutions. In their mission to obtain an outcome 
that complies with their choice, (or, if that is not possible, to minimise their 
hardship), Muslims are creatively employing various strategies and tactics.  
Beginning with the strategies, that is, what Muslims are trying to accomplish, it is 
possible to identify three different types: firstly, Muslims have sought to reform 
one ordering to take account of another. This is occurring in three directions:  
i. reform of English law, so as to incorporate shari‘a and ethnic 
orderings; 
ii.  reform of fiqh, so as to incorporate English law (and more broadly 
‘European’ or ‘international’ values), and their ethnic orderings; 
and,  
iii. reform of their ethnic orderings, so as to incorporate shari‘a and 
English law.  
 
The second strategy is to combine two or more orderings to develop new hybrid 
or syncretic orderings. Examples include ‘angrezi shariat’, ‘pardeshi rewaj’ 
(Ballard 2006: 51), and also the construction of super-hybrid orderings that 
involve three or more orderings such as ‘Anglo-Muslim Turkish law’ (Yilmaz 
2004). Thirdly, Muslims have sought to follow one particular ordering, 
dispensing or avoiding interaction with the other(s).  
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4.3.1 Strategy one:  reform of an ordering so as to take account of another 
When looking at how Muslims have sought to incorporate shari‘a into English 
law, it is possible to identify the use of three different tactics, that is, how 
Muslims have tried to achieve this goal: tactic one, comprised of demands for a 
personal law; tactic two, is characterised by more limited demands on a 
piecemeal basis related to specific shari‘a norms; and, tactic three, is 
characterised by efforts to seek recognition of shari‘a norms through non-
community specific Acts of Parliament such as the 1998 Human Rights Act, 2010 
Equality Act, and 1996 Arbitration Act.   
Tactic one involved Muslims campaigning for the wholesale recognition of 
shari’a as a personal law applicable to all Muslims over family law matters.  Calls 
for such a reform were first made in the 1970s, most prominently by the Union 
of Muslim Organisations of UK and Eire in 1976 (for details see UMO 1983; 
Poulter 1990b). It is difficult to evaluate the degree of popular support that such 
a call had at the grassroots level. Nielsen (1993) suggests the demand was 
backed more by Muslim leaders than Muslims generally, but cautions against a 
reading that this implies Muslims are disinterested in such matters. As seen by 
the issues we have raised elsewhere, this clearly is not the case. Menski (1993) 
suggests that the lack of popular support could be explained by the fact that 
Muslim laws already exist at the unofficial level. Keeping them off the official 
radar, then, insulates them from interference by the state, but also avoids 
difficult questions such as who decides what shari‘a decrees in the context of 
family law. Nevertheless, earlier, and similar calls since for a Muslim personal 
law have firmly been rejected by the state.  
177 
 
It is important to briefly outline reasons for the rejection. Inclusion, it has been 
argued, would not only destabilise a well-functioning legal system but also 
violate universally applicable human rights norms.271During the 1990s, Poulter 
in particular argued that,  
[…] on human rights grounds, Muslims should not be allowed to operate a 
system of Islamic personal law in England because of the risk that the rights of 
women will be violated in a discriminatory fashion through such practices as 
polygamy, talaq divorces and forced marriage (Ansari 2004b: 266 quoting 
Poulter 1990b:158).272   
 
Though Poulter made the error of seeing forced marriage as a practice 
sanctioned by shari‘a, his overall objection is still today often (uncritically) 
bandied in Western discourse. State officials and institutions when offered the 
opportunity to do so, or when reacting to particular events, have been keen to 
present that there is ‘one uniform law for all’ based on British values (Shah 2010: 
77).273 In 2006, Trevor Phillips, then chairman of Britain’s CRE, went as far as to 
suggest that Muslims who cannot accept this, who want instead a system of 
shari‘a law, should leave the UK.274 In more recent years, the ‘One Law for All – 
No sharia law Campaign’, launched in 2008, has claimed that any recognition of 
shari’a would also violate citizenship rights, equality under the law, and the 
important principle of secularism.275  
                                                          
271 For a discussion of human rights as a Western concept see: Polis & Schwab (1979); Panikkar & Sharma 
(2007).  
272 See also Poulter (1990b: 159-164); (1997: 52-3). 
273For a recent example, see Eleftheriou-Smith, Loulla-Mae (2014): 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-pledges-lessons-on-magna-carta-as-he-
seeks-to-push-british-values-9538187.html  (accessed 03/08/2014). 
274 Muslims ‘must’ accept free speech, BBC news report, 26/02/2006 (available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4752804.stm, last visited 05/02/2015). Trevor Phillips was responding 
to angry protests by Muslims against the publication of cartoons satirising Prophet Muhammed.   
275 http://www.secularism.org.uk/launchofonelawforall-campaignaga.html. 
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Tactic two involved Muslims making more limited demands related in particular 
to either fardh or haram shari‘a norms, usually in the form of exemptions. These, 
particularly at the local level and prior to the Satanic Verses Affair in 1989, had 
some success (see Nielsen 1988; Shah 1994). Since then, besides the field of 
Islamic finance, demands have increasingly met resistance from a ‘secularising’ 
state and from a media vigilant of ‘shari‘a-creep’. In the context of criminal law, 
more so than in any other area of the law, agents of the law begin from a position 
that any recognition of otherness or alterity would jeopardise the integrity of the 
system (Shah 2005: 68). Few, if any, demands of (partial rather than complete) 
cultural defence have succeeded (see in detail Renteln 2004; Shah 2005).276 In 
the context of civil law, including when involving issues related to the family, 
demands have been vigorously questioned and challenged, often being 
interpreted as a claim for preferential treatment (see Jones & Welhengama 
2000). The view from within the communities, or at least of many members, 
however, is that the law and its personnel are biased since they grant 
concessions to some groups but not others (Yilmaz 2000; Meer 2008). Noting the 
small number of exemptions and even less number of concessions granted to 
Muslims, but also to other newer minorities, it is difficult to reject Shah’s (2002: 
1) conclusion that a situation of repression of other ‘legal’ orders is in place at all 
levels, despite the rhetorical claim by state officials that Britain today is a 
multicultural or inclusive society.  
                                                          
276 Rather, the state has instead created a number of ‘cultural offences’, that is, new offences, or by bolting 
on to existing offences an aggravating factor enabling stiffer penalties, in relation to acts that are 
practised by the cultural group of the ‘offender’ (which in contrast to the territorial law is condoned, 
approved or even endorsed and promoted in a given situation by the personal, or ethnic, ordering). 
Examples include the criminalisation of fgm/fgc, khat, ‘honour murders’, and forced marriages. 
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Tactic three involves Muslims turning to non-community-specific general Acts of 
Parliament by way of which they could have shari‘a incorporated. The Acts 
include the 1998 Human Rights Act, and 2010 Equality Act, and these have 
become key tools for religious minorities wishing to assert their right to practise 
their religious beliefs. The 1998 Human Rights Act indirectly incorporated ECHR 
rights into domestic law, and, since it marked an abrupt shift from passive 
religious tolerance to the active protection of religious freedom as a positive 
right, it was immediately hailed a ‘new dawn for the freedom of religion’ (Hill 
2002). Article 9 gives everybody the right either ‘alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance’. This includes the absolute right to hold a 
religion or belief, or to change it. It also includes the qualified right to manifest 
religion or belief, subject only to the limitations laid down in Article 9(2), which 
allow the state to interfere with the right if: (a) the interference is ‘prescribed by 
law’; and, (b) meets a legitimate aim of being in the ‘interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others’; and, (c) is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Since 
religious liberty became a positive right that could only be lawfully interfered 
with if specific conditions are met, a variety of claims have made their way to 
court, including prominently by a young Muslim girl asserting her right to wear 
the jilbab to school despite the clothing contravening the school uniform 
policy.277  
                                                          
277 See in detail R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) (Respondent) v. 
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School (Appellants) [2006] UKHL. 
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Prior to 2003 in England, Wales, and Scotland, 278 discrimination on the basis of 
religious belief was mostly uncontrolled. Some religions were afforded 
‘unintended’ protection under the 1976 Race Relations Act, since an ‘ethnic 
group’ was interpreted to include Jews and Sikhs, but to their dismay not 
Muslims. Following the 2003 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, in the workplace, 
in Britain became unlawful.279The Regulations, which were augmented by the 
2006 Equality Act, have since been re-enacted in the 2010 Equality Act. Utilising 
their new found protection, a variety of claims have made their way to English 
courts, including prominently by a Muslim woman who asserted her right to 
wear the niqab whilst working as a bi-lingual support worker in a co-educational 
junior school in Leeds.280 Though both claimants lost their case, the litigation 
brought to the attention of schools and employers across Britain their duties 
under both Acts, and to consider carefully if their actions or policies when it 
comes to limiting religious freedom are either justifiable in the circumstances, or 
proportionate in achieving a specified legitimate aim.  
Muslims have also used another Act of Parliament by way of which they have 
incorporated aspects of shari‘a into English law. Unlike informal shari‘a councils 
which rely on the good will of the parties, or forms of social sanctions by the 
community, the determinations made by Muslim Arbitration Tribunals (MATs) 
are enforceable by either party in the normal civil courts, since they come under 
                                                          
278 Legislation prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religious belief had existed in Northern 
Ireland since 1976. For details see Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, and 
its predecessor, the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 (repealed 1.3.1999). 
279 The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 implemented the provisions of the 
Council Directive (EC) 2000/78/EC . 
280 See in detail Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council [2007] IRLR 434 EAT. 
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the provisions of the 1996 Arbitration Act. Launched in 2007,  MATs must 
operate within the legal framework of English law, but this is not seen by its 
architects to prevent or impede the,  
[…] ‘overriding objective’ of securing the proceedings before it in ‘accordance 
with qur’anic injunctions and prophetic practice ‘as established by the 
recognised schools of Islamic sacred law’.281 
 
Besides child custody, civil divorce proceedings, and criminal law matters, the 
MAT can deal with all matters of civil and personal religious law (for details see 
Bowen 2013). The architects of the MAT have developed detailed formal 
regulations that govern the process of dispute resolution under its jurisdiction. 
Parties can withdraw at any time prior to the decision being made.  The panel 
that hears a case must include a ‘scholar of Islamic sacred law’, but also a 
solicitor or barrister of England and Wales. In arriving at a decision the tribunal 
takes account of both the ‘recognised schools of Islamic sacred law’ and the laws 
of England and Wales. Though decisions cannot be appealed, they are open to 
judicial review by an English High Court. In this way, Muslims have, it appears, 
harmoniously created a fusion of Islamic and English legal tradition. 
Muslims have not only sought to reform English law so as to take account of 
shari‘a or their ethnic orderings, but have also sought reform in the opposite 
direction. If we turn to how Muslims have sought to reform fiqh, in light of 
English law and more broadly ‘Western values’, it is possible to identify two 
different tactics. Tactic one has involved Muslim scholars using neo-ijtihad to 
develop new forms of fiqh. As we have seen, some scholars like al-Alwani, al-
                                                          
281http://www.matribunal.com/procedure_rules.html (accessed 30th October 2013). 
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Qaradawi and Oubrou have exerted themselves to develop and establish a fiqh or 
jurisprudence for minorities, one that takes account of the minority status of 
Muslims, and the conditions under which the community finds itself in dar al-
dawa. This development has allowed Muslims to be able to follow aspects of 
English law, when previously longstanding consensus/fatwas had suggested 
otherwise. The rulings by the ECFR that, subject to some conditions, female 
Muslim converts are not required to divorce their non-converting husbands, and 
that Muslims can embrace British or European citizenship (muwatanah) without 
this being a violation of shari‘a, are cases in point. Other scholars, such as 
Ramadan and Ceric, depart company over the development of a ‘minority fiqh’, 
but, in their own ways, have also by way of neo-ijtihad sought to develop a fiqh to 
address contemporary challenges faced by European Muslims, using either 
traditional techniques such as maṣāliḥ and maqasid, or by re-modelling the 
Covenant of Medina so as to apply it in our contemporary times. It is difficult to 
evaluate the impact that each of these developments has had at the grassroots 
level. It is hoped that future research will address this.  
Tactic two has involved especially Muslim youth becoming their own muftis. As 
self-appointed muftis they are able to reform as little or as much of fiqh as they 
wish. These Muslims tend to be largely self-taught in religion, and are quite 
eclectic in their use of source material. As part of the process of self-learning, 
they seek out legal opinions from a wide range of sources, including ‘internet 
imams’, from peers contributing to Islamic forums and discussion groups. Their 
heavy reliance on the Internet has led to them being labelled irreverently as 
‘google-sheikhs’ in some circles. Yilmaz (2005b: 191) notes how some Muslims 
183 
 
are surfing a pool of ‘unofficial madhhab laws’ for solutions to everyday 
problems they face in English society, and terms this activity as ‘inter-madhab-
net’. Zaman (2008: 190-1) notes how the Internet (e.g. forums, discussion 
groups, ‘ask a mufti-style’ questions) has opened up avenues for ‘venue-
shopping’ or even ‘fatwa-shopping’. Within the heterogeneous category of self-
appointed muftis, some are hostile towards traditional authority and established 
interpretations, marking them out as being less relevant in contemporary times, 
or for life in Britain; preferring instead to rely on personal judgments. Muslims 
from this group, to varying degrees, tend to use a variety of devices such as 
darura (necessity) takhayyur (selection), talfiq (amalgamation) and more 
radically ‘neo-ijtihad’ (individual reasoning), which does not necessarily conform 
to rules established by usul al-fiqh, in order to fit their beliefs to secular and 
modern environments. Reading the shahada before eating non-halal meat to 
make it shari‘a-compliant, being at ease with free mixing of sexes, or even gay 
and Muslim are cases in point. This practise is controversial, and is regarded by 
large sections of Muslims as being unacceptable bida’ ah (innovation). Some are 
even told that they do not have the right to call themselves ‘Muslim’. It is clear 
that these ‘Muslims’ have moved away from ordering their lives strictly on 
‘textual’ or ‘scholarly’ Islam, but do they still come within the outermost borders 
of ‘lived’ or ‘everyday’ Islam?  
Looking at how Muslims have reformed their ethnic orderings, in light of shari‘a 
and English law, it is possible to identify efforts here too. One tactic has involved 
younger British-born generations educating their parents, grandparents, and so 
on about what they feel is shari‘a-compliant or demanded by English law. More 
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research is needed to draw out the impact of this tactic on customary practices 
such as FGM/FGC, forced marriages, dowry, kin, caste or clan discrimination, 
forms of gender inequality, including the prevention of women going to 
university or into the workplace. Another tactic has involved the establishment 
of community organisations to reform aspects of ethnic orderings. Besides the 
Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM) whose work is based on tackling clan-based 
discrimination and disadvantage amongst Somalis, the Muslim Women’s 
Network UK (MWNUK), founded in 2003, works to improve social justice and 
equality for Muslim women and girls.282 Like ATM, the MWNUK was set-up by 
second-generation British-Muslims, and it uses English law as well as shari’a to 
achieve its mission. The MWNUK describes itself as,  
[…] an Islamic feminist movement that uses the Quran’s spirit of equality and 
justice to challenge human interpretations (based on culture and tradition) that 
discriminate against women and girls, to achieve equal rights and opportunities 
for all. 283 
 
Through recent campaigns it has targeted the practice of forced marriage, ‘FGM’, 
and ‘honour’ based gender violence. Responding to claims that forced marriages 
are a Muslim-specific problem, for years the Muslim Council of Britain has 
consistently condemned and raised awareness that the practice is not Islamic but 
a cultural phenomenon practiced by Asian communities in Britain including 
some Muslims (see Cesari 2009: 150). Recently, in 2014, it launched a new 
                                                          
282 See for details their website: http://mwnuk.co.uk/index.php (date accessed 02/02/2014).  
283 http://mwnuk.co.uk/principles.php (date accessed 02/02/2014). 
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campaign to tell Muslims who are unaware that FGM is un-Islamic, predates 
Islam, and by association is bringing the religion into disrepute.284  
As we have seen, the goal of Muslims employing strategy one is to reform one 
ordering so as to take account of another.  On reform a fusion of orderings is 
achieved, but limited to the extent of the reform. These changes can be tracked. 
For a perusal of statutes and case law, or fiqh and fatawas, or custom and 
cultural practices, renders them visible. The change that occurs when strategy 
two is employed is more difficult to see. Strategy two also involves a fusion of 
orderings, but this time something quite new is created, namely, hybrid living 
‘laws’ or orderings. These phenomena however are hidden or rendered invisible 
if one adopts the tools of official legal science only rather than a plurality-
conscious lens. This is because the new hybrid ‘laws’ that have emerged, to use 
Chiba’s model, fuse ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ laws. Before turning to strategy two, 
we also need to refocus our lens from how courts or other official agencies are 
dealing with claims of legal plurality to include how Muslims as ‘productive legal 
actors’ on the ground are coping with the fact that they find themselves, or their 
act, subject to multiple, overlapping orderings that coexist in the same space.  
 
  
                                                          
284 http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/FGM-Islam-Leaflet.pdf. 
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4.3.2 Strategy two: combining the norms of two or more orderings to 
create something new 
Above, we briefly outlined how Muslims developed angrezi shariat, but there is 
more to the story of how strategy two is unfolding. Besides the example of 
angrezi shariat, Muslims have developed a multitude of hybrid and super-hybrid 
orderings, as many as there are functioning sub-groups within the community. 
For instance, it is not uncommon for Turkish Muslims in Britain to marry thrice; 
the civil ceremony and wedding feast (dugun) often follows the nikah (that is 
usually treated as a betrothal); paving the way for registration at the Turkish 
consulate. These Muslims are following a super-hybrid ‘Anglo-Muslim Turkish 
Law’ in Britain (Yilmaz 2004). What I call the triple-sandwich marriage 
solemnisation illustrates that British Muslim Turks in the diaspora are 
committed to three separate legal regimes: English, Turkish and Islamic.  
The formulation of new hybrid legal systems involves not just Muslims 
combining discrete sets of rules, or laws, but the creation also of supporting 
dispute resolution fora, offering conciliation and arbitration both formally and 
informally to meet the needs of the group. By way of exploring this in more 
detail, let us take a look at a few examples of Muslim wives caught up in the web 
of legal pluralism cast in the shadow of English law that will also help us to see 
how this has come about.  
We begin with the example of a (devout) Muslim wife, who has had a nikah and 
not a civil ceremony, but finds that her husband is refusing to give her a talaq. 
Where does she turn to? English law as we have seen does not recognise the 
nikah. If there is no marriage, there can be no question about granting a divorce. 
The case of Uddin v Choudhury is good authority that English courts will treat the 
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nikah as a valid contract when the dispute is over the mahr.285 There are also 
devices such as resulting and constructive trusts that have been developed by 
equity that could be used by judges to deal with property matters involving 
cohabiting couples in England and Wales; when one learns to their dismay the 
full repercussions of legal ownership being held by one party, rather than jointly, 
when the relationship breaks down. Nevertheless, the critical issue of a religious 
divorce remains. The wife in the scenario outlined finds that recourse to English 
law alone will not solve her problem. Since she is not prepared to ignore shari‘a, 
or lose face and honour in her community by marrying someone else until she 
has obtained a divorce, she is stuck.  
Besides the misunderstanding that the nikah is valid in the eyes of English law, 
there are a number of reasons why the wife in our scenario may have only had a 
nikah. Bano draws out that in many cases non-registration is due to women 
lacking ‘power and position within their newly found marriages to successfully 
negotiate the formal registration of marriage’ (2012: 163). Many Muslim women 
also trust or depend on promises made by the husband that he will comply with 
the injunctions of shari’ a, or that a civil registration would follow, but which in 
reality is indefinitely postponed (see for details Bano 2007: 52).  
Moving on to another typical scenario, say the couple had both a nikah and a civil 
ceremony, though an English court dissolves the latter, the former remains the 
prerogative of the Muslim husband. If the civil marriage is dissolved, but the 
religious marriage subsists, she finds herself in a ‘limping marriage’. Badawi 
explains the predicament the wife finds herself in:  
                                                          
285 See in detail Uddin v Choudhury [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1205.  
188 
 
 
[she is left] hanging there, unable to remarry, because in conscience she does not 
want to challenge the law of Islam because she is a committed Muslim or 
because she is frightened as a Muslim from doing so. Also, socially she does not 
want to lose face and honour in her community by marrying someone else when 
she is still married in the eyes of God (1995: 77-8).  
 
Although not a single Muslim to date has used the provision, the 2002 (D(RM)A) 
does offer the wife the option of petitioning the court to withhold the decree 
absolute until the religious marriage is dissolved. Nevertheless, the husband may 
still refuse to give a talaq. Again the wife finds that recourse to English law alone 
does not solve her problem.  
In both scenarios we assumed that the wife knows what is possible by way of 
readdress under English law, often this is not the case. Muslims do often, though,  
occupy a disadvantaged position in English society owing to their socio-
economic status, but also because of language barriers and a lack of 
qualifications (Modood & Meer 2010: 87). This means they are likely to face a 
number of barriers when attempting to access the English legal system to resolve 
their legal disputes. From not being able to pay legal fees to having their 
concerns understood.  
We also made the assumption that the wife would seek readdress from a court as 
if this was the ‘natural’ course of events that she would follow. Historically, 
Muslims, but women especially, do not take recourse to courts when it comes to 
family disputes; instead, matters are dealt with extra-judicially (Menski 1993: 
259; Yilmaz 2003). The underlying ethos that governs Muslim legal 
consciousness is that family disputes are best settled in private. There is a strong 
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presumption that washing one’s ‘dirty linen’ in public can only bring dishonour 
and loss of face to the parties and their families, irrespective of the merits of the 
dispute in question. A solution achieved privately through mediation, with the 
help of elders or community leaders depending on the intensity of the dispute, is 
also likely to heal wounds and help parties move on; whereas, proceedings in a 
court that is set-up to impose decisions and lacks cultural expertise will 
exacerbate the difficulties (Pearl 1986: 32; see also Menski 1993: 255). Foblets 
(1994: 375) notes that Muslims in France and Belgium developed feelings of 
distrust and avoidance after learning that judges dealing with their disputes had 
a tendency to devalue Muslim norms and values, imposing instead Western 
standards that they sought to uphold. Muslims have had similar experiences in 
Britain as illustrated infamously by our discussion of Chaudhury v Chaudhury 
above; they have also learnt that the English legal system is not like the systems 
they had in their countries of origin, in Asia and Africa, which recognised 
personal laws.286  
Outlining these factors on the one hand helps us to see that a Muslim wife is 
unlikely to seek recourse to English law when facing a family dispute. On the 
other, these same factors provide important cues for the reconstruction of 
unofficial Muslim dispute resolution fora. Even if the wife was to turn to English 
law, as we have seen, it will not provide a remedy, since in Menski’s (2008b: 20) 
view it purposefully remains blind to unofficial Muslims laws to avoid clashes. 
The wife, then, has to find a way to ensure her divorce is ‘Islamised’ (Keshavjee 
2007: 170). It is important to note also that many wives have found themselves 
                                                          
286 For a useful understanding of the operation of personal laws in Asia and Africa see Menski (2006).  
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in the scenarios we outlined above; in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, the US, 
and Canada. Some husbands deserted their wives with great impunity, refusing 
to grant religious divorces, whilst re-marrying themselves by way of nikah as 
shari‘a allows controlled polygyny. Such actions created major difficulties for the 
wife, but also created great scandal affecting the reputation of the whole Muslim 
community.  
Muslim scholars and community leaders felt they had to respond. For scholars 
like Badawi (1995: 78), it had to be in a manner that would resolve disputes 
‘without either breaking the sharia or the law’. In 1982, at a meeting in 
Birmingham’s Central Mosque, representatives from 10 leading British Islamic 
centres came together and decided to make private arrangements by the setting 
up of the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC). Attendees felt they had to act since,  
[…] sitting back and waiting for the civic local authorities to solve problems of 
the Muslim community does not present a positive response to the challenges 
facing Muslims (ISC 1995: 9). 
  
So here we see another glimpse of Muslims as productive legal actors, ready to 
take care of their own affairs by developing a quasi-legal body that can provide 
‘practical viable answers to the challenges facing Muslims in the West’ (ISC 1995: 
3). After the meeting, a wider consultation with Muslim scholars hardened 
consensus, that: 
[…] it is a must, in such cases, to establish such institutions to cater for the basic 
needs of the Muslim community’.287  
 
                                                          
287 http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/ (accessed 4/02/14).  
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Besides resolving disputes referred to it based on Muslim family law,288 the ISC 
set itself the objective of promoting the lawful practice of the Muslim faith in the 
UK.289 In practice this meant that alongside dispute resolution it developed a 
fatwa department, and Islamic counselling service. In essence, the ISC models the 
London Beth Din, a rabbinical body for the United Synagogue that has been 
regulating the affairs of Jews in Britain since the early 18th century (for details 
see CSC 2009). 
Based in Leyton, East London, the ISC is still today one of the most active shari‘a 
councils in Britain – hearing around 50 cases a month. It is open to all Muslims, 
but makes rulings in light of the literalist and four major schools of Sunni Islam. 9 
out of 10 cases are brought by women and involve mainly marital disputes. A 
large number of these cases concern divorce. Typically, a wife has obtained a 
civil divorce but the husband refuses to give a talaq, either because he does not 
recognise the jurisdiction of the English court or because he is trying to stop the 
wife from divorcing him or remarrying. One of the methods used by the ISC by 
way of which it tries to resolve the problem is mediation. Where an intransigent 
husband persists in his refusal to grant the wife a talaq, or fails to respond to 
repeated letters, the ISC can dissolve the marriage (fasakh). A fasakh can be 
granted on a variety of grounds including dhirar (harm or maltreatment of the 
wife) and mafqood al-khabr (desertion). Alternatively, the ISC can grant the wife 
a khul‘a, but she must return the mahr to her husband, which in effect instantly 
dissolves the marriage. The wife receives a divorce certificate or talaq nama 
                                                          
288 The ISC outlines that its main function is ‘to guide the Muslims in the UK in matters related to religious 
issues as well as solving their matrimonial problems which are referred to it by the Muslims of this 
country’ (ISC 1995: 3).   
289 http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/ (accessed 04/02/2014).  
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from the ISC, and is free to move on with her life. The ISC says that the talaq 
nama is authoritative, and has been accepted in countries like Pakistan (ISC 
1995: 19), but, as Bano (2012: 23) points out, it has no legal standing under 
English law.   
To meet demand, other shari‘a councils developed over the years in major 
conurbations that house large concentrations of Muslims. The Muslim Law 
Shariah Council (MLSC) was set up in 1985, and operates from the premises of 
the Muslim College in Ealing, West London. It comprises of 21 ulema and is 
affiliated with the MCB. Since its inception the MLSC has dealt with over 3000 
Muslim family law disputes. It has also mediated cases involving other spheres of 
Islamic law, as well as Muslims from other European countries where there are 
no similar institutions (Shah-Kazemi 2001: 10). The late chairman, Professor 
Zaki Badawi, writing in 1995, attributed the success of the MLSC to its 
conciliatory rather than adversarial approach:  
We seek bring people together, to reconcile them, rather than to create 
dissension between them (1995: 78). 
 
When operating in its capacity as arbitrator rather than mediator, the MLSC 
adopts an inquisitorial approach since its primary aim is to ‘discover the truth’. 
The qadi (Islamic judge) hears and tests the quality of the oral testimony of 
witnesses and in so doing fulfils the duty before God  ‘to ensure that he has come 
to decisions on the basis of all his endeavours to arrive at the truth’ (Shah-
Kazemi 2001: 38-9). 
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In recent years, a number of law firms have also entered the market – dispensing 
advice over how clients can successfully negotiate English and Islamic law.290 
Attracted by the reality that British Muslim family law has ‘created a legal market 
in its own right’; these firms offer creative legal strategies, which bridge the gap 
between the different forms of law (Pilgram 2011: 769-72). The involvement of 
solicitors in the operation of hybrid laws, though, is not something new. The 
strict delineation of public/private spheres, where shari’a councils restricted 
their operation to the latter so as to avoid conflict with English courts, meant 
that the involvement of solicitors remained largely hidden (Bano 2012: 228). 
It is not known how many shari‘a councils there are in mosques or houses today. 
One report in 2009 estimates that there are at least 85, but the veracity of the 
claim has been challenged. They do not operate in a standard manner, and 
Muslims can, and do, seek out shari’a councils that offer them the maddhab or 
service that suits their needs. It is possible to identify examples, though rare, of a 
party changing from one shari’a council to another midway in proceedings, or 
approaching other councils if the outcome is perceived as unsatisfactory. In the 
process of ‘privatising justice’ (Shah 2005: 358), Muslims have not only 
developed self-help mechanisms that operate on the basis of shari‘a. Tas (2014) 
describes the operation of the secular Kurdish Peace Committee, established by 
gurbet Kurds in North London, that settles disputes with reference to traditional 
Kurdish values and cultural expectations. Disputes are also often settled amongst 
Somali and South Asian Muslims by way of clan or biraderi elders, sometimes 
                                                          
290 One example is Duncan Lewis Solicitors, which in 2012 under the leadership of Aina Khan launched an 
Islamic and Asian Division that seeks to provide ‘innovative Islamic solutions under English law’.  For 
details see http://www.duncanlewis.co.uk/Islamic_Law.html (accessed 09/10/2014). 
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involving more formalised village or panchayat type committees but, to date, 
there is an absence of field research regarding such developments.     
Shari’a councils have come under mounting public and political scrutiny since 
the (in)famous lecture given by the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan 
Williams in 2008.291 Williams (2008) had argued that people, not just Muslims, 
should not be forced to choose between the stark realities of loyalty to 
religion/culture or loyalty to the state. In contrast to the message of Trevor 
Phillips to Muslims that we saw earlier, he felt there was a danger in the 
approach to law that simply said:  
[…] there’s one law for everybody and that’s all there is to be said, and anything 
else that commands your loyalty or allegiance is completely irrelevant in the 
processes of the courts. 292 
 
To allay the danger of ‘a stand-off, where the law squares up to people’s religious 
consciences’, he suggested constructive accommodation of some aspects of 
shari’a.293 What Williams had in mind is that Muslims could choose to have 
marital disputes and financial matters dealt with by state-recognised shari’a 
‘courts’. In his view, the adoption of parts of Islamic law would also help 
maintain social cohesion, but he argued that this relies on shari‘a being better 
understood. Williams’ speech drew a wide range of reactions. Besides criticisms 
based on the assertion that there should be ‘one law for all’ some queried 
whether Muslims even want this. Concerns raised much earlier by Badawi (1995: 
78) about the dangers of state-sponsorship of shari‘a councils, the distortive 
                                                          
291 On the mixed responses to the lecture see in particular Millbank (2010); Shah (2010). 
292 ‘Sharia law is unavoidable’. BBC news report, 7/02/2008 (available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7232661.stm accessed 13/02/13). 
293 Ibid.  
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effects this may have, were being repeated by Muslim spokespersons. Keeping 
such bodies on an unofficial level, in their view, provides an important degree of 
autonomy. As we have seen, inaction by the state was only partly the reason for 
the development of these self-help mechanisms. Others wanted to know how 
would the state decide which understanding of shari‘a law it would apply or 
endorse.294  It was pointed out that the Muslim community is not homogeneous, 
support for one body or version of Muslim family law may mean others are left 
behind, creating tensions in the community. Some groups, especially those 
focused on rights, expressed concerns that the introduction of a Muslim law 
would come at a detriment to vulnerable sub-minorities such as homosexuals, 
women and children. Developing this point, some honed in on how (unofficial) 
shari‘a councils discriminate against vulnerable women. Pointing to their 
patriarchal nature, over-emphasis on mediation including ‘indefensibly’ when 
domestic violence has occurred or when the ‘wife’ had already obtained a civil 
divorce, and how the wife has to ‘buy her freedom’ by the return of mahr or by 
forsaking her claim to child custody. These objections form a small, but 
important, component of a much larger discussion, namely that shari‘a is 
incompatible with gender equality, democracy and, more broadly, the values of 
Western civilization.  
Citing concern for Muslim women, who in her words ‘are suffering a system 
which is utterly incompatible with the legal principles upon which this country is 
                                                          
294
 Over some of the difficulties of which understanding of Islamic family would apply see also 
Poulter (1990b: 158). 
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founded’;295 Baroness Cox introduced a Private Members Bill in 2011-12 to 
restrict the (perceived) activities of shari‘a councils.296 The Bill contained a range 
of measures, including the creation of a criminal offence for anyone falsely 
claiming or implying that shari‘a councils have any of the powers or duties of a 
court, or in the case of arbitration, to make legally binding rulings without any 
basis under the 1996 Arbitration Act297 and, to disallow any arbitration that 
treats a women’s testimony as being worth half of her husbands. 298 
Accompanying the exactitudes was a more general rallying call by Cox that,  
Equality under the law is a core value of British justice. My bill seeks to preserve 
that standard.299 
 
Supporters of the Bill included Christian and secular bodies; several 
organisations with minority membership that largely work to diminish the role 
of religion in public life, concerned especially on the impact this has on the lives 
of women; centre and far-right opponents of shari‘a including political parties 
UKIP and BNP, street protest movement EDL, and think-tank Civitas, Centre for 
Social Cohesion (see for details Grillo 2015: 163-226).   
The Bill had a second reading but went no further.300 It was reintroduced, with 
few changes, and in October 2015 had its second reading. 301 Though there are 
                                                          
295 ‘Baroness Cox: ‘if we ignore wrongs, we condone them’. Independent online, 23rd October 2011 
(available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/baroness-cox-if-we-ignore-wrongs-
we-condone-them-2299937.html (accessed 04/03/13). 
296 Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill (HL) 2011-2012. 
297 Ibid, s.7.  
298 Ibid., s.1 (2)(12a).  
299 ‘Bill limiting sharia law is motivated by ‘concern for Muslim women’’. The Guardian online, 8th June 
2011 (available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/jun/08/sharia-bill-lords-muslim-women 
(accessed 04/03/13).  
300 The committee stage of the Bill was never scheduled, which is one method used by government to stop 
the progress of a House of Lords Private Members Bill that it does not support. In 2014, Cox introduced 
again the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill (HL) 2014-15, but this Bill never reached a 
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some aspects of the Bill, notably, the extension of the public sector equality duty 
to include ‘informing individuals of the need to obtain an officially recognised 
marriage in order to have legal protection’, that would have beneficial effects, 
yet, other measures are alarmist,302 and appear to be attempting to address a 
phantom pain. A review of the available empirical evidence reveals no evidence 
of shari‘a councils falsely claiming (or purporting) to have powers equivalent to 
English courts.303 Service users also are overwhelmingly women and they choose 
to use shari’a councils.   
This is not to say that we become complacent when it comes to establishing, and 
if required through law, to protect the freedom to choose. As we have seen, there 
is pressure on the wife to ‘Islamise’ her divorce. Some women may feel pressured 
into approaching and then accepting the rulings of shari‘a councils that do not 
operate under the 1996 Arbitration Act – either because they fear ostracism, 
excommunication or even reprisal. There is also the issue of bargaining within a 
patriarchal system that means that choice or voluntariness is constrained. As 
Sandberg & Cranmer (2015) note this mischief is not addressed by Cox’s Bill. 
Concerned about the genuineness of consent to the jurisdiction of ‘tribunals’ 
(whether religious or secular) that operate outside the state legal system, they 
suggest their own draft Bill: Non-Statutory Courts and Tribunals (Consent to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
second reading and duly lapsed on the 30th of March 2015 when Parliament was dissolved ahead of a 
general election.  
301 Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill (HL) 2015-16.  
302 Some of the criticism or accusations levelled against shari‘a councils can also be read as being part of a 
wider alarmist tendency when it comes to Muslims or shari‘a. The government’s new counter-extremism 
strategy requires schools and universities to prevent radicalisation, including by way of promoting 
‘British values’. For details see ss.25, 31, 32, of the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act.  
303 A report by Cardiff University in 2011 found no such claim: Douglas et al (2011).  
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Jurisdiction) Bill. In their view, a definition of consent for the purposes of such an 
‘Act’ could be modelled on the approach taken in the 2003 Sexual Offences Act.  
For a long time acculturalists, feminist scholars, and policy-makers have been 
concerned about the state sponsorship of a ‘cloak of oppression’, that is, the 
undesirable marginalising effects of empowering an ethnic group on vulnerable 
members of that group, particularly women.304 The focus on ensuring there is 
genuineness of consent, as this study also argues, goes some way to address the 
concerns that many quite legitimately have about empowering ethnic or 
religious groups. 
The concern for Muslim wives has also led to responses from within the Muslim 
community to address perceived inequalities and ill treatment of especially 
women. Aside from calls that the nikah be given legal validity, 305 Muslims have 
also expended energy over the years to develop a model marriage contract that 
could help to protect women. In 2008, following a wide and lengthy consultation 
with religious scholars and groups like the MCB, MWNUK and Imams and 
Mosques Council, the Muslim Institute produced the model ‘Muslim Marriage 
Contract’ (MMC), with the objective that it would help secure ‘equality and 
justice in British Muslim families’. The MMC outlines in clear terms that it does 
not constitute a valid marriage in the eyes of English law. It does however 
provide written proof of the marriage and mahr, and grants a delegated right of 
divorce from the husband to the wife (talaq-i-tafwid/’esma’). Other terms like the 
husband waiving his right to polygyny can also be inserted. It also enshrines that 
                                                          
304 For example, see Okin et al(1999); Phillips, (2003); Deveaux (2006). 
305 In recent years calls for recognition have been made by Mufti Barkatulla of the Islamic Sharia Council, 
Dr Ghaysuddin Siddiqui of The Muslim Institute, Usama Hasan, imam, masjid al-Tawhid, and Cassandra 
Balchin of the Muslim Women’s Network-UK. 
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a wali’s (guardian) consent is not something that a female needs to obtain before 
she has a nikah. In other words, it is not requirement for a valid nikah. In 
response to major disputes that may arise between the couple, the MMC states 
that attempts be made for these to be resolved with the help of the family, or 
community leaders, and only if this does not work, by a shari‘a council before 
readdress is sought in an English court. The suggestion is illustrative of the 
importance placed by Muslims to deal with matters privately or extra-judicially.  
Suggesting an alternative approach, on the 9th of January 2014, Baroness Warsi 
and Aina Khan launched the ‘Muslim Marriages Project’ (MMP).306 The project is 
described as being aimed at addressing the many legal and societal issues caused 
by unregistered Muslim marriages. According to Warsi, to treat these issues two 
routes as solutions need to be explored. The legal route would involve 
legislation, compelling Muslims to register their nikah marriage. The other route 
focuses on the community’s role, and would involve members raising awareness 
of the problems of unregistered marriages amongst Muslims and a drive to 
encourage imams to register mosques. Since the launch of the MMP, alongside 
efforts to capture data on the prevalence and causes of unregistered marriages, 
Khan has developed a flowchart to assist mosque and marriage venue personnel 
to register their buildings for the purposes of solemnising marriages.307 What 
remains unclear, though, is if the envisaged legislative reform would solely apply 
to Muslims or would also impact other ethnic minority marriages, for example 
the Hindu and Sikh vivah, also taking place across Britain. To what extent, if any, 
                                                          
306 Aina Khan is Head of the Islamic and Asian division of Duncan Lewis Solicitors. The project builds on 
the work of the Ministry of Justice’s Muslim Marriage Working Group that was set up 2011 to look at 
unregistered marriages.  
307 Khan has also been involved in raising awareness of her project that has involved road shows, 
university lectures, and a roundtable discussion at the House of Lords.  
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these other communities have been consulted. It also appears to ignore, that for 
a variety of reasons, many Muslims choose not to have a civil marriage but under 
the proposed scheme would be forced to register their nikah marriages.  
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4.3.3 Strategy three: adherence to one ordering and avoiding the other(s)  
Individuals acting out the third strategy seek to follow one particular ordering, 
dispensing or avoiding interaction with the other(s). This can be analysed as 
occurring in multiple directions. Avoidance may relate to the personal, ethnic or 
territorial law(s). Here, too, we can identify different tactics that have been 
employed by Muslims. These provide further illustrations of the heterogeneity 
within the Muslim community. 
 Some Muslims have undertaken hijrah (emigrated) to live in dar al-Islam. 
Following a transnational cousin marriage some South Asian Muslim women, for 
example, have in accordance with rivaj left Britain to live with their husbands. 
Illustrating their allegiance to their ethnic identity, some (first generation) 
Muslim immigrants (often on retirement) have returned to their country of 
origin, piercing ‘the myth of return’. There are anecdotal accounts of parents 
taking their daughters back ‘home’ at or around the age of puberty, (or when 
pre-marital relationships have come to light), so that they can grow up in an 
environment where izzet can better be maintained. The decision may also 
involve a role reversal of family re-unification, as the father may stay on in 
Britain to send remittances. Another, different, strand of emigration that has 
received intense media attention in the past year relates to Muslims leaving 
Britain to join jihadist/terrorist groups. Recent statistics published by the Home 
Office suggest 750 UK-linked Muslims have travelled to take part in the Syrian 
conflict. Some, including British-born schoolgirls, are now believed to have 
joined Daesh/ISIS.308 A small number of British Muslims have left to join the 
                                                          
308 HM Government (October 2015) Counter-Extremism Strategy, Cm 9148, p.10.  
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Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) to fight ISIS, as well as to help Syrian 
opposition forces. For all of the above, in the absence of detailed research it is 
difficult to pinpoint the extent normative influences gave rise to the decisions 
made.   
Among Muslims who have chosen to remain in the UK, it is also possible to 
identify a variety of tactics used by them that have the goal of dispensing or 
avoiding one or more orderings. Some Muslims have dispensed with shari‘a 
altogether, by leaving the fold of Islam (see Cottee 2015). Apart from those 
members who have openly or ‘officially’ made this public, there are others who 
have done so ‘unofficially’, choosing not to ‘come out’ for fear of ostracism, ex-
communication, or violence. Established in 2007, the Ex-Muslim Council of 
Britain says that it assists around 350 people a year who have faced threats for 
leaving Islam from family and ‘Islamists’.309   
Some Muslims appear to be avoiding English law. Sites where legal pluralism in 
conflict cannot be resolved with the employment of strategy one or two has led 
to some Muslims avoiding English law.310 In relation to polygyny, a very small 
number of British Muslims are engaged in such unions. Most of these cases 
involve Muslims employing strategy two, namely, registering one nikah 
marriage, and keeping the other unregistered (see Pearl and Menski 1998: 277; 
Yilmaz 2001), or, in response to the immigration ban of second wives or due to 
financial circumstances, by undertaking ‘commuter polygamy’ where they spend 
                                                          
309 For details see ‘Losing their religion: the hidden crisis of faith among Britain’s young Muslims’. The 
Guardian online, 17/05/2015, can be accessed at  
http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/17/losing-their-religion-british-ex-muslims-non-
believers-hidden-crisis-faith (accessed 18/05/2015). 
310 The continued use of khat, practices such as FGM, honour crimes, and polygyny (involving two 
unregistered nikahs), are potential examples, but detailed research is required to unpack the phenomena. 
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some time abroad each year with wife number two. But there are cases where 
Muslims are not registering their nikahs marriages at all. Shah-Kazemi’s study of 
women using the MLSC in Ealing revealed that 27% of Muslim marriages were 
not registered. More recently, Aina Khan (2014) has claimed that 80% of 
marriages are unregistered amongst young Muslims in Britain.311  Menski 
(2008b) has also suggested the development of a 4th stage in the process of 
angrezi shariat, whereby some Muslims are deliberately refusing to follow 
English law, choosing instead to follow Muslim laws alone. However, far more 
expansive empirical research is needed to understand why some Muslims are 
deciding not to register their marriages. To obtain a more fuller understanding of 
the decisions Muslims are making when it comes to marriage solemnisation, the 
impact that personal, ethnic and the territorial laws are having on their 
decisions, as well as to draw out other explanatory factors we now turn to the 
responses of 59 Muslim participants that this study engaged to outline some 
answers. 
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 For details see: 
http://www.duncanlewis.co.uk/news/Aina_Khan_and_Baroness_Warsi_kickstart_Muslim_Marriage_Project_(
14_January_2014).html#sthash.At2PrbDT.dpbs (accessed 06/02/15), 
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Chapter 5: Understanding choice outcomes 
5.1 Towards a thick description of Muslim decision-making 
Our analysis has revealed multiple strategies and tactics that have been 
employed by Muslims in response to a situation of internormativity. From efforts 
to reform orderings to the creation of new trans-local hybrid living laws and 
identities to avoidance or even dispensation of particular orderings. The 
negotiation begins with the individual and their conscience, before negotiations 
between individuals and others including the state occur. For us to obtain a ‘thick 
descriptive’ (Ryle 1971: 6) understanding of the negotiation that is taking place 
in the individual’s mind, this study left the armchair and went into the field. 312  
 
5.2 Research methodology  
It is the ‘voice’ of Muslims that the fieldwork sought to bring out. To understand 
through their words how they read and negotiated their lived reality against a 
backdrop of internormativity. For this reason the method of interview is 
especially useful, for it allows the researcher to focus on the respondent’s own 
expression of experience (Denzin & Lincoln 2011: 10). Oral interviews moreover 
give respondents the space to share their personal life histories against the 
backdrop of particular socio-cultural contexts and in this way human agency is 
not reduced to superficial patterns collocated with discrete social categories like 
‘race’ and ‘gender’ (Maynes et al 2008: 16-20).  
                                                          
312 Over the years the term ‘thick description’ has come to be used in different ways by researchers; here 
it is used to portray that besides ascribing intentionality to behaviour attention must also be given to 
absorbing the context in which the behaviour occurred. For details see Ryle (1971). 
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The interview began with respondents being asked the form(s) of marriage 
solmenisation they had chosen to have before moving on to a series of questions 
probing the reasons for their choice. All participants were asked the same 
questions, but to obtain clarification or, importantly, to explore unexpected 
opportunities presented by the answers given, other questions peculiar to the 
respondent were also asked. This was done, for example, when one respondent 
revealed that they were party to a polygynous union. In another case, the 
respondent had converted to Islam to facilitate a nikah. While maintaining semi-
structured questions, at some points the interview became non-directive, 
allowing respondents more freedom to share their thoughts and in this way the 
research was better able to ensure that a rich and thick response emerged. 
Overall, the conversational approach worked well, and generated a wealth of 
information. 
In several ways the research was explorative, for in recent years much attention 
has focused on Muslims not registering their marriage yet the prevalence and 
explanations for the practice have largely been based on anecdotal evidence. A 
primary aim, then, of the research was to identify the extent of non-registration 
amongst the sample and to record explanations for why this is occurring. In 
addition to understanding the significance of shari‘a, urf and English law to the 
individuals involved, the investigation also sought to bring out how other 
dimensions of difference (like age, gender, social class, immigration status, and 
residential location) possibly impacted their decisions. The objective was not to 
find patterns or definitive links that would reduce human agency to social status, 
but to show how any analysis of Muslim decision-making must look beyond an 
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analysis of an intersection of normative orders to include other dimensions of 
difference as well as the person’s motivations, aspirations and needs. In other 
words, it is not just about ‘who they are’, but also about ‘what they want’, and 
though there may be a significant overlap there may also be significant 
divergence.  
In total, 166 individuals were engaged. In my presence all respondents 
completed a questionnaire consisting of a series of largely closed-ended 
questions.313 Being present allowed me to answer questions they had, address 
clarifications sought, and to reassure participants that the information would be 
treated as strictly confidential.314 Engagement began with individuals studying at 
SOAS, University of London and through the use of the snowballing technique 
connections were made and others came to constitute the sample group.315 The 
fieldwork was carried out over a period of 18 months from 2012 to 2014 and all 
interviews took place at universities in London, either at SOAS, University of 
London, Queen Mary, University of London, or at the Institute of Education, 
University of London. Completed questionnaires were sorted into various 
piles,316 separated according to age,317 gender,318 social class,319 nationality,320 
                                                          
313
 See ’Questionnaire 1: Gateway Criteria’ in appendix.  
314 Participants were informed of the strict ethical code of conduct researchers at SOAS, University of 
London, are required to comply with. Some respondents were themselves research students and 
therefore had a good understanding of the process. Written consent was obtained from all participants. 
Some of the information being sought like immigration status or parent’s occupation was very sensitive 
and therefore some participants either declined to participate, or left the question(s) unanswered. 
315 Where there was a shortage of respondents efforts were made to forge new contacts and to follow up 
new connections.  
316 The dimensions of difference were heuristically selected.  
317 Respondents were sorted into the following age categories: 18-25; 26-33; 34+.  
318 Respondents were sorted into the following gender categories: male; female.  
319 Respondents were sorted into the following social class categories: middle class; working class. 
Individuals were asked to self-identify, but given the possibility of the mis-match between a respondent’s 
‘objective’ social class and how they perceive themselves, they were also asked to provide their 
occupation and if they were a student then their parent’s occupation (the ‘main breadwinner’ or primary 
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and residential location.321 These were regularly reviewed, and when it became 
apparent that there was a shortage of respondents in one group efforts were 
made to forge new contacts and to follow up connections provided either by the 
respondents, informants, 322  or gained independently. Following perceived 
‘correlative hints’,323 in depth interviews with 59 individuals occurred.324 The 
sample profile is outlined below. 
Table 1 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provider). The study used National Readership Survey (NRS) social grades, which uses the chief income 
earner’s occupation, to help classify respondents ‘objectively’. The table below illustrates the grade 
classification:  
 Grade  Social Class Chief Income Earner’s occupation  
A Upper middle class Higher managerial, administrative or professional 
B Middle class Intermediate managerial, administrative or professional  
C1 Lower middle class Supervisory or clerical and junior managerial, administrative and 
professional 
C2 Skilled working class Skilled manual workers 
D Working class Semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
E Non-working  Casual or lowest grade workers, pensioners, and others who depend 
on the welfare state for their income  
 
In some ways, the classification was not relevant as how individuals perceived themselves and the 
choices they made were equally relevant for our purposes since the research wanted to show how 
dimensions of difference, whether real or perceived, impact how people make decisions.  
320 Respondents were sorted into either: British nationals, EU nationals and third country nationals.  
321 Respondents were sorted into categories where they were either resident in a location with less than 
<4% or greater than >5% of their ethnic groups’ population.   
322 Three Somali-led organisations were especially helpful with regard to forging contacts and to make 
connections with Somalis: Ocean Somali Community Association (OSCA), Tower Hamlets Somali 
Organisations Network (THSON), and the Council of Somali Organisations (CSO). 
323 On the usefulness of correlative hints when conducting fieldwork see Tufte (2010: 6). 
324
 See ‘Questionnaire 2’ in appendix.  
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The questions used were semi-structured and open-ended. Insights from 
informants helped to shape the questions that were asked. All individuals self-
identified themselves as ‘Muslim’ and had been or were currently married. 
Respondents were also selected on the basis that their marriage had taken place 
in Britain, and not abroad. Where a respondent had divorced and since 
remarried they were asked to discuss their present marriage. Each interview 
ranged between 1-2 hours and was subsequently transcribed with the 
permission of the respondent. All participants were assured of anonymity for 
their accounts and have been given pseudonyms (that correspond to their 
gender and that are typically found amongst their ethnic group) in this study.  
A conscious effort at all stages was made to minimise bias and potential 
distortion. One concern related to perceptions that participants may have had 
about me as the researcher, for perceptions can significantly influence how 
participants respond.325  On the one hand, I was perceived as an ‘insider’ since I 
was Muslim, on the other hand, for the majority of participants I was to some 
extent also an ‘outsider’ since I was not a member of their ethnic group or 
someone who shared fully their cultural background. Being perceived as a fellow 
Muslim had advantages, but also opened-up the possibility of respondents 
worrying about how I would perceive their ‘Muslim-ness’ in response to what 
they may reveal. As part of a reflexive approach,326 I would check to see if the 
respondents were giving answers that they thought may please rather than what 
they actually believed, experienced, or knew. Several participants also wanted to 
                                                          
325 See for example Thomas & Peterson (2015: 18). 
326 It was important to keep a reflexive diary in which I recorded my interests and values, to see how 
these may influence my methodological decisions and logistics of the study. On the importance of keeping 
a reflexive journal see Lincoln & Guba (1985). On the benefits of reflexity see Koch & Harrington (1998). 
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know my view of the questions asked, but to minimise influence responses were 
avoided without compromising trust. Respondents were told that we could 
discuss my views after the interview was completed.  
5.3 Observations  
In relation to the form of marriage solemnisation they had, as well as 
accompanying ethnic rituals in the form of ceremonial events, our sample of 
Muslims illustrated as a group awareness of five different options:  
1. a registered civil marriage as laid down by English law;  
2. a nikah followed by the marriage banquet (walīmah) as laid down 
by doctrinal shari‘a;  
3. a hybrid combination of the above two, forming a ‘double-decker’ 
marriage, in accordance with ‘angrezi shariat’;  
4. a nikah that is accompanied by ethnic rituals in the form of 
ceremonial events like mehndi327 or donis328 that are centred on 
the maintenance of  honour and avoidance of shame, and; 
5. a nikah accompanied by ethnic ceremonies plus a civil marriage 
(we could call the tri-combination a ‘triple-sandwich marriage’) 
that is done in accordance with a super-hybrid version of living 
law like anglo-shari‘a-rivaj or ‘anglo-somali-shari‘a’.  
 
 
                                                          
327 The term refers to traditional and ritualistic ceremonies conducted by South Asians. They can vary in 
number, elaboration, and often take place pre-wedding but can also happen at the same time or post the 
wedding. Each community celebrates the ceremony in different ways according to their own familial or 
biraderi norms, and are often heavily centred on the maintenance of honour (izzet) and prevention of 
shame (sharam).  
328 For Somali’s a key ritual is donis in accordance with heer (tradition). Donis involves the formal asking 
(even begging) of the hand of the bride by the elders of the groom’s family or sub-clan. Usually this 
happens during or after a lunch feast that is arranged between the parties. Speeches are exchanged by the 
representatives of both families. It is seen as especially important that a blessing is given by the maternal 
uncles of the bride. If the union is agreed, this is followed by sooryo, namely, a sizeable amount of money 
is exchanged amongst those present (and when involving diasporic Somalis can be sent to relatives back 
in Somalia). Dozens of people usually get a share of sooryo, and the importance of sooryo is evidenced by 
the fact that people talk about it for months (even years) after the wedding.  
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5.3.1 How are Muslims getting married? 
 Table 6 below illustrates the results. 
 
Not a single respondent said that they had undertaken a civil ceremony only, or a 
‘registry marriage’, a term used by some respondents. When a civil marriage had 
taken place it was either part of a double-decker or triple-sandwich 
arrangement. In total, three respondents (or 5.1%) had arranged their marriage 
in accordance with option 2, one respondent (or 1.7%) in relation to option 3, 
nineteen respondents (or 32.2%) in relation to option 4, and thirty-six (61%) 
had opted for option 5. 
55 respondents (or 93.2%) completed their marriage with ethnic rituals in the 
form of ceremonies. All 59 respondents (or 100%) had a nikah. This suggests 
that in terms of normative influence shari’a followed by urf had most impact on 
the decisions of our sample. The prevalence of ethnic ceremonies illustrates the 
extent urf norms are part of the lives of Muslims. Often overlooked, failure to 
adequately comply with ethnic rituals like donis can jeopardise the prospect of 
0 
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marriage itself or lead to violators being ex-communicated.  
5.3.2 How many did not register their marriage? 
Before turning to examine how many Muslims did not register their nikah, the 
responses from the sample tell us that 2 out of every 3 Muslims do register their 
marriage. Combining options 1, 3, and 5 reveals that thirty-seven respondents or 
62.7% had registered their marriage.  
Combining those that had opted for either option 2 or 4 tells us that 22 
respondents (or 37.3%) had not registered their nikah marriage. There was 
however significant variation among ethnic groups. Among Somalis the figure 
was much higher: from the 23 respondents who identified themselves as Somali 
16 (or 69.6%) had not had a civil registration. From the 24 respondents who 
identified themselves as Bangladeshi, 4 or (16.7%) chose not to have a civil 
registration. The figure among Pakistani respondents was higher: 2 (or 28.6%) 
had not had a civil registration. Hamza, our only Arab respondent, and Andrew, 
our only ‘White: English’ respondent, registered their marriage.  
Looking at the age profile of Muslims who had not registered their nikah we see 
that the majority (15 of the 22 respondents or 68.2%) were between the ages of 
18-25. In contrast, only 5 (or 22.7%) were between the ages of 26-33 and 2 (or 
9.1%) were above the age of 34. Although predominantly a feature among young 
Muslims and thus lending support to the view that this is a newer generation 
trend, the results reveal that non-registration is something that exists across the 
age spectrum.  
More male respondents reported that they were party to only a nikah marriage 
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that had not been registered than female respondents: 14 out of 32 male 
respondents (or 43.8%) compared to 8 out of 27 female respondents (29.6%) 
did not have their nikah marriage registered. It was also the case that more 
respondents who defined themselves as, and indeed were according to the NRS 
social grading system, as ‘working class’ as opposed to ‘middle class’ had a nikah 
marriage that was not registered:  13 out of 29 ‘working class’ respondents (or 
44.8%) compared to 9 out of 30 (or 30%) of ‘middle class’ respondents.  
Finally, nearly all of the 22 respondents who did not have their nikah registered 
were British nationals: 21 (or 95.4%). Only 1 respondent who identified 
themselves as an EU national had not registered their nikah. All respondents 
who identified themselves as third country nationals had registered their nikahs, 
seeing it as necessary to secure their right to remain with their partner in 
Britain.  
In the final analysis, based on the dimensions of difference explored, it seems 
that the most likely person not to register their nikah is a male Somali, between 
the age of 18-25, who is working class and resident of a town where the 
demographic profile is such that at least 5% of the population is his own ethnic 
group. All of the 22 respondents said that not registering their marriage was 
their choice. However, one respondent said that since the nikah she had 
expressed the desire to have her marriage registered but her ‘husband’ was not 
in agreement.  
5.4.4  Examining the reasons for the variety of current social practices 
We now turn to a closer examination of the information revealed by the 
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interviewing. Beginning with option 2, three respondents had opted to only have 
a nikah and a low-key walīmah. The reasons provided varied. Adam expressed 
that a nikah was sufficient and thus anything else was simply extra and in his 
view unnecessary. In his words,  
Following Islam is the most important thing and that means having a nikah and a 
walimah. Anything else is unnecessary. My wife agreed and I don’t see a reason 
for having a registry marriage […] we wanted to keep things simple and private 
and that is the example given to us by the prophet. [Adam]. 
The other two respondents provided a different reason for only having had a 
nikah. Both respondents were students and had met their partners at university. 
Farah met her partner in the first year of university and quickly the relationship 
developed but both parties did not want to break the injunctions of shari‘a by 
having a relationship outside marriage. In her words,  
Having a relationship outside shari‘a is a major sin. I know lots of girls who are 
doing that but I didn’t want that. I knew he was right for me, so it was a choice of 
either getting married or not seeing each other. […] when we finish university 
we will tell our parents […] and we feel that it is the right step. We have got to 
know each other much better and we are growing together. I think it will be fine 
and we can do things again with the traditional ceremonies. [Farah]. 
I asked Farah if she would have a civil ceremony and she replied that in time they 
both planned to do so. The other respondent came from a single parent 
household and revealed that her mother was privy to the relationship. She too 
had met her partner at university and for her the nikah symbolised their 
commitment to each other. It allowed them to see each other without feelings of 
guilt being present and she also revealed that it enabled her to get to know her 
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‘husband’ and to ‘save up money’ before she and her mother ‘went public’.  
I didn’t want to have an arranged marriage but my faith really doesn’t allow me 
to see guys outside marriage. I wanted to know [my partner] better, and not feel 
guilty about my feelings for him […]. I want to be in a good place with him before 
we tell other members of my family. […] My mother married young and because 
she had an arranged marriage she didn’t really know my father and so things 
didn’t work out for them. [Jamila]. 
These cases seem to suggest that a small number of Muslims are testing out 
relationships without violating the injunctions of shari’a: for them a nikah 
enables them to freely mix or even cohabit with their partner. Both of our 
women respondents felt they were ‘married’ when pressed but at the same time 
not having a registered marriage or going fully public meant that their 
cognisance of ‘being married’ was not entirely complete. During the interview 
with Jamila, she revealed knowledge of another girl that had had a nikah but not 
told her parents, and she was sharing a room at the university halls with her 
‘husband’. Unfortunately this person declined the invitation to participate in this 
research study.  Whether the arrangement was motivated by her desire to test 
out the relationship is not known, but some Muslims are testing relationships 
within the bounds of shari’a and if the relationship bears out, they are deciding 
to take the next steps of registering their nikahs and/or informing family. It must 
be emphasised that making family privy triggers the need for the couple involved 
to take account of familial and ethnic norms related to the ritual of marriage. If 
this is triggered too early, concerns over honour (izzet) can translate into danger 
for a blossoming relationship or put pressure on the couple to marry when they 
are not ready. It is hoped that more, and extensive, research in the near future 
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will be conducted that looks at this phenomenon. What can be said here, though, 
is that compulsory registration of the nikah as is being pushed by some 
campaigners would in essence penalise these Muslims who wish to test out the 
relationship within the bounds of shari’a before they take the next steps. In the 
pursuit of protecting women from unscrupulous ‘husbands’ and what flows from 
non-recognition of the nikah we must not overlook that many women for a 
variety of reasons are choosing to have an unregistered nikah, including for the 
reason that they wish to see how the relationship goes before taking this 
important step.   
Turning to option 3, only one respondent, with what seem quite unique 
circumstances, choose to have a nikah and civil registration. Hassan revealed 
that his partner was from a different tribe which posed a major obstacle that was 
exacerbated by the fact that he had arrived in Britain at the age of 14 as a 
refugee, and thus had no immediate family members who could liaise with his 
prospective partner’s family. In his words,  
My close family isn’t in Britain so there was nobody who could really talk to my 
wife’s father. I was from a different clan […] a clan that is looked down on […] 
they call us ‘boon’.329 Her father was very against me […] there is still a lot of 
conflict over which clan you belong to even if you have a good profession. We 
chose to get married and had a nikah and registration […] but my wife now has a 
bad time from her family. We are all Muslim but which clan you belong to, who 
gives you a reference, is very important […] for a lot of Somalis. [Hassan].  
                                                          
329 Helander (2003: 157-162) discusses several causes of the inferior position of the ‘boon’, including 
being cursed (inkaar or habaar), lacking in intelligence/reason/knowledge (caqli), and being regarded as 
descendants of some wild animal. While some Somalis treat the ‘boon’ as a uniform category of ‘lowly’ 
people, members themselves emphasise that they consist of a broad variety of groups, a fact that is seen 
as significant for the ‘boon’ themselves.  
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The non-acceptance of the relationship was a major reason why Hassan 
registered his marriage, which was done on the same day as the nikah.  Hassan’s 
story illustrates the pressure being faced by some minorities to marry within the 
same ethnic group, to comply with urf norms centred on maintaining status and 
honour, despite it seems whatever the profession or Muslim-ness of the suitor.  
Turning to option 4, 19 (or 32.2%) of the sample chose to have  nikah that was 
accompanied by ethnic ceremonies. An arrangement that is consistent with the 
stitching together of urf and shari’‘a norms. When asked which ceremony was 
more important to them – the nikah or the ceremonies connected to urf like 
donis, mehndi, and the wedding reception, 13 respondents (or 68.4%) of the 
sample said it was the nikah. Below are some of the responses recorded.  
Being a Muslim means that we follow what Allah has prescribed. Marriage is half 
of your deen. […] it is one of the most important things any Muslim can do so of 
course the nikah comes first. That doesn’t mean you can’t have events that 
celebrate your marriage with friends and family but some Muslims are forgetting 
that they must be modest […] some of these events are un-Islamic and not 
necessary. [Abdul]. 
I want to follow Islam. It is really important to me […] a nikah is a blessing and 
more than just an event and you can’t ignore that. I would definitely say the 
nikah is the most important.  [Amal]. 
My mendhi and wedding reception was important to me but they don’t mean 
that you are married and to be honest most the people who came knew my 
parents and not me. […] when I had the nikah that was when I felt married […] it 
was when I gave my consent and then the imam completed the nikahnama. 
[Hafzah]. 
However, two respondents revealed it was their ethnic ceremonies modified to 
take account of their Britishness’ that were actually the most important part of 
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the marriage process. Both respondents said they would not admit that openly 
because of how they might be perceived by other Muslims. In their own words,    
I wanted to have the best mehndi and reception. […] that may come across as 
shallow but it’s something I always wanted since I can remember. […] I wanted 
my husband to be involved in planning the wedding and I jokingly told him that 
if it wasn’t perfect I wasn’t going to go ahead with the nikah. [Sara]. 
The nikah is important but I want all my family and friends around me to 
celebrate the occasion […] you hear other Muslims saying that it is a waste of 
money having a big shaadi do but I don’t agree. You only get married once […]. 
[Zainab]. 
Four respondents said that they did not see the need to choose what ceremony 
was more important. In their own ways, these respondents said that Islam not 
only allowed but encouraged the celebration of pre and post nikah events. They 
did not draw any sharp boundaries between ethnic ceremonies and how they 
interpreted shari‘a or Islam. Illustrating this view, Jamal and Mohamed 
respectively said,  
It is important to get blessings from your family and clan. That is part of Islam 
and we are required to inform the community when a marriage takes place. My 
marriage was arranged by my father and in Islam you don’t disrespect your 
elders. He told me he had arranged the marriage and I accepted his decision. […] 
my wedding celebrations lasted for seven days.330 [Jamal]. 
Islam encourages us to celebrate what is halal. When someone gets married it is 
an important event that should be planned and celebrated. All my family came 
together and I will never forget how special that was […] we ate together, 
celebrated together and prayed together. [Mohamed].  
                                                          
330 Traditional Somali wedding celebrations can last for up to seven continuous days. After the wedding 
day, the first three days known as ‘sadexda’ are spent celebrating in the bride’s house, the last three days 
known as ‘’toddobada’ are spent celebrating in the groom’s house. This tradition has been modified in the 
new milieu of Britain, with the number of days in particular being reduced.  
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On the question of whether they were aware that the nikah was not recognised 
as having legal effect in the eyes of English law, from the nineteen respondents 
sixteen (or 84.2%) of this group said that they were aware of this fact. Three (or 
15.8%) said that they did not know at the time of their marriage that this was the 
case. All of these respondents were Somali. When added to the single 
Bangladeshi who chose option 2 (nikah only), this shows that from our sample of 
59 respondents only 4 respondents (or 6.8%) did not know the nikah had no 
legal effect at the time of their marriage. This establishes that by and large 
Muslims know that the nikah does not have legal effect and when they only have 
a nikah (plus ethnic ceremonies) they are consciously making the choice not to 
register their nikah.  
The reasons given by respondents over why they chose option 4 varied. Three 
respondents asked me to explain rather why they should have a civil marriage. In 
other words, what advantages did it bring or need did it address. Faisal said,  
I don’t see any need for me to have a civil marriage. Tell me why I should have it? 
[…] I’m looking to go back to Somalia or Kenya […] there are no opportunities 
here and we are treated with no respect. (Faisal). 
Others were clear in their responses that they saw the nikah as ‘marriage’ and it 
fulfilled their needs and saw the registration process as something extra or a 
‘piece of paper’ that had a lot of bureaucracy attached to it. Two male 
respondents above the age of 35 didn’t see any need for the state to have a role 
in the marriage process. Abdi and Rahim said,  
I don’t have anything against the civil marriage but it is not something that we 
need to have. We had the nikah and celebrated our wedding and everyone knows 
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we are married. […]. My wife knows that I will follow shari‘a so she doesn’t insist 
as some women do that we need to have our marriage registered and honestly I 
think it would cause more hassle than do good. (Abdi). 
I don’t want the state to know our personal business. What happens in our 
marriage is between me and my wife. I don’t think we need to register […] Allah 
sees everything and that is enough […]. (Rahim). 
One female respondent did want to have her marriage registered but said that 
her husband wasn’t keen and that she then didn’t pursue the matter. A couple of 
the respondents said they ‘hadn’t got round’ to registering their marriage, while 
others said they might register in the future but had no firm plans. A common 
theme amongst Somali respondents for non-registration was the view that in the 
absence of financial assets or even children there was no need to register. In 
another case, a respondent revealed that she was party to a polygynous union. In 
fact, she was the third wife. She knew from the outset that her husband had a 
wife in England and one in Somalia. This meant that registration was never on 
the agenda but she revealed she was very happy with the arrangement. The 
reason she gave for her confidence was, 
My husband is a very good man and is a community leader. He knows what is 
acceptable under shari‘a and what is not. He provides me with a separate home, 
fulfils my needs and doesn’t treat me differently from his other wives. […] we 
[the other wives] also get on well. […] His first wife has had health difficulties for 
some years […] every six months he goes to Somalia for a couple of weeks to 
spend time with his second wife and children […] and also other family 
members. […] we have a good arrangement so why do I need a registry 
marriage? […].  (Zahra). 
This case is consistent with our analysis in chapter four that some husbands are 
undertaking ‘commuter polygamy’, and are also entering into unions where one 
221 
 
marriage is registered and another that is not. The wife in this example made it 
clear that she willingly entered into this arrangement. She was previously a 
divorcee, and also stated that she regarded herself as ‘middle class’, and gave as 
her job description the title of ‘director’. In another case, involving our only 
‘White English’ Muslim the interview revealed that she had converted to Islam 
approximately 13 months before the interview date. Her decision was not 
related to her marriage. After embracing Islam Anna decided she wanted to 
settle down and in accordance with the dictates of her faith she wanted to marry 
a Muslim. She had no concerns about not registering her marriage. Anna 
explained,  
I identify myself as Muslim and that means that I follow the word of god. For me 
that is the most important thing. So having a nikah was essential. […] I wanted a 
husband who could help me improve my faith […]. My husband is Moroccan and 
we had amazing traditional celebratory events that made me feel much closer to 
his family. […] I’m not saying that having a civil ceremony is wrong, it’s just not 
right for me […] that might change in the future but at the moment I’m financially 
secure and independent and want to work towards fulfilling my spiritual needs. 
(Anna). 
One Bangladeshi respondent revealed that the reason she chose not to have a 
civil marriage was partly motivated by the legal effects registration could bring. 
Nasima was a young professional working in Canary Wharf and had been 
married for 4 months at the time of interview. She was introduced to her 
partner, a chartered accountant by profession, by her mother’s friend who she 
referred to as ‘auntie’. Nasima explained that she had been looking for a partner 
for over four years before she agreed to marry her husband. Nasima revealed the 
pressure she felt to get married especially given her age – she was thirty-two at 
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the time of her marriage. She indicated that she and her ‘husband’ were still 
getting to know each other and on probing Nasima revealed that they were 
experiencing some difficulties in adjusting to married life and this played into 
her view that a civil marriage was not the right move for either of them for the 
time being.    
The majority of our sample chose to have a triple sandwich marriage 
arrangement. Thirty-six (or 61%) of respondents had a nikah that was 
accompanied with ethnic ceremonies plus a civil registration. This shows most 
clearly the extent that Muslims are choosing to skilfully combine a variety of 
normative orders, illustrating in the process that they lead multicultural lives 
and are giving effect to their tessellated identities.  When the respondents from 
this group were asked to rank the ceremony they held to be most important, the 
results were more diverse than the group that had opted for option 4.  Twenty-
five respondents (or 69.4%) of the group said the nikah,331 six respondents (or 
16.7%) said the civil marriage; five respondents or 13.8% said that the nikah and 
civil marriage were equally important.  
Among the respondents that saw the nikah as the most important ceremony, 
similar reasons were given as respondents who chose option 4. These 
respondents ‘felt’ married only after the nikah had occurred. All saw it as 
‘essential’ and an affirmation of their faith, or of their ‘Muslim-ness’. From this 
group, 17 had the nikah first which was accompanied by ethnic ceremonies and 
the civil registration followed. Six from this group had a nikah and civil 
                                                          
331 From this group, eleven respondents said that after the nikah the civil marriage was the next most 
important, whilst fourteen respondents placed ethnic ceremonies above the civil marriage. 
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registration that was solemnised by an imam in a registered building. All of the 
other respondents in this group had their nikah at the bride’s home. These 
eleven respondents had a gap between the nikah and civil marriage. The longest 
gap between the nikah and civil marriage was approximately 2.5 years. Imitiaz 
explained why the gap was so long, 
We had planned to register our marriage but both of us got busy with work and 
family commitments so we postponed it. The push came when my wife told me 
she was pregnant so we decided it was time to register our marriage.  
Another respondent, Saima, had also ‘put off’ registering her marriage for over a 
year but then went through the ‘registration process’. She explained her 
motivation:  
We had saved up money together to buy our own home, and because of this we 
decided that it was time to get all the paperwork in order so that included the 
registration of our marriage. […] the process was quick and we involved the 
family too. (Saima). 
From the six respondents who said the civil marriage was most important to 
them, three respondents indicated that their immigration status impacted their 
ranking. Habib was keen to point out that for him,  
[…] shari‘a comes first but for me and my wife to be together we needed to have 
the registry marriage also. It is really important and it is not like the two are 
incompatible. It is a necessity so I think for my circumstances it has to be registry 
marriage first. (Habib). 
The other two respondents strongly felt that having a civil marriage was 
essential to protect their rights and an expression of their British-ness.  Sania 
said,  
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For me getting married is a big step and I wanted to make sure I had the civil 
marriage first. […] I don’t understand why some Muslim women are choosing not 
to have a civil ceremony. […] marriage brings a lot of responsibilities and it’s us 
women that have to give-up a lot when we get married […] things need to be 
done properly and this means having the right paperwork. [Sania]. 
Five respondents also did not see the need to choose between the nikah and civil 
marriage. Respondents explained that they saw no conflict, and tended to see the 
civil marriage as also a requirement under shari‘a. One respondent, Hussain, saw 
‘combining the two together as a natural process that helps Muslims feel at ease’. 
Though our sample involved only 59 Muslims, the information gained shows that 
Muslims are not making the same choices. Not all members of the sample had the 
same views or were impacted by the normative orders discussed in the same 
way. Most Muslims are having either a double-decker or triple sandwich 
marriage and this reveals the extent that they lead multicultural lives. Some are 
testing out relationships within the boundaries of shari’a, informing families 
when they are ready which brings into play familial and ethnic norms. While a 
few it seems are creatively arranging polygynous unions without falling foul of 
English law. Besides the influence of the normative orders discussed, Muslims 
are also impacted by their personal life histories, their wants, and by other 
factors such as immigration status, and whether they are male or female. Yet, all 
respondents had a nikah, and a large number placed great weight on ethnic 
ceremonies. The state therefore needs to accept that Muslim’s see their private 
orders as legitimate reference points to live by, and in the context of marriage 
solemnisation prefer these over the civil ceremony required by the state.  Many 
Muslims choose to have a nikah accompanied by ethnic ceremonies only, for a 
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variety of reasons. Amongst the Somali Muslim community this seems to 
especially be the case. Therefore compulsory registration of the nikah as some 
have suggested is not the option. A small number of the sample did reveal that 
they were not aware that the nikah was not legally valid and this lack of 
knowledge needs to be addressed.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
In our global village, people are moving from one country to another and 
different cultures are intermingling as never before. The outcomes of the 
interaction are especially important in the context of ‘law’. This is because law, 
which is a sub-species of norms, is at the apex of the pyramid that is culture, for 
law lays down communally agreed minimum standards of behaviour and failure 
to comply can lead to severe sanctions. The intermingling of different norms has 
led to what seems is ‘a battle of laws’ that is part of a wider ‘war of normativities 
and values’.  
This study set out to interrogate how migrants, and their offspring born in the 
new milieu, are responding to this situation. We restricted our discussion to 
family law matters, and in particular to the institution of marriage, which has 
become an especially contested site in recent years. Using the case study of 
Muslim migrants and their relationship with the English legal system, two 
approaches were discussed. We focused on the content of the law, to examine 
how far the law has adapted to accommodate the beliefs of Muslims and their 
way of life. Secondly, we focused on the reality of legal plurality experienced by 
Muslims, and how this affects their behaviour. We looked at the strategies and 
tactics by which the Muslim community and individuals have sought to deal with 
the challenges raised by the presence of conflicts between differing, overlapping, 
normative orderings. Thirdly, looking at a particular instance of where Muslims 
had to cope with diverse norms – marriage solemnisation – we interrogated the 
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impact that personal, ethnic and territorial norms are having on their decisions, 
as well as to draw out other explanatory factors.  This was done through original 
fieldwork, involving in-depth qualitative research with 59 Muslims.  
 
6.1 Observations 
This study made several observations. On arrival to Britain, Muslim migrants 
brought with them their cultural luggage that included ethnic and personal 
normative orderings. In political and sociological circles, the focus has often been 
on shari‘a to the neglect at times of the importance of ethnic orders. Migrants 
arrived with their own understandings and meanings of law – a legal 
consciousness. This is reflected in their behaviour, and affects their interaction 
with other citizens as well as the English legal system. When it comes to the 
overwhelming majority of Muslims, attachment to shari‘a and their ethnic 
orderings has not diminished contrary to widespread expectations as the 
community has expanded and taken root in British society. This is the case also 
with British-born generations who have been brought up in the ‘West’. This has 
led to the claim from some quarters that Muslims are simply ‘inassimilable’ 
(Barou 2014: 647), and therefore remain an ‘alien wedge’ or even the ‘enemy 
within’. Despite their long presence in Britain, there is also a tendency to see 
Muslims as a homogeneous community – a view not uncommon among large 
sections of non-Muslim Britons.  
A number of actors with their own preoccupations and agendas have tended to 
push the image and idea of people as members of discrete ethnic and cultural 
groups. This is particularly the case when it comes to Islam and Muslims. On the 
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one hand, this is being achieved through alarmist scholarship and media 
reporting, efforts by right-wing groups like Britain First and the BNP, street 
movements like EDL, but is also the result of assimilationist/multiculturalist and 
securitisation policy adoptions over the years that rather than redressing 
discrimination or alienation have made people feel ‘othered’ in Britain. The early 
policy of assimilation ignored the needs of minority communities, placing the 
burden on them to make adjustments. The shift towards multiculturalist policies 
may have sought to attend the political needs of minorities but the way it was 
applied reinforced group identification, which was divisive. On the other hand, 
some ‘Muslims’ themselves and notably ‘jihadist’ groups like al-Qaeda and 
Daesh/ISIS have sought to demarcate a Muslim ‘us’ from a non-Muslim ‘them’, a 
dichotomy that is based on a ruinous hostility to difference.   
Through an analysis of a lot of secondary literature, legislation and case law, and 
by way of primary research, this study has shown that the overwhelming 
majority of Muslims are not refusing to adapt. They are not as the 
misrepresentation would have us believe homogeneous followers of a violent 
religion. This study began from the position that to remove many 
misunderstandings, but also if there is to be a buy-in of the recommendations on 
how we move forward together, it needed to provide a better understanding of 
Muslims and of Muslim ‘laws’. It explained that shari’a is a pluralistic legal order 
to its very core. Ethnic or traditional norms predicated on honour or izzet are 
often crucial to Muslims. Muslims in Britain are heterogeneous in fiqh, ethnicity, 
class, education and profession, religiosity, generation and by way of many other 
dimensions of difference. They are part of a local community and wider society, 
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tied to a myriad of other relationships and are influenced by all sorts of 
motivations, aspirations and needs. This impacts their behavior allowing for no 
easy interpretation of what their views will be on any particular issue or what 
they will do in any given situation.  
In diaspora the engagement with the ‘other’, not just non-Muslims but also 
‘different’ Muslims, has forced Muslims to review their understandings of Islam, 
tradition, self-identities, or put more simply ‘who it is that they are’ and ‘what it 
is that they want’ in their new unfamiliar surroundings. In the politics of cultural 
negotiation existing identities, norms, symbols, and values are being considered, 
reinterpreted, and new forms of each are emerging. Far from simple acts of 
bricolage, these processes can be deeply painful and conflictual (see Salih 2004: 
996). The end tendency for the overwhelming majority is towards the forging of 
a tessellated identity. Put differently, they are mixing and matching, or 
synthesising, their norms and values and this allows for great variety, eclecticism 
and personal patterning. In this way identity remains individual. For this reason 
we can say Muslims, not only groups or societies, are multicultural.  
In the field of ‘law’, we saw that Muslims are committed to personal and ethnic 
rather than only territorial laws, but this is rendered invisible if we use the tools 
of official legal science only. Received ideas about ‘law’ in the West, now a state 
of mind rather than a geographical location, privilege a conceptualisation that 
treats only the normative ordering of the state as ‘law’.  All other normative 
orderings are de-statused to custom, cultural or religious practices, mores, or 
traditions. From this perspective, the nation-state has complete prerogative to 
decide in what circumstances and under what conditions it allows ‘mores’ to 
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operate within its territory and under its authority. Britain’s legal systems 
envisage uniform laws as both desirable and the pinnacle of legal development.  
This approach to law is consistent with the ideology of ‘legal modernity’, which is 
undergirded by legal positivist and legal centralist ideas. As it is a self-defining 
system that gains its authority because it has procedural validity, law is 
understood as being ‘normatively closed’. Since the law of the state emanates 
from what is perceived to be a democratically legitimate and accepted process 
the system in place holds a powerful position in the minds of ordinary citizens.   
Muslims however relate to something more than just the state law alone. They 
find themselves or their act subject to multiple, overlapping, normative 
orderings that coexist in the same social space. This becomes visible if we use the 
tools provided by the alternative science of legal pluralism. Using pluri-legal 
methodologies enables us to see how actors on the ground are negotiating 
diverse norms, engaging with the norm making and enforcing authorities of the 
different systems to alter the significance assigned to long standing ideas and 
practices, or how they are developing new trans-local hybrid and super-hybrid 
normative orderings, as well as their own dispute resolution fora, in the bid to be 
consistent with their understandings of ‘who they are’ as well as with ‘what they 
want’.  
This study was the first of its kind to identify that Muslims have employed three 
different strategies and a variety of tactics under each to achieve their goal when 
dealing with the problems created by internormativity: strategy one involves 
them exerting effort to reform one ordering to take account of another. This is 
occurring in three directions: 
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(i) reform of English law so as to incorporate shari‘a and their diverse ethnic 
orderings;  
(ii) reform of fiqh so as to incorporate both English law (and more broadly 
European or Western norms and values), and their diverse ethnic 
orderings; and, 
(iii) reform of their ethnic orderings so as to incorporate shari‘a and English 
law and ‘European’ norms and values.   
 
The fact that some Muslims are engaged in reform in three separate directions 
simultaneously illustrates the extent that they lead multicultural lives.  
As concerns the extent that English law has adapted to accommodate the beliefs 
of Muslims and their way of life we saw that few changes have occurred. The 
demand for a Muslim personal law was forcefully rejected. Some limited 
concessions have been granted, but often Muslims have found to their dismay 
that their claims are treated with suspicion, and as if they are asking for 
preferential treatment. Conversely, from within the community, some members 
have argued that it is the state that has given preferential treatment to the claims 
of some minorities rather than treating all minorities equally. Muslims have had 
some successes using non-community specific Acts of Parliament like the 1998 
Human Rights Act, 2010 Equality Act, and the 1996 Arbitration Act. Conflict has 
to large extent been avoided because the UK’s partly codified constitution has for 
centuries allowed individuals to do as they please in matters of faith and culture, 
unless the law states otherwise. 
However, in recent years Parliament has discussed Bills, with some becoming 
law, that directly or indirectly target the norms, symbols or activities of British 
Muslims. Baroness Cox’s Bill, for the third time in four years, proposes to restrict 
the activities of shari‘a councils.  Earlier, the 2010-12 Face Coverings 
(Regulation) Bill sought to ban the wearing of the burqa or niqab in public 
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places. Last year, an amendment to the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act outlawed the 
use of khat. 332 In the same year the 2014 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act made it an offence to coerce someone into marriage. This year, Part 
4 of the 2014 Immigration Act brought in to effect new duties to report ‘sham 
marriages’ and powers to investigate and prevent the same. The 2015 Counter 
Terrorism and Security Act, which places the Conservative government’s Prevent 
programme on statutory footing, inter alia requires schools and universities to 
take active steps to prevent radicalisation and to promote ‘fundamental British 
values’. The latter in particular has been described by Muslims as ‘creating a 
‘McCarthyite witch-hunt’ against them.333Voicing their dismay, by way of a public 
statement to government, a consortia of imams, Muslim community 
organisations, leaders, and activists, described the Act, along with the raft of anti-
terror measures in the past decade, as ‘criminalising Islam’ and as more evidence 
of ‘the ongoing demonization of Muslims in Britain [and] their values, as well as 
prominent scholars, speakers and organisations’.334The government has since 
announced new plans to introduce Ofsted inspection and regulation of 
madrassas that inter alia will enable the state to close establishments if they are 
assessed to promote extreme views or are deemed to be incompatible with 
‘fundamental British values’. These measures and other efforts that openly focus 
on promoting fundamental British values are consistent with the new 
‘integration’ policy of ‘muscular liberalism’, and signal the state’s commitment to 
                                                          
332 The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Designation)(Amendment) (No. 2)(England, Wales and Scotland) Order 
2014. 
333 Topping, A, Ismail, N, & Malik, S (2014) ‘British Muslims condemn terror laws for creating ‘witch-hunt’ 
against Islam’. A Guardian online report 11/03/2015 (available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/11/british-muslims-terror-laws-witch-hunt-islam-cage-
hizb-ut-tahrir (accessed March 11/03/2015). 
334 Ibid.  
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majoritarian values in the on-going war of normativities and values.  
So, in legal terms at least, we have what seems to reflect a monocultural society. 
This belies the claim of the state and legal system that the ‘other’ has been 
accepted and reflected in the legal system. Over two decades ago, Nielsen (1992: 
154) referred to this situation as the ‘unreality of cultural encounter’. Not a great 
deal has changed. The expectation continues to involve minority, rather than 
majority, groups having to adapt their way of life, outlook and attitudes to 
European weltanschauungs. To some extent the one-way flow of information and 
experience is inevitable, keeping in view the existing power relationships. 
The result as we have found is that the cultural and religious ‘traditions’ and 
preferences of Muslims can be tolerated so long as they do not impinge on the 
life of the majority, verbalised as ‘public policy’, the ‘conscience of the court’, 
‘secularism’, and human rights norms. A number of recent cases, referred to in 
the course of discussion, may suggest that the judiciary is slowly becoming more 
sensitive with regard to minority values and traditions, but a closer look seems 
to reveal that this is often limited to when minorities are deemed to have in good 
faith attempted to assimilate to the law and its values (MA and JA v Her Majesty's 
Attorney General) or when judges have feared losing jurisdiction to shari‘a 
councils (Ali v Ali). The changes to the law of nullity and the creation of civil and 
criminal offences in relation to forced marriage do provide real victims with a 
remedy. At the same time, they also further the cause of assimilation since the 
new measures open-up ethnic minority marriages – long understood as a key 
institution for the transmission of culture and values – to ‘anxious scrutiny’ 
under their jurisdiction.  
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It is not difficult to understand why such an approach finds little quarter with 
many Muslims. Though the existence of ‘parallel courts’ and ‘shari‘a-creep’ may 
seem to some as alarming, one way in which minorities not just Muslims 
preserve and act-out their culture and norms is through private ordering or 
private orders.  In relation to family laws in particular, we have seen how 
Muslims have attempted to readdress this imbalance in their favour by 
attempting, using a number of methods, to maintain themselves as a self-
sufficient unit while seeking to be ‘accepted’ as part of the wider community. The 
informal and formal methods of dispute resolution and the development of 
trans-hybrid and super-hybrid living laws like angrezi shariat and Anglo-Muslim 
Turkish Law can be viewed in this context. When employing strategy two, formal 
use is made of English law by many British Muslims to maintain the conceptual 
and actual superiority of shari‘a. Some Muslims make formal use of shari‘a, but in 
actual fact their behavior is motivated very much by their allegiance to ethnic 
orderings verbalised as concerns over izzet (honour) or be-izzeti (dishonour). At 
other times, Muslims are simply pursuing their ‘wants’, and that has little to do 
with their allegiance to an ordering, and more to do with how that ordering can 
facilitate that specific ‘want’. By their own admission many are not ‘religious’, or 
‘traditional’, though often find it very difficult to ‘come out’ as such. Others, 
prioritise their religion and often visibly as a marker of identity and shared sense 
of community. In some cases this is a reaction against the experience of being 
‘othered’, or perceived othering by the state and/or non-Muslim Britons. Among 
many ‘millennial Muslims’, in particular, feelings that they are not allowed to ‘fit 
in’, let alone ‘be themselves’ has played a major role in them forging a stronger 
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connection with their faith. In the case of young Muslim women or ‘Muslim 
feminists’ it is a reaction against patriarchy, for them Islam is a guarantor of 
women’s rights and thus a liberating force for women. The demand by parents 
that they have arranged cousin marriages can, then, be dismissed as ‘cultural’ 
hangovers and not part of ‘true Islam’, in its original, ‘pure’ form.  Yet, many are 
still cautious, especially if resident in an ethnic enclave and close to extended 
relatives and kin, that they are not seen to be overly critical of ‘culture’, for fear 
of being labelled as ‘bad girls’, which could affect marriage prospects and other 
relationships. Many younger generation Muslims often want to work out what is 
‘Islam’ and what is ‘culture’, and to test the boundaries of each to see how British 
norms and values can be reconciled. Some do look at alternative fatwas before 
deciding their course of action. Others do not adhere to strict jurisprudence, 
instead are at ease with exercising their personal judgments. Yet others see this 
as inappropriate or are frightened to ask too many questions about the 
understanding of ‘Islam’ that they have inherited.  
The study shows that, by and large, Muslims have successfully identified conflicts 
presented by normative clashes and through a complex of adjustments have 
managed to preserve to a large extent the values and norms of their religion and 
ethnic cultures. This process has not, though, been without pain or hardship. As 
illustrated by these developments, Muslims are clearly not passive subjects of 
the law rather they are ‘productive legal actors’.  
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6.2 Looking to the future 
If the status quo remains in that Muslims, along with other minorities, have to 
carry the weight of adjustment then the opportunities as well as the challenges 
presented by the intermingling of cultures can only be successfully negotiated if 
Muslims are ‘organised, cohesive and wise' (see Kettani 1990). In the context of 
marriage, the development of a model Muslim marriage contract that informs 
parties of their responsibilities and enables the inclusion of clauses to protect the 
rights of women is a positive step in the right direction. It also goes some way to 
address the concern that some women using shari‘a councils believe falsely that 
the nikah has legal validity and, on becoming aware, blame imams and 
community leaders for the lack of available information (see Bano 2012: 163). 
The challenge ahead, then, will be to encourage imams or those performing the 
nikah across Britain to use the model contract. Muslims could also seek to have 
the model contract recognised as a pre-nuptial agreement. In recent years, courts 
have been prepared to take these into account in divorce proceedings.   
More broadly, the efficacy of strategy one will be improved by Muslims 
participating more fully in the process of law reform and to make positive 
contributions in those areas of social and legal policy that affects them. The Law 
Commission, one public body that initiates such reform, invites opinion during 
periods of consultation and it is at this stage that contributions from Muslims are 
likely to be impactful. The same can be said about White Papers, which present, 
and invite opinion on, ‘firm’ government policies. Although there are a healthy 
number of elected Muslim councillors in Britain, this has not translated to their 
number at Parliament. In time this is likely to improve and could be a valuable 
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asset if Muslims can learn to make use of them so as to ensure that their voices 
are represented when it comes to any form of public decision-making.  
Besides the lack of engagement that means their views go unheard, sometimes 
the state is unaware, confused or able to overlook their needs because there is no 
co-ordinated response.  The problem is not as has been suggested in some 
quarters that when it comes to Muslims there is an absence of a single 
authoritative body.  This is not unique to Muslims. The issue is what prevents 
Muslims coming together to achieve a common good or want. In this regard, 
more work needs to be done by umbrella bodies like the Muslim Council of 
Britain to ensure that they are representative, and this would mean more 
collaboration, even merging, with other bodies to ensure a cohesive and united 
voice articulates the needs and aspirations of the diverse Muslim body.  Muslims 
also need to have more open and focused debates within the community to 
explore how the transition from Islam of the fathers to Islam of the sons and 
increasingly daughters can occur (Mandaville 2001: 124). More open and 
focused debates also need to be conducted over how Muslims should address 
‘legitimate’ concerns of the majority population: for example, in relation to 
proselytisation and apostasy, use of religious violence and how to foster an 
active concern for societal solidarity where not everyone concerned is a Muslim 
or expresses Muslim-ness in the same way. If the development of ‘European 
Islam’, or understandings of Islam that can be reconciled with European 
weltanschauungs are to occur, this will require the development of places of 
learning that can be at the forefront of Islamic studies in Britain.  
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Whether or not Muslims seek to have recognised their personal or ethnic ‘laws’ 
is in one sense a question aside, for private ordering or private orders exist and 
will continue to exist despite lofty declarations by the English legal system as to 
its all-encompassing supremacy. Yet, non-recognition causes individuals to feel 
conflicted and can lead to alienation. Even if individuals can successfully 
negotiate the cross-demands of multiple orderings – it is exhausting. Muslim 
respondents in this study saw their personal, or ethnic, ‘laws’ as legitimate moral 
and normative codes, by which they and others can choose to live their lives. 
Many revealed that they prefer, and in the event of conflict, would like to choose 
god’s law rather than the state’s law. The state needs to accept this, if it is to 
build multicultural bridges and not communitarian walls. Non-recognition, 
moreover, places the state on the back foot when it comes to helping those whom 
it regards, and who probably in fact are, vulnerable and disadvantaged.  
The state should therefore consider juristic legal pluralism, as a means of 
reconciling overlapping, normative orders. This will require that it shifts from a 
conception of law as a single set of normatively-closed rules that are merely to be 
followed and interpreted. At one point in its own history it was advantageous for 
it to push such a view so as to gain and hold power, but the social setting has 
since changed. By replacing positivistic with sociological approaches to law it can 
more readily situate its own ‘law’, and of others, in a social setting and as a 
culmination of lived experiences. The process will help all citizens see the full 
import of culture, how it shapes our ‘legal consciousness’, and more broadly 
‘provides the spectacles through which we identify experiences as valuable’ 
(Dworkin 1985:228).  
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As with any significant change there will be alarm and resistance, but there is 
nothing to suggest the state could not make a successful transition. A claim that 
the operation of state or weak legal pluralism would lead to chaos335 ignores 
British colonial history, and that this is a typical reality in ‘southern’ jurisdictions 
today. The British state is not unaccustomed to such a scenario, for it 
administered personal laws that it codified like Anglo-Muhammadan Law in 
India for almost 90 years. It has also been said that de-centring law from the 
state will make it confusing to demarcate the non-legal from the legal.336 That, 
calling informal normative orders ‘law’ is pushing them into Western categories, 
something that distorts rather than illuminates.337  The pitfalls are real, but 
almost all of the Muslims we engaged in this study saw shari‘a as ‘law’ 
irrespective of whether they followed it or not. When the label of ‘law’ was not 
used, as too was the case when respondents discussed their ethnic orderings, 
they knew from lived experience that each laid down rules, that if not followed 
led to sanctions. So, against this real life context, the primary concern should be 
how the state responds rather than on us disputing definitions.  
This does not mean that the state should recognise carte blanche all that Muslims 
feel compelled to do by their personal or ethnic ‘law’ codes. It doesn’t follow that 
we should suspend judgment when discussing or facilitating normative plurality. 
Rather, it enables us to get into proper perspective the superdiversity being 
experienced by individuals, and that law and values everywhere are never a 
                                                          
335 Responding to the furore caused by Williams lecture, the then Culture Secretary Andy Burnham 
commented: ‘You cannot run two systems of law alongside each other. That would, in my view, be a recipe 
for chaos, social chaos’ (‘reaction in quotes: Sharia law row’ BBC report 8/02/2008 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7234422.stm (accessed 09/02/2008).  
336As has been argued by Merry (1988: 878). 
337 As has been argued by Roberts (1998: 104-5).  
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given but have to be constantly negotiated (Menski 2007: 132).  This leads us on 
to, then, how the state should determine what is acceptable or ‘tolerable’ given 
the sundry of orderings and competing values.  
 
6.2.1 Facilitation of choice and the protection of consent 
The state could respond by allowing the individual to make that decision for him 
or herself. The study adopted the individual as the point where all normative 
orderings ‘converge’, and suggests that this be the vantage point from which to 
look at the possible reconfiguration of the legal system. As such, in view of the 
reality that many Muslims prefer using shari‘a councils, the state could respond 
through institutional change that is part of a bigger paradigm-shift that allows 
majority-minority communities to co-exist and define their mutual rights and 
obligations.  
Over clearly delineated matters of civil law, including religious divorce and 
conflict resolution related to civil, commercial, familial, inheritance, or mosque 
disputes, this could mean a system of joint governance, similar to the model of 
‘transformative accommodation’ proposed by Shachar (2001). This approach 
allows for an organic transformation of competing systems but with the state 
acting as a ‘referee’ to accommodate the needs of minorities. Individuals would 
retain the liberty to choose from the options of going to semi-autonomous 
private order bodies like shari‘a councils or Kurdish Peace Committees, or to 
English courts to resolve a dispute. This would allow individuals to be ‘both 
citizens with state protected rights and members of a minority group who can 
choose to enjoy their cultural or religious group membership’ (Malik 2012: 37). 
241 
 
In other words, they can enjoy their mosaic identity, heritage and beliefs rather 
than being forced to choose between them.  
The change would officialise that no one body has monopoly over decision-
making, creating a constructive environment in which there is healthy 
competition for the loyalty of British Muslims. The move from unofficial status 
would mean that informal dispute resolution fora could be held more 
accountable. Shari‘a councils would have to evaluate how they operate and as a 
result British Muslims are likely to be better engaged. By way of an added level of 
protection say through judicial review individuals can still reject the 
jurisdictional authority of the body that they have voluntarily chosen to use, 
where clearly laid down procedural rules have not been adhered when disputes 
are heard. This may seem like a radical change, and by and large this was how it 
was interpreted when the then Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams 
suggested it, but, even in 2008, it was to a large extent already a reality in Britain. 
A careful analysis of shari’a councils, known as MATs, and battei din like the 
United Synagogue London Beth Din, would have revealed that a system of joint 
governance was already successfully operating along these lines by way of the 
1996 Arbitration Act.  The initiation of institutional change therefore is not that 
big a step at all.  
It may be that the state is reluctant to take control owing to high political, social 
and monetary costs involved that could come with regulating diverse groups that 
would be entitled to their own dispute resolution fora. It does however have a 
vested interest in groups’ private ordering, not least because of concerns over 
ghettoisation and the protection of vulnerable sub-minorities, especially women.  
242 
 
As has already been mentioned, at one level, whether the state seeks to take the 
initiative is a question aside, since a variety of private order bodies offering 
dispute resolution services are operating in Britain in the shadow of English law. 
Of crucial importance, then, is how it ensures that individuals are aware of the 
‘options’, and are able to ‘freely choose’. Protecting the citizen’s right to choose is 
a prerequisite of a democratic and liberal society. It also constitutes a sound 
basis for multicultural and pluri-legal policies.  
One of the main observations of this study is that individuals are involved in an 
on-going process of identity-formation. They are open to and even seek out 
membership of different networks. They consider, and do internalise, norms 
from diverse sources. They alter the significance assigned to long-standing ideas 
and practices. They sometimes revive traditional norms and values. More often 
they create new or syncretic norms by fusing diverse norms from different 
sources. They model their behaviour in accordance with their knowledge of who 
they are, and what it is that they want. It is not difficult, then, to see that their 
ability to choose is crucial. That choice may relate to their membership of a 
community or religion, or simply the choice of a woman for instance to ‘marry 
out’ of her ethnic or religious community. This study advocates that every 
individual has the right as well as a responsibility to make sense of 
internormativity and to construct his or her own way of life. The state must 
ensure that this is supported, even offered legal protection. In this regard, 
legislation similar to that suggested by Sandberg & Cranmer (2015) that cares 
for genuineness of consent in the context of how the supplementary jurisdiction 
of shari‘a councils could operate would be valuable. They suggest a definition of 
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consent be modelled on the approach taken in the 2003 Sexual Offences Act. 
Inspiration could also be gleaned from the jurisprudence that has developed to 
define duress under s.12 (c) of the 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act. 
 
6.2.2 Acknowledging more substantially the right to be different 
Finally, aside from this dimension of the debate, the issues raised in this study in 
relation to Muslims form a small, but important, component of a much larger 
discussion, that is, the willingness of the state and others to accept the reality of 
the superdiverse nature of contemporary British society. That partly has been 
caused by waves of immigration, more so by the forces of globalisations and 
synchronous technological advancements that define our postmodern age. The 
state’s legal system predominantly is unwilling to constructively deal with 
difference or alterity and what flows from constituents being different. Though 
we have not focused on them to the same extent, the same tendency is 
observable amongst the gatekeepers of shari‘a and ethnic orderings that we have 
examined. Future research needs to explore this more fully as this is a necessary 
aspect if we are to understand the full picture of the ills and accidents of 
multiculturalism that cultural surgeons are trying to cure.  Yet, as our 
respondents showed through their choices, it is their right to choose to either be 
the same or different that is crucial to their well-being. In the final analysis, this 
study suggests that we need to embrace the ‘right to be different’ more positively 
and not with alarm. In relation to the state, this will require some paradigm-
shifts, particularly over how it approaches equality and justice.  
Since the first pieces of anti-discrimination legislation in the 1960s, the state has 
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been exerting effort to ensure that all individuals irrespective of their gender, 
ethnicity, religious, or national background have equal rights, and are treated 
equally before the law. The focus on equalisation of rights is not peculiar to 
Britain – it was at the heart of the early civil rights movement in the United 
States of America. Like all movements it is the product of a particular socio-
historical and cultural context, for it was forged in response to the horrors of 
slavery and inspired by the Christian belief of a brotherhood of believers.338 
From a focus on racial and gender equality in the early years, the movement 
grew to include other characteristics on the basis of which the state came to 
accept there could be inequality in the public sphere. So, in Britain today, 
enshrined in the 2010 Equality Act,339 we have nine protected characteristics, 
but the focus remains as the title of the Act shows on the equalisation of rights or 
entitlements, or using Taylor’s (1994: 37) vocabulary on a ‘politics of 
universalism’.  
The right to formal equal treatment that allows for assimilation is, though, only 
one form of equality, albeit one that has been a particularly successful coloniser. 
An alternative form of equality is the right to have one’s differences recognised 
and supported in the public sphere.340 It is this second conception of equality, 
which more judiciously treats people as equals rather than equally, that needs to 
be embraced. Following Taylor’s (1994) critical essay this alternative approach 
referred to as a ‘politics of difference’ has attracted significant support. 
                                                          
338 Kelly (1992: 105-6) notes, ‘The equality of men, in Christian eyes, arose not from rational 
consideration of the world but from the relationship of humanity to Christ, its Redeemer’. . St. Paul once 
wrote to the Galatians, the Celts of Asia Minor, that all who are baptized, having put on the person of 
Christ, and being all one person in him, are ‘no more Jew or Gentile, no more slave and freeman, no more 
male and female (Gal. 3: 28)’.  
339 The Act consolidated over 100 different pieces of anti-discrimination legislation. 
340 See Taylor (1994 37-42); Modood (1997: 20). 
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Minorities will continue to bring claims related to equal opportunity and equality 
before the law, but, increasingly, claims they bring will be related to their right to 
be different. For them it is insufficient for the state to focus only on the 
equalisation of rights and entitlements in the public sphere. They want their 
mosaic identity to be more substantially recognised and accommodated, and 
they make these demands not as immigrants but as British citizens with a global 
outlook living in a postmodern era. There are justifications that favour the 
adoption of a new approach revealed by this study. As this study shows, people 
are self-creating and self-defining and thus there is no such thing as a uniform 
Muslim, let alone uniform citizens. The state, then, cannot continue applying the 
Aristotelian notion that all individuals are ‘likes’ and therefore should be treated 
identically when it comes to equal treatment (see Fredman 2011: 7-11). 
Recognising difference does not mean that there will be inequality as if this is the 
‘natural’ outcome.  This has long been recognised in other jurisdictions. In a case 
involving a challenge to a university’s admission policy that differentiated 
amongst applicants, the Indian Supreme Court in 1992 noted,  
It is now an accepted jurisprudence and practice that the concept of equality 
before the law and the prohibition of certain kinds of discrimination do not 
require identical treatment. The equality means the relative equality, namely the 
principle to treat equally what are equal and unequally what are unequal. To 
treat unequals differently according to their inequality is not only permitted but 
required [1662].341 
 
This study also shows that what makes individuals ‘themselves’ are their cultural 
                                                          
341 St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630, at 166. 
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affiliations. Their self-identities are partly shaped by the perceptions that others 
have of them. Failure to recognise aspects of a person’s identity, say the religious 
or ethnic characteristics that they hold dear, does have ‘injurious’ consequences, 
not least because a lack of due recognition can impair a person’s self-esteem and 
could lead to self-hatred (see also Honneth 1992: 189; Taylor 1994: 25). It can 
also lead to a ‘reactive’ ethnicity or religiosity in the face of perceived threats 
(see Rumbaut 2008: 3). In the pursuit of equalisation the state has overlooked 
that the greater wrong it could end up inflicting is oppression and subjugation 
through non-recognition of what are perceived to be ‘legitimate’ differences (see 
also Young 1998). Experiences of non-recognition and distortion of their beliefs 
and ways of life have left many Muslims and other minorities feeling imprisoned 
in false or distorted stereotypes that they have found difficult to pierce, and 
hence have had the effect of reducing their mode of being. For these reasons, the 
state has to engage with difference more adequately, rather than ‘glossing over 
it’ and seeking to assimilate those who differ in the image of the majority.  
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